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From the state’s founding in 1949, East Germany’s ruling SED engaged in an exhaustive 
campaign to remove doubts about the country’s legitimacy as an independent state, doubts that 
not only existed abroad, but also at home amongst its own people. Although the Basic Treaty 
between East and West Germany in 1972 officially established diplomatic relations between the 
two countries in 1972, and did much to signal to the world the permanency of the state, the fact 
that the country abruptly dissolved 17 years later tells us much about the precariousness with 
which the GDR (German Democratic Republic) had existed. At no time was the GDR’s existence 
certain, a fact which resulted in persistent efforts by the SED to encourage participation in 
anniversary commemorations in a desperate attempt to create legitimacy.  
Using previously untouched archival documents, this dissertation explores three main 
facets of GDR anniversary commemorations that showcase the ways in which the SED attempted 
to convince the populace of their vision of a distinct GDR identity. The first and most important 
facet was the ideological theses the SED issued in honour of a particular anniversary, which not 
only guided the planning of all celebratory measures, but were also integrated into all cultural 
events, exhibits, group activities, and festivities themselves. The second facet sheds light on the 
ways in which national, regional, and local National Front organizations sought to educate the 
populace on these central anniversary theses by carrying out wide-ranging events, most of which 
were pedagogical in nature, including lectures, forums, publications, exhibitions, and festivals. 
The third facet involves the ways in which National Front organizations carried out “socialist 
competitions” at the national, regional, and local levels during the weeks and months leading up 
to the anniversary itself. Also vital to understanding these anniversary commemorations are the 
tensions between centre and periphery, especially the ways in which national and regional 
 
 v 
National Front committees attempted to work with one another, despite often vast differences in 
opinion, understanding, and available resources. 
Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to show that even though the National Front designed 
the anniversary commemorations to be enjoyable for East Germans, the state nevertheless went to 
great lengths to promote its monopolistic vision of East Germany. The SED sought to strictly 
control their message down to the individual East German: once the SED Politburo’s propaganda 
wing had designed the theses, there was no room for an alternative narrative. While less-than-
positive opinions often came up in theses discussion forums, local National Front committees 
sought to counteract them as part of their efforts to convince East Germans of the state’s point of 
view. In fact, the anniversary commemorations were so ubiquitous that there were virtually 
endless opportunities for the public to hear this point of view, as each GDR citizen could be 
simultaneously involved in local, regional, or national events, ranging from sporting events, to 
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Figure 1. 7-year-old Marlies enjoying the Berlin festivities in honour of the 15th anniversary of the GDR while 
drawing with a friend  (Heiner Hein,”Marlies’ schönste Geburtsgsfeier,” Berliner Zeitung, October 8, 1964, p. 8).  
 
 On the 15th anniversary of the GDR on October 7, 1964, a group of press officials from 
the Berlin daily the Berliner Zeitung explored Berlin’s main popular street festival held on Karl-
Marx-Allee alongside 7-year-old Marlies. In slowly making their way through the throngs of 
people gathered, the whole group saw the festivities through the eyes of a child, carefully noting 
her awe and wonderment at it all. On her journey, Marlies passed by the fairgrounds in front of 
the children’s store, stopped at the food stands, and looked on at the dancing and performers 
singing beloved popular songs along the way. She also stopped to look at the seesaws, slides, and 
to mingle with other children. “She could not get enough of the many, many people, the orchestra 
and the singing groups on the stage of the Feststraße,” the reporters commented, “Marlies wanted 
to join in everything!”1 When asked if she knew whose birthday they were celebrating, Marlies 
                                               
1 Heiner Hein,”Marlies’ schönste Geburtsgsfeier,” Berliner Zeitung, October 8, 1964, p. 8. 
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replied, “I know! Our republic is 15 years old! Our teacher told us that today we are all 
Geburtstagskinder! [birthday boys and girls]” Marlies exclaimed.  
Marlies’ experience of the GDR’s 15th anniversary festivities makes clear the pure joy 
such events could bring the populace. Sociologist David Knottnerus explains how “ritualized 
practices” help collective social identities develop and create emotional impact. This emotion 
serves to create “a sense of collective dependence” amongst those participating.2 This is 
particularly helpful when, as French Revolutionary historian Mona Ozouf points out, festivals are 
used to create a new beginning for a new revolutionary state and society by anchoring the state in 
new symbols and conferring a sense of identity, distinct from the old one.3  
Marking its distinctiveness in the collective minds of the people and creating new 
collective memories was vital to the young GDR’s continued existence. In order to first create a 
distinct identity replete with new (revolutionary) holidays and ideologies, however, the ruling 
SED needed to develop core messages to communicate to the populace. As the following work 
explains, the themes they eventually chose pervaded all aspects of GDR anniversary celebrations 
over the years: the National Front4 designed all manner of festivities from exhibitions, parades, 
events, forums, to public speeches, in order to collectively promote the ideological themes. The 
same message carried across in another vital piece of the GDR anniversary commemorations, that 
of the economic and socialist competitions. Unlike the parades and exhibitions, socialist 
                                               
2 David Knottnerus,“Emotions, Pride and the Dynamics of Collective Ritual Events,” in Gavin B. 
Sullivan, Understanding Collective Pride and Group Identity: New Directions in Emotion Theory, Research and 
Practice (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 46 
3 See Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution. Trans by Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988). 
4 The National Front (NF) was a “collective movement of all parties, mass organizations and associations in the GDR 
under the leadership of the SED, and as such, a political institution that actively influenced sociopolitical processes.” 
See “Die Nationale Front der DDR (NF),” Objekt- und Fotodatenbank Online der Gedenkstätte Museum in der 




competitions on the whole were not exactly glamorous. Rather, they were often extremely 
mundane “friendly competitions” where different organizations, individuals, or enterprises were 
pitted against one another in order raise production efforts, cut inefficiencies, and increase 
economic output. These competitions were so important because much like other states with 
planned economies, the GDR lacked the inherently competitive nature of capitalist economies. 
Even though a main function of these “socialist competitions” was economic, the state still saw 
them as an important means of shaping the identities of GDR citizens, especially given the 
“educationally-focused” nature of the cultural competitions. Widespread participation in these 
competitions in the lead-up to the anniversaries was thus in many ways more important to the 
GDR leadership than the anniversary festivities themselves, as the immense preparation ensured 
East Germans were thoroughly exposed to the SED ideological themes –  that is, the SED’s 
“anniversary theses” – for that year.  
The themes of these “anniversary theses” reflected both domestic and international 
events. During the 1950s and 1960s in particular, the biggest threat to the GDR’s existence was 
its lack of both internal and external legitimacy, for, until 1969-72, only a handful of (Eastern-
Bloc) countries recognized it as a separate state from the West. In addition, West Germany’s 
Hallstein Doctrine – which threatened to cut off diplomatic relations with any state that 
recognized the GDR – continued to undermine the GDR internationally. Thus, GDR rhetoric in 
these very early years could only claim legitimacy based on its adoption of socialism and the fact 
that it was following in the Soviet Union’s revolutionary footsteps. In an effort to create a more 
favourable contrast during these years, East German ideological rhetoric also attempted to 
undermine West Germany’s own legitimacy by arguing that the West was a warmongering, 
exploitative, dogmatic, Nazi-infected, imperialist state.  
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As a result of this hardline position, the GDR sought, for nearly its full 40 years of 
existence, to justify the necessity of the GDR’s close relationship with the Soviet Union by 
encouraging GDR citizens to develop connections with Soviet citizens. The only problem with 
this was that much of the populace did not seem to have a favourable opinion of the Soviets, 
either in the early years or later on. This hostility did not deter the National Front, however, from 
creating competition after competition, year after year, that touted the benefits of a close German-
Soviet relationship, even once the GDR began to achieve its own economic successes and 
international recognition.  
With the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the resulting closing of the border that 
stopped young, educated people from leaving for the West, the GDR was able to achieve a 
modicum of economic success.  The anniversary theses reflected this change: instead of 
attempting to convince the people of the GDR to stay in the East, the theses switched to a focus 
on achieving internal legitimacy by convincing East Germans that they were part of a greater 
socialist ideal through instilling pride in the GDR’s accomplishments and growing sense of 
identity. Following the “normalizing” of relations with West Germany in 1972 and the resulting 
international recognition of the GDR as a permanent, independent state, the GDR anniversary 
theses became more confident and emphasized the clear superiority of socialism – proven by not 
only their economic successes, but also by the very generous social policies that benefitted the 
entire population during this time. Despite imminent economic collapse by the 1980s, the SED’s 
anniversary theses completely diverged from reality and the SED doubled down on their previous 
themes about their international acclaim and economic prowess, asserting the stability and 
prosperity of their state.  
While it was the responsibility of the Berlin National Front to design events and 
competitions based on the anniversary theses, Berlin relied on its regional branch committees, 
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particularly mid-level officials, to transform their ideas into ground-level activities. These 
bureaucrats were vital to the functioning of the GDR dictatorship. For the ways in which they 
carried out the national campaigns at the Bezirk (state), Kreis (county) and local National Front 
committee levels were key to the ultimate success of the festivities and socialist competitions in 
the GDR, as it was through these competitions and festivities (events) that the populace 
interacted with the themes on a practical level.  
Too often the focus in GDR historiography has been on those at the very top of the state 
apparatus or, more recently, those at the grassroots level. But that view does not fully capture 
how the GDR functioned. Neither the SED nor the National Front in Berlin designed the majority 
of commemorations in any detail and the anniversary celebrations and competitions were 
certainly not a spontaneous grassroots affair. A vast range of officials at the Bezirk or Kreis level 
could be counted as belonging to this important mid-tier, with everyone having varying degrees 
of responsibility – from those who belonged to the National Front and its constituent mass 
organizations in some leadership capacity, to those who were part of the National Front’s task 
forces created for the anniversary commemorations, to local officials who organized city district 
festivals, to officials who sat on subcommittees. All helped organize, popularize, and carry out 
the commemorations. It was these people who made decisions on how to design the 
commemorations as well as who assisted in overseeing and judging the locals on their 
decorations or submissions to a competition. Such officials were vital “cogs” in the SED 
machine, for it was they who kept it running. Thus, even though the top level of the state 
machinery was still very much in control, it does not seem quite as all-powerful as traditionally 
presented when one considers how completely reliant it was on these mid-level bureaucrats to 
implement its ideological goals at the lower levels.   
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This vital role of the intermediaries was a major feature of the tensions between centre 
and periphery, which plagued the organizational process of competitions through the years. In the 
early years, Berlin insisted on as much ideological uniformity in their message across the regions 
as possible, criticizing regional committees that diverged from their often-unrealistic instructions. 
Meanwhile, the regions complained about a lack of clear guidelines, support, and financial 
assistance. In later years, these goals changed ever so slightly: Berlin began to be satisfied to see 
popular participation in the competitions, no matter how the regions managed to achieve these 
results, as long as the ideological message was still present. 
It is this question of how the SED continually tried to keep these themes first and 
foremost in the public imagination that this dissertation seeks to explore. Looking through the 
lens of the state trying to create a GDR identity, this work explores three main facets of GDR 
anniversary commemorations.  Chapter One discusses the first and most important facet, which 
are the ideological theses the SED would issue in honour of a particular anniversary, intending 
for the theses to not only guide the planning of all celebratory measures, but also to be integrated 
into cultural events, exhibits, group activities, and festivities themselves. Core anniversary theses 
that the SED repeatedly made use of included the continued threat posed by West Germany, the 
necessity of the GDR’s “friendship” with the Soviet Union, the East German citizens’ thriving 
economic and social lives, as well as the GDR’s ever-increasing international legitimacy. 
Chapter Two examines the second facet of GDR commemorations, which was how national, 
regional, and local National Front organizations sought to educate the populace on these central 
anniversary theses by carrying out wide-ranging events and activities, most of which were 
pedagogical in nature, including lectures, forums, publications, exhibitions, and festivals. 
Chapter Three investigates the third facet of GDR commemorations, which were the “socialist 
competitions” (sozialistische Wettbewerbe) at the national, regional, and local levels during the 
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weeks and months leading up to the anniversary itself. Although the main function of these 
competitions was economic – especially in achieving the state’s goal of “catching up without 
overtaking” the West – due to their occurrence at every level of society (from the national level 
all the way down to the apartment-complex association (Hausgemeinschaft) level), the 
competitions were also a means of reinforcing the anniversary themes to GDR citizens. Given 
their ubiquity, I have chosen to investigate a variety of cultural and economic competitions from 
the national to the local level. An additional consideration affecting the success of these events 
and competitions are the tensions between centre and periphery and how they attempted to work 
with each other, despite often vast differences in opinion, understanding, and available resources.  
Using examples of GDR anniversaries that best showcase such a wide array of themes, 
this dissertation explores a great wealth of previously untouched archival material from the late 
1950s to late 1970s, such as the 40th and 60th anniversaries of the October Revolution in 1957 and 
1977; the 15th (1964), 20th (1965), and 30th (1979) anniversaries of the GDR’s founding; the 30th 
Anniversary of the “Liberation from Fascism” (the end of World War II) in 1975, as well as the 
theses from the 750th Anniversary of Berlin in 1987. This study begins in 1957 with the 40th 
Anniversary of the October Revolution, the earliest anniversary that the GDR celebrated in a 
major way. If commemorations can be considered to be – as I argue in this work – a stabilizing 
and legitimizing force in which to recreate new national narratives, then during the uncertain 
1950s, the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution was simply the earliest largest 
commemoration that best served the SED’s goals. This anniversary served as an auspicious first 
commemoration with very few drawbacks, since it celebrated the overthrowing of capitalism in 
favour of a socialist system that had now endured for 40 years. In fact, celebrating the great 
beginning of the first socialist state made it clear to those at home and abroad that the GDR was a 
firm part of the Eastern Bloc. The 40th anniversary also provided the ideal opportunity for the 
 
 8 
SED to reinvent German history by proclaiming how long communism’s roots in Germany were, 
while at the same time presenting the Nazi period as a diversion from Germany’s original 
(correct) communist course – a diversion that West Germany was still a part of. Outside the 
purview of this study are the more focused celebrations that organizers designed around specific 
topics or themes, such as the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther in 1983,5 the 
anniversaries celebrating the founding of the KPD (Communist Party) or the SED, the GDR’s 
celebrations in honour of the 25th anniversary of Kristallnacht in 1962, or even the 120th 
anniversary of the 1848 revolutions in 1968. Neither does this study concern itself with the yearly 
May Day celebrations, which, as an annual occurrence, the National Front could not invest the 
same extensive and massive preparation into, such as by creating anniversary theses to be 
communicated to the populace.  
At the end of their tour through the crowded Karl-Marx-Allee, Marlies pronounced the 
festival as “the best birthday party I’ve been to!” and told those accompanying her that “at school 
[tomorrow] I’ll have so much to talk about!”6 Although the National Front was very happy with 
such a result –  especially in piquing the interest of such a young person – the real work for the 
reporters at the Berliner Zeitung was in crafting this scene to its readership afterwards. For 
example, the newspaper quoted Marlies as asking those accompanying her how many people 
were present, to which they estimated “hundreds of thousands.” Also woven into Marlies’ story, 
as reported by the newspaper, was the fact that she walked by the area in which, “moments 
before,” a group of Pioneers, FDJ, and other children had just presented GDR leader Walter 
Ulbricht with a symbolic “Book of Good Deeds,” listing the achievements of ordinary GDR 
                                               
5 For a discussion of the Luther commemorations in 1983, see Jon Berndt Olsen, Tailoring Truth: Politicizing the 
Past and Negotiating Memory in East Germany, 1945–1990 (New York: Berghahn, 2015), p. 148-163. 
6 Heiner Hein,”Marlies’ schönste Geburtsgsfeier,” Berliner Zeitung, October 8, 1964, p. 8. 
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citizens in building up socialism. In thus describing everything that the Feststraße had had to 
offer, especially the awe and wonderment of a child’s perspective, the newspaper was attempting 
to promote the Berlin festivities, to attract public interest in the remaining celebrations, and to 
create a memory of this event – one of “music, laughter and dancing everywhere” – that would 
stick in people’s minds until the next anniversary celebration.7 This role of the press or “work 
with the press” as the National Front often termed it, was something they expected of all 
newspapers in the GDR. The National Front committees large and small were always expected to 
be in connection with the press, promoting the work they had all done in creating not only 
festivities such as this, but also the far less glamourous socialist competitions in the weeks and 
months leading up to the anniversary. Far more important to the SED and National Front was that 
the East German populace went away having absorbed (on the surface at least) the ideological 
message presented to them that anniversary. 
  
                                               







This dissertation is built upon many different historiographies. It is most clearly a cultural 
history that explores the preparation, organization and implementation undertaken by the 
National Front in order to make the GDR’s anniversary commemorations a success. In this 
respect, it follows the works of those who were writing after the cultural turn in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, most notably those in other fields such as the French Revolution. It is also a political 
history of the GDR due to its main primary source material: although public opinion is used 
wherever possible, all of the sources in this dissertation are state-based sources, mostly from the 
National Front, the GDR’s Department of Culture, and the SED Politburo (such as the papers of 
Kurt Hager, chief ideologue of the SED), all of which are located in the German federal archives 
in Berlin-Lichterfelde. I supplemented these Bundesarchiv findings with some from the Berlin 
Landesarchiv, as well as from newspapers like the state-run Neues Deutschland and the Berlin 
daily Berliner Zeitung, and a few regional newspapers, such as that of Freie Presse. All of these 
sources provided this work with some useful additional perspectives.8 
At the same time, this is also a work of social history, one that looks at the GDR’s 
organizing powers from the national level to the lowest of levels – that of the apartment-complex 
association (Hausgemeinschaft). In this regard, the dissertation has a dual top-down and bottom-
up focus: while the sources are all indeed state-based sources, the voices represented within them 
are not just those of top officials like Hager; instead, they come from the very bottom of the state 
apparatus, the volunteer National Front organizers in the small villages and towns across the 
GDR, who translated Berlin’s often rather lofty goals for its celebrations into much more 
manageable competitions and festivities. This means that this work is situated between political 
                                               
8 While I located some of these newspapers in the federal archive, most of my access was made possible through the 
Zefys portal of the Berlin state library (the Staatsbibliothek). 
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and socio-cultural histories of the GDR, something which is entirely necessary given the former 
heated debates over whether the GDR had been an illegitimate dictatorial regime or whether East 




Although few works address festival commemorations in East German historiography, the 
approach taken by scholars of other time periods, especially the French Revolution, show the 
ways in which festivals can assist in creating a sense of identity and legitimacy in a new 
“revolutionary” state. For example, following the fall of the Ancien Regime, the French 
revolutionaries, much like the East Germans a century-and-a-half later, needed to construct an 
identity for their new revolutionary state and at the same time, underscore how this new state 
would constitute a complete break with the past, including the repurposing or abolition of the 
symbols of the old system.  
Unlike other areas in memory theory, festival commemorations have been investigated by 
far fewer scholars on the whole. Nevertheless, there are some very important works that can be 
used to illuminate the issues in the field. These works came about as a result of interest in cultural 
history, beginning at the end of the 1970s. At the vanguard of this tradition are the scholars of the 
French Revolution, especially François Furet, Maurice Agulhon, and Mona Ozouf. Furet led the 
way with a focus on revolutionary rhetoric that helped to understand political ideology.9 Agulhon 
focused on revolutionary symbols and how these shaped peoples’ political views, while Lynn 
                                               
9 See François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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Hunt wrote about how symbolic practices like language, images, and even everyday political 
activities established a break with the past and thereby created new social and political groups.10  
One of the earliest and best works about the principle function fulfilled by festivals is by 
Mona Ozouf, who wrote about the French revolutionary festivals in her 1976 work La Fête 
révolutionnaire (1789-1799). For the first time, Ozouf demonstrated how revolutionary festivals 
were important in their own right, especially how they could “recast space and time” in order to 
develop “a new community based on new values.”11 These new revolutionary festivals were 
intended to create a new order in place of the fallen Ancien Regime, replete with new markers of 
identity and nation that could quickly take the place of the old ones. As Ozouf explains, erasing 
the particularly long-rooted Catholic rituals in favour of a completely new revolutionary 
symbolism was a difficult thing to do. The new rulers had to establish the Revolution as the 
beginning of a new republican era in order to break with the past and signal a new beginning. The 
goal was to use festivals to do this, which meant new symbolic objects and events needed to be 
chosen to celebrate. By marking the beginning of this new era with a festival, legislators would 
therefore be “plac[ing] the new time beyond dispute and [showing] that history derived from a 
founding act.... [in order] to have ‘a fixed point to which all other events might henceforth be 
related.’”12 In this respect, Ozouf’s views are rooted in Durkheim’s theories on the function of 
religion in organizing society. On the collective and cohesive role of the festival, Ozouf 
comments:  
By dint of repetition, the sacred, beneficent atmosphere of mythical times could be 
resuscitated. Through contemplation, recitation, or, better, by a miming of the glorious 
days that were the Revolution’s age of innocence, faith would be rekindled through 
                                               
10 See for example, Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-
1880 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French 
Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 12-13. 
11 Lynn Hunt, forward in Mona Ozouf, Festivals and the French Revolution. Trans by Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, 
Mass; London: Harvard University Press, 1988). x-xi.  
12 Ozouf, Festivals, 159.   
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contact with heroism. By transporting the past into the present, the historical rite 
conferred the virtues of the former upon the latter.13  
In addition, Ozouf points out that there were many different versions of the same festival that 
were performed: local ones in addition to the large national ones. All festivals, even those that 
differed, however, were still linked by revolutionary traditions and conceived of in an identical 
way.14 The result is that scholars can use the revolutionary festivals as a measure for how the 
Revolution was progressing at that moment in time.15  
As was the case with the festivals of the French Revolution, the organizers of early Soviet 
festivals had to find a way to mark the new era and both create and legitimize new revolutionary 
traditions. In his work on early Bolshevik festivals (1918-20) during the Civil War, James von 
Geldern confirms much of what Ozouf argues for the case of the French festivals: as a new 
revolutionary regime, the Soviets faced a variety of challenges in presenting their new ideas to a 
populace entrenched in the older traditions of the Orthodox Church and the fallen Romanov 
autocratic traditions. For example, a Bolshevik calendar of holidays existed for a time alongside a 
competing old Orthodox one.16 Initially, the Bolsheviks looked to the festivals of the French 
Revolution and those of ancient Greek tragedy for their inspiration. However, this proved a 
miscalculation as the populace did not connect with such traditions. Besides unclear 
communication with the people, the propaganda lacked a central cohesive structure.”17 A year 
later in 1919, the Bolsheviks corrected their course and attempted to work in some of the rich 
traditions of imperial Russia that were more familiar to the populace in combination with their 
                                               
13 Ozouf, Festivals, 167.  
14 Ozouf, Festivals, 25.  
15 Ozouf, Festivals, 65. 
16 James von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 7.  
17 Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 7.  
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own new Marxist-based ideas.18 Von Geldern argues that one particularly good way of 
incorporating both was in the area of theatre performances: an already strong tradition with which 
the Russian population was familiar and a good way to conspicuously insert propaganda.  
Another feature of these festivals was that the Soviets presented their regime as being the 
culmination of a long tradition. In this way, they could present themselves as legitimate rulers 
instead of as usurping rebels, which, in combination with a stricter and better managed 
organizational festival structure created by 1920, lent Bolshevik rule even more legitimacy. In 
addition, a better centred and focused narrative helped establish the Revolution as inevitable.19 
Ultimately, in light of the continued existence of political opposition, these early Soviet festivals 
were, according to Von Geldern, “a bid for political legitimacy, an attempt to lend the Revolution 
a sacred aura.”20 
In her work on Soviet festivals of a slightly later time period, during the Stalinist terror of 
the 1930s, Karen Petrone provides an insight into the way that these celebrations helped create 
new identities such as that of the “New Soviet Man.” Petrone describes these identities as “highly 
variable, contingent, and constantly in the process of being reshaped.”21 She argues that these 
celebrations were not always successful with all members of the population, being generally 
more accepted by the youth, as well as by those rising to prominence within the elite, but not 
generally with workers or farmers.22 These celebrations, as part of everyday life in contrast to 
“‘circuses’ that would divert the population from the terror,” actually reinforced social power 
                                               
18 Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 209; 7. An example is of the Soviets officially sanctioning workers’ 
demonstrations (which were banned under the Tsars) and incorporating them into the official celebrations by having 
them carry their banners. 
19 Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 210.  
20 Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 209.  
21 Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin. (Bloomington, Ind: 
Indiana University Press, 2000), 204. 
22 Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 204. 
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dynamics because they “supplied the raw materials out of which Soviet cadres constructed their 
own identities.”23 While these identities could in theory be shared with others, this did not happen 
very often, particularly at the local level: local celebrations often diverged from the official plan, 
turning into “apolitical dances, a cover for religious practices or, worse, yet, drunken brawls.”24  
Part of the reason for this lack of interest at the local level could have had to do with the 
fact that the main focus of attention was lavished on larger urban centres such as Moscow, which, 
as the centres of power, had more resources allocated to them and were thus able to host bigger 
and better celebrations. Indeed, officials at the centre did not have a lot of control over 
countryside celebrations or those in non-Russian areas.25  It was in this way that the success at 
creating a Soviet identity decreased from centre to periphery. Also important for understanding 
how people perceived the celebrations were social hierarchies. Petrone writes that Soviet 
celebrations enabled elites to affirm their place in society through exclusive invitations to events 
or receiving expensive food and goods, while those of lower social standing had their inferior 
position affirmed through a lack of invitations or less access to key events.26  
  Unlike some of the other scholars, Malte Rolf investigates a much broader time period 
than some of the other studies, looking at the entire period of Soviet festivals from 1917 to 1991, 
with a particular focus on the years 1917 to 1941. Like the others, Rolf seeks to explain how the 
Soviets conceived and organized festivals in an attempt to gain control of the masses. In contrast 
to some of the other authors, however, in particular Von Geldern, Rolf focuses more on the 
repressive authoritarian nature of the festivals. He contextualizes Soviet festivals by comparing 
the ways in which they created authority and legitimacy with other authoritarian regimes of the 
                                               
23 Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 205. 
24 Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 205. 
25 Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 203-4. 
26 Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, 203. 
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time period, i.e. Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, finding similarities in their aesthetics 
and methods. With his longer time frame, Rolf looks to answer how these festivals helped the 
Soviet leaders sustain power over time and legitimize their rule. An important aspect in asserting 
this control was the use of propaganda: the festivals helped the Soviets attempt to create their 
new order by making their message highly visible and easily disseminated.   
Ultimately though, as also highlighted by Von Geldern and Ozouf, the initial problem 
Rolf identifies as facing the Soviets was how to successfully break with old tsarist traditions in 
order to create their own legitimacy: “The Soviet prazdnik [festival] had to alter traditional 
celebration customs, fuse with them, or replace them.” 27 It was thus during the 1930s that the 
Soviet festivals became even more centralized and controlled, while opposing voices were stifled. 
Rolf comments that celebrations were “oppressive…social partitioning” that were “one of the 
important cultural tools of the formative power of the regime that assigned every participant his 
or her place in the social hierarchy.”28 Thus, the creation of a “well-developed planning 
apparatus,” including a “network of commissions” to successfully communicate the message and 
execute the festivals in the regions was crucial.29 Despite the increased centralized control, 
decision-making continued to be made at top levels, while the majority of the festival 
organization was left to the so-called “middle cadre,” who made decisions both in Moscow and in 
the regions.30 
Another advantage of his vast temporal range is that Rolf is able to examine the influence 
that these Soviet festivals had on the countries of the Soviet Bloc after 1945. He comments that 
                                               
27 Malte Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 1917-1991, trans. Cynthia Klohr (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2013), 4. 
28 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 93. 
29 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 2. 
30 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 11. Rolf comments that the identities of this group are generally unknown, as the 
documents drawn up are largely anonymous.  
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celebrations were a major part of “the total package of sovietization” that was given to the Soviet 
satellite states, including the GDR. 31 This was essentially part of the breaking with the old 
regime and the establishment of the new states as “part and parcel of Stalinist culture and, in the 
eyes of the propagandists, an aesthetically adequate expression of the ‘new times.’”32 The 
occupying forces began this process by helping Sovietize national holidays, which in the end 
helped give the new states a degree of legitimacy when founding their own regimes.  
Of the 250th anniversary commemorations of Petrograd in 1957, Emily Johnson argues 
much along the same lines as Rolf and Petrone regarding the relationship between centre and 
periphery. She shows how interconnected but yet separate the two were: the local offices inquired 
from top officials as to the plans for the celebrations, but they did not follow such instructions to 
the letter. Mid-tier officials would also have to enquire as to the correct ideology and terminology 
when creating the wording template to be used for the festivals.33 Johnson also points out that the 
relationship between centre and periphery was not entirely top-down: there was quite a lot of 
“give and take.” The periphery could potentially benefit greatly from holding celebrations by 
receiving benefits from the centre, such as resources for construction/restoration projects, awards 
to distribute, and even a spotlight for local cultural and economic projects.34  
However, more so than the others, Johnson’s work focuses on the influence that current 
events and political climate had on the development of large commemorative festivals. In 
describing the delay in holding anniversary celebrations in 1957 instead of 1953 (the year of the 
actual 250th anniversary), Johnson argues that 1957 was a greater opportunity from a political 
                                               
31 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 183.  
32 Rolf, Soviet Mass Festivals, 183  
33 Emily D. Johnson, “Jubilation Deferred: The Belated Commemoration of the 250th Anniversary of St. Petersburg/
Leningrad,” in Julie A. Buckler and Emily D. Johnson (eds) Rites of Place: Public Commemoration in Russia and 
Eastern Europe (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 83-84. 
34 Johnson, “Jubilation Deferred,” 83. 
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standpoint, given the context of Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s 1956 speech and the climate of de-
Stalinization. 1957 was thus a better year in which to reinvent the political narrative of socialism 
and potential for the future, especially given that it was also the 40th anniversary year of the 
October Revolution.35  
Although not a “revolutionary” state like the Soviet Union, West Germany also needed to 
establish a break with the recent (Nazi) past in order to legitimize its international position within 
the Western Bloc. In one of the few works examining West German commemorations, 
specifically those of the end of World War II (May 8, 1945), Jeffery K. Olick highlights the ways 
in which the international and domestic political situation intensely affected the form these 
anniversaries took. For example, Olick characterizes the 1950s as a time of “avoid[ing] the past 
by focusing on the future.”36 Reflecting on the past was very difficult for the West German state 
in these early years and there was no time for guilt; rather, the focus was on rebuilding the 
country. Then there was the fact that old narratives still existed, such as the 1918 stab in the back 
theory as well as Nazi rhetoric about the necessity of defeating Bolshevism.37 Thus, it is 
unsurprising that even though there were achievements to celebrate such as working out 
reparations with Israel, integration into West, or even finally achieving sovereignty, there was no 
commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the end of the War on May 8, 1955.38 
By the 1960s, a new generation of West Germans who did not have their parents’ same 
sense of loss or victimization began to demand a re-evaluation of German identity and 
responsibility.39 It was these popular feelings that brought Willy Brandt and the Social Democrats 
                                               
35 Johnson, “Jubilation Deferred,” 95. 
36 Jeffrey K. Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations 
in the Federal Republic of Germany,” American Sociological Review 64, no. 3 (June 1999), 386. 
37 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 386. 
38 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 387. Note: this was especially the case given the Nazis’ heavy use of spectacle.  
39 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 388. 
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to power in 1969 and enabled détente with the East by 1972 (known as Ostpolitik). It was in this 
new political climate in 1970 that West Germany’s first official commemoration of May 8 took 
place on the 25th anniversary of the end of World War II.40 In examining President Heinemann 
and Chancellor Brandt’s speeches on the day of the celebrations, Olick notes a major shift in tone 
from the politicians of the past: while Heinemann did consider Germans to be victims, he did not 
focus on the details of their suffering. Brandt’s speech also highlighted the universality of 
victimhood, and while he considered 1945 a “tragedy,” he importantly did not refer to it as an 
“injustice” as others had before.41 As time went on, such “normalizing” elements began to grow 
stronger. Five years later, in his speech at the 30th anniversary celebrations in 1975, new Social 
Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, amid a global oil crisis, attempted to normalize West 
Germany by pointing out that they should be able to celebrate May 8th just as much as the Allied 
countries.42  
This normalization narrative carried on into the 1980s, although conservative Chancellor 
Kohl also adopted stronger rhetoric towards the East than previous governments and included 
more language of patriotic pride. Olick writes that “Kohl pursued a symbolic rehabilitation of 
German identity and history that demanded from Western powers a gesture of forgiveness for the 
Nazi past (indeed, of forgetting it).”43 While not invited to the Allied 40th anniversary 
celebrations of D-Day in 1944 as he had hoped, Kohl gave his own speech in Bergen-Belsen that 
Olick describes as an “in-between solution,” where Kohl attempted to “accept responsibility 
while emptying it of political content.”44 It was, however, President Richard von Weiszäcker’s 
                                               
40 Note: the GDR began celebrating the end of the Second World War five years earlier in time for the 20th 
anniversary in 1965. 
41 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 390.  
42 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 390. 
43 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 393. 
44 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 394. 
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speech to the Bundestag on May 8, 1985 that proved historic for West Germany’s memory 
politics. As Olick explains, what is significant here is that Von Weiszäcker directly confronted 
the “basic national memory myth” and distinguished between different types of guilt and 
responsibility. He argued that German guilt was individual, and not a collective guilt that would 
carry on with the younger generations. Von Weiszäcker did acknowledge, however, that the 
blame for Nazi atrocities lay not only with Hitler, but also with those ordinary Germans who 
claimed that they did not know.45  Von Weiszäcker thus advised Germans that the task at hand 
was to view the 40th anniversary of May 8 not as day of celebration, but rather as a day for 
remembering everyone’s suffering (including the minorities who perished, but were rarely 
acknowledged) and for reminding future generations to not close their eyes to current inhumanity 
as that would “risk infection.”46  
As we can see from these examples, festivals helped revolutionary societies establish their 
legitimacy, clearly demarcating how the new regimes were breaking with the traditions and 
regimes which they had overthrown. The newly-founded GDR had to break with the Nazi past as 
well, and even though it did so by attaching itself to the tradition that the Soviets themselves had 
fought to establish 30 years before, the GDR still needed to establish its own brand of German 
socialism and convince the populace that sovietisation was one way of achieving this. The East 
Germans also had to distinguish themselves from the West Germans and make clear that West 
Germany inherently lacked legitimacy, not only because it had failed to break with its Nazi past, 
but because of the inherently exploitative nature of its capitalist system. 
                                               
45 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 396. 
46 Olick, “Genre Memories,” 396. 
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The Debate over GDR Authoritarianism 
Although East German rhetoric pointing out West Germany’s failure to fully move on 
from its Nazi past was certainly exaggerated, a culture of silence surrounding German guilt did 
pervade German society for the better part of two decades following the end of World War II. 
When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there was great anxiety amongst politicians in the newly 
unified Germany to not repeat the same mistakes that had been made before; namely the fact that 
West Germans had insufficiently dealt with their Nazi past. This time, politicians, scholars, and 
indeed some of the public at large, placed great importance in the years following unification in 
1990 on “getting it right,” that is, correctly and thoroughly “working through” the darker aspects 
of the GDR past rather than “coming to terms” with them.47 For “working through the past” 
(Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung) in comparison to the more famous “coming to terms with the past” 
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung) that was undertaken in dealing with Germany’s Nazi past, 
acknowledges the process to be an ongoing one that may never reach a definitive conclusion.48  
 The problem with this anxiousness of “putting things right” was that in many ways, this 
impulse to analyze and work through GDR history was undertaken too quickly and too soon, thus 
resulting in a charged political climate. In January 1992, barely two years after the fall of the 
Wall and only one year after the state’s official dissolution, the archives of the GDR’s secret spy 
service, the Ministry for State Security (more commonly known as the “Stasi”), were made 
available to the public.49 As many former East Germans began streaming into the archives, they 
                                               
47 See Helga A. Welsh, “When Discourse Trumps Policy: Transitional Justice in Unified Germany.” German 
Politics 15, no. 2 (2006): 137–52.; Andrew H. Beattie, Playing Politics with History: the Bundestag Inquiries into 
East Germany. New York: Berghahn Books, 2008. 
2008 
48 Welsh, “When Discourse Trumps Policy,” 138.   
49 For more on this issue, see Gary Bruce, “Access to Secret Police Files, Justice, and Vetting in East Germany since 
1989,” German Politics & Society 26, no. 1 (2008): 82 -111. 
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were outraged to discover trusted friends and family who had worked informally for the Stasi. 
The media soon became fixated on such stories of betrayal and ended up over-emphasizing the 
role of the Stasi in comparison to that of the ruling party.50 Time and again, person after person 
was “exposed” in public as having collaborated with the Stasi.51 This negative view of the GDR 
was not only a construction of the media, however, as many German politicians also presented 
the GDR as now the second dictatorship of the twentieth century with which Germans would 
need to come to terms. As such, at this time, everyone from politicians to journals to the public at 
large, described the GDR using negative descriptors such as the SED dictatorship (SED-
Diktatur), an unjust and illegitimate state (Unrechtsstaat or Unrechtsregime), or a tyrannous 
dictatorship (Gewaltherrschaft), all of which only further served to firmly link the GDR to the 
Third Reich.52 As Andrew H. Beattie points out, “[t]he fact that the East German regime had not 
committed genocide was not to be allowed to prevent it being condemned as vigorously as the 
Nazi regime.”53 
This debate within the public and political spheres spilled over into the historical 
profession during the 1990s, with countless number of academic works forcefully condemning 
the GDR as yet another totalitarian state of the twentieth century. Catherine Epstein characterizes 
the situation as one where, due to the charged political climate in which they were writing, 
scholars in Germany in particular felt a need to “stake out” the history of the GDR with the 
totalitarian model in mind much more so than those working elsewhere, such as in the US or 
                                               
50 Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 54-55.  
51 People like Christa Wolf, for example. 
52 Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 199. In 1992 and 1995 the German Bundestag commissioned two separate 
Enquete Commissions (inquries) into the history and consequences of the “SED-Dictatorship in Germany.” Beattie 
notes that the conclusions of the Enquete Commissions, while having done a very thorough exploration of the past, 
were still limited in some respects, namely in their focus on victim narratives to the neglect of a “normalized” view 
(232).  
53 Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 198. 
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Britain.54 One of the most clear examples of this comes from Klaus Schroeder, who 
unequivocally defines the GDR as a totalitarian regime in his famous work Der SED-Staat 
(1999).55 Klaus-Dietmar Henke takes a similar, yet more cautious view: he argues that the 
totalitarian paradigm, while very useful in identifying the characteristics and structures of such 
regimes, can sometimes be overly simplistic. 56 Ultimately, however, Henke defines the GDR as 
an authoritarian regime, specifically of a “late-authoritarian” type.57 Christoph Kleßmann also 
sees the usefulness in using totalitarianism to explain certain structural elements within both the 
Third Reich and the GDR.58 Kleßmann observes certain similarities in these systems, such as the 
harsh penalties that people could suffer from merely grumbling about everyday life, and he 
argues that there was very little space for the existence of a private sphere free from the influence 
of the state.59  
In line with Hannah Arendt’s definition of totalitarianism, Armin Mitter and Stefan Wolle 
in their 1993 book, Untergang auf Raten, argue that the GDR had been in a state of continuous 
civil war. While Mitter and Wolle do address aspects of the GDR’s history from below, their 
main focus is on the state’s repressive qualities, especially the development of the state’s power 
mechanisms, which drew regular people into collaborating with state repression. As stated in the 
title, the authors focus on the GDR’s decline in stages, such as the Soviet tanks’ role in 
preventing the state’s collapse in the aftermath of the 1953 workers’ uprising; how the state dealt 
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with the 1956 and 1968 protests elsewhere; the 1961 building of the Wall; as well as the final 
collapse with the revolution of 1989.60 Wolle continues this strand of thought in his later work, 
Die Heile Welt der Diktatur (1998). Here, Wolle further makes clear the Orwellian nature of the 
Stasi’s web of interference into the private lives of citizens, describing a society that was 
“poisoned to the core” containing people who were essentially made of “glass.”61 In a rather 
dramatic fashion, Wolle compares the GDR’s downfall to that of the Sphinx in Greek mythology, 
who, after losing her power to terrorize people once Oedipus solved her riddle, grew despondent 
and threw herself over a precipice.62  
By the end of the 1990s, the tide began to turn against this authoritarian narrative.63 
Konrad Jarausch describes the problem with the totalitarian theory that scholars had been using to 
describe the GDR as relying too heavily on Hannah Arendt’s definition of it. Jarausch criticizes 
Arendt’s version of totalitarianism, arguing that it was based on a “Stalinist understanding of 
communism” stemming from observations of methods of rule in the early 1950s and 1960s, 
which did not take into account later developments in the Soviet states.64 Perhaps most 
vigorously of all, Mary Fulbrook completely condemns the totalitarian approach, arguing that 
besides it stemming from a sense of “superiority” many in the West felt for having “won” the 
Cold War, it was nothing more than a reversion to Cold War discourses of the 1950s and 1960s 
where the West viewed the GDR as merely “a totalitarian dictatorship imposed by the 
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Communists on an unwilling populace.”65 Others held a similar view, and a surge in scholars and 
even members of the German public began to feel that the totalitarian discourse had gone too far 
and failed to explain how average citizens had been able to lead very normal lives in spite of 
living in a dictatorship. After more than a decade of living in the capitalist West, many former 
East Germans, in particular, had become nostalgic towards certain aspects of their earlier lives. 
With the explosion in popularity of this discourse, the GDR past was often viewed during this 
time period in a nostalgic, rose-tinted fashion. In fact, this discourse came to dominate media 
discourses on the GDR — thus effectively “normalizing” the GDR and significantly swinging the 
pendulum in the opposite direction. 
It was Mary Fulbrook herself who has been the main proponent of this so-called 
“normalization discourse.”66 Fulbrook has argued that during the totalitarian discourse of the 
1990s, the average former East German would have felt that their “perfectly ordinary lives” had 
been “drowned out by the narratives of power and oppression or, when heard, rapidly rejected as 
a form either of political apologetics or retrospective nostalgia.”67 Fulbrook goes on to explain 
that “[o]f course [the GDR] was a dictatorship. But it was not only a dictatorship.”68 Not only 
does Fulbrook argue that the totalitarian approach has done little to explain the complexities of 
life within the GDR, but she also sees the GDR as comparable to other modern industrial 
societies, reasoning that “[t]here is no modern society in which people’s individual lives… are 
not in some way affected by the political system in which they live.”69 Furthermore, Fulbrook 
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suggests that it is “a false dichotomy to suggest that states are based either on coercion or on 
consent,” preferring to classify the GDR as a “participatory dictatorship” that people took part in 
for a wide variety of reasons.70 Aligned with Fulbrook in this view are those such as Esther von 
Richthofen, for example, who, in Bringing Culture to the Masses (2009) writes about cultural life 
in the GDR, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, and argues that citizens’ cultural life was 
not solely determined by politics or repression. Indeed, Richthofen cautions against defining 
GDR cultural life as having been a reaction that developed in response to oppression.71 She states 
that while cultural life did have some “strong dictatorial overtures,” the people still had enough 
agency in this aspect of their lives, especially with respect to some grassroots organizations.72  
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, other scholars attempted to find a middle ground 
within these polarizing normalization and totalitarian debates. As early as the mid-1990s, Bernd 
Faulenbach began to argue that while the political life of the GDR was not divorced from the 
everyday Alltag, there existed niche areas of life that were less influenced by the party and the 
Stasi, specifically an “Eigensinn” in consciousness and action.73 Furthermore, Faulenbach points 
out that while the GDR’s high-Stalinist phase in the 1950s did have some authoritarian traits, the 
state’s crimes simply did not compare to those of the Nazi regime.74 Jarausch also suggests that 
totalitarian theory, which while useful for classification purposes, can lead to too much focus on 
state oppression.75 Thus, while totalitarian theory can be a good first step in an analysis, using it 
after that runs the risk of “glossing over complex realties and of simplifying difficult ethical 
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situations.”76 Jarausch instead prefers to term the GDR a “welfare dictatorship” in order to fully 
capture what he sees as a contradiction of the benefits of social welfare with the reality of the 
political repression.77 Jürgen Kocka also sees the problem as a misuse of definitions: according to 
Kocka, the GDR would certainly not be a totalitarian regime based on Arendt’s definition, 
however, the definition of Friedrich and Brzezinksi, which focuses on the state’s attempts to 
control all aspects of life, does actually reflect the reality of life in the GDR in 1950s and early 
1960s. Nevertheless, Kocka agrees that taking such an approach limits explanations of daily 
experience. Thus, Kocka ultimately prefers to categorize the GDR as a “modern dictatorship” as 
opposed to a “totalitarian dictatorship” – although he believes the latter term should not be 
dismissed outright as it is helpful for comparative purposes.78 
In more recent years, some scholars have continued to take this middle ground: while not 
completely condemning the GDR as having been a totalitarian regime, they dispute the validity 
of the “normalizing” discourse by shedding light on some of the more repressive aspects of the 
GDR through case studies, micro-histories, and ground-level analyses. These works include Gary 
Bruce’s regional case study on the Stasi, The Firm (2010) and Stefan Wolle’s Aufbruch nach 
Utopia (2011) and Der große Plan (2013), which seek to emphasize the importance of the 
controlling nature of the regime and its infiltration down to the lowest levels and impact on 
ordinary citizens’ lives.79 More recently, Andrew Demshuk, in Demolition on Karl Marx Square: 
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Cultural Barbarism and the People’s State in 1968 (2017) has shown the “the limits of 
democracy” in the GDR by looking at the events surrounding the demolition of the university 
church in Leipzig.80 Directly contradicting the participatory dictatorship thesis, this work 
demonstrates that despite fierce public opposition to the church’s demolition, the state did not 
comply with public pressure, leaving ordinary East Germans unable to affect the final outcome.   
 
Post-Totalitarian Debates  
 
By the mid 2000s, scholars began to distance themselves from the polarizing totalitarian 
debates on the GDR. Andrew I. Port denounces such arguments as having become “the banalities 
of East German historiography” that is, “history as comfort food for those most interested in 
moralistic posturing.”81 Furthermore, Port points out that: “The historiography of the GDR 
has…tended toward the provincial: […] many investigations make little effort to relate their 
findings to developments outside of East Germany or to issues of greater historical and 
historiographical importance.”82 For example, Charles S. Maier explains that he prefers to 
describe the GDR in terms of “late communism” in order to “really to avoid a generalising model 
and to restrict description to the unique characteristics of the east European regimes in the 1970s 
and 1980s –  that is, to insist on the temporal dimension of analysis.”83 Many works thus attempt 
to investigate previously ignored aspects of life in the GDR without first situating their works in 
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the continuum of the polarizing debates. For example, while he acknowledges Honecker’s 
dictatorial rule of the GDR, Jonathan Zatlin, in his economic history of the GDR, The Currency 
of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany (2009),84 describes the GDR’s 
attempt at eliminating cash currency in favour of a “currency of socialism,” that is, socialist 
consumer products. An important aspect here is that Zatlin is looking at how the Marxist view of 
money in the GDR was vital to understanding the economy. In the mind of the leadership, money 
equalled evil capitalistic exploitation. Despite this view, money never did disappear in the GDR. 
Paul Betts, in Within Walls: Private Life in the German Democratic Republic (2010),85 argues 
against a black-and-white narrative regarding the existence of a private sphere for the GDR’s 
population. Focusing in particular on the various experiences in Berlin, Betts points out that this 
private sphere was still able to exist, even despite the pervasiveness of Stasi interference. 
Furthermore, Betts argues that the SED indeed also protected the existence of the very private 
sphere that they also intruded upon and thereby heightened the importance of maintaining it. 
Taking an interdisciplinary approach in Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers 
of Power (2009),86 Patrick Major explores aspects behind the Wall such as the youth experience 
of western music, jeans, films, as well as their lack of travel options. 87   
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In his 2008 work Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German 
Democratic Republic (2008),88 Eli Rubin specifically positions himself between the totalitarian 
and ordinary life debates. Rubin highlights the importance of plastic during the 1950s-1970s and 
how it signified the GDR’s technological superiority in the world for its population. He traces the 
design, mass production and consumption of plastics and how it became vital to the GDR’s 
economy in the form of manufacturing and exports. In his later book, Amnesiopolis: Modernity, 
Space and Memory in East Germany (2016), Rubin continues this socio-economic focus, 
exploring East German leader Erich Honecker’s attempts to address the housing crisis in the 
1970s as part of his “unity of social and economic policy.” In this case study, which explores a 
specific housing development on the outskirts of Berlin, Rubin looks at how Honecker’s policy 
of sacrificing the future in favour of answering peoples’ present needs led to a reshaping of the 
public’s memory of the capitalist past, but also ultimately led to the GDR’s downfall.89 
More emphasis on identity politics can be found in Jan Palmowski’s 2009 work, Inventing 
a Socialist Nation, a regional study of how the SED used the concept of “Heimat” to forge a 
sense of identity and contribute to the legitimacy of the state.90 Palmowski states that “Heimat” 
resonated with the people, especially in comparison to other ideologies such as that of 
antifascism, mainly because locals were able to interpret “Heimat” in their own way. In the end, 
Palmowski argues that the state’s main success was in strengthening already-existing regional 
ties, though not necessarily the creation of a cohesive national identity. However, he points out 
that East Germans’ participation in this narrative did help to stabilize the regime. Also looking at 
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GDR through the lens of memory and identity is Jon Berndt Olsen’s Tailoring Truth:Politicizing 
the Past and Negotiating Memory in East Germany, which explores East memory discourses as 
presented in monuments, museums, exhibitions and some commemorations. 91 Olsen focuses on 
how the KPD and later SED used memory discourses to eradicate the memories left by the Nazis, 
create new narratives for public consumption, and thus legitimize the state. In order to see their 
new narratives succeed, Olsen argues, the SED drew on older working class traditions and tried 
to combine these with their newer discourses such as that of antifascism. Ultimately, Olsen 
characterizes this process of developing a new memory culture as a “complex and drawn-out 
affair” that had few immediate results, especially with regard to the public reception, which was 
difficult to assess.92 
As shown by the trajectory of these works, GDR historiography in recent years has 
increasingly gone beyond the heated and often politicized debates over whether or not the GDR 
was an authoritarian regime or whether it was an entirely normal state. The focus has become 
more cultural and social, seeking out new ways of looking at the GDR without taking sides in this 
debate. In this respect, my dissertation also seeks to follow this trend, especially those 
investigating the GDR’s identity and memory discourses, leaving aside the very polarizing 
totalitarianism debates. Although my work is a political top-down look at how the SED sought to 
get the public on side with its policies through its anniversary theses, it is also an interdisciplinary 
socio-cultural study that looks at the ways in which these competitions and festivities manifested 
themselves at the lowest of levels, and importantly, how those at the very bottom of the state 
apparatus attempted to carry out Berlin’s wishes.  
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Theories of Collective Memory, Rituals, and Transnational Myth-making 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Emile Durkheim first wrote about a concept he called 
a “collective effervescence” in one of his most famous works, The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life. What Durkheim is describing here are so-called “primitive” societies and the 
universality that seemed to underpin their social interactions and rituals. In Durkheim’s view, 
social gatherings, especially those of a ritualistic or festive nature, helped communities of 
individuals develop collective “consciousnesses.” Durkheim wrote that:  
collective consciousness is the highest form of the psychic life, since it is the 
consciousness of the consciousnesses. Being placed outside of and above individual and 
local contingencies, it sees things only in their permanent and essential aspects, which it 
crystalizes into communicable ideas.93  
 
What he meant by this is that human experience is greatly affected and shaped by our experiences 
within a group. In particular, most of our knowledge and understanding of the world has been 
created outside of our own individual thoughts. For example, Durkheim pointed out that language 
is a product of “collective representations” because all people use words that pass “the limits of 
our personal experience.”94 The same works for ideas, which Durkheim also considered to be 
collective representations that “surpass the knowledge of the average individual. They are not 
abstractions which have a reality only in particular consciousnesses.”95  
It was while building upon Durkheim’s ideas decades later that Maurice Halbwachs 
coined the term “collective memory.” Importantly, Halbwachs pointed out how individual 
thoughts are affected by the collective societal view: for it is through people’s experiences within 
their societies that they develop their memories. It is also within society that people “recall, 
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recognize, and localize their memories.”96 Halbwachs went on to say that this is indeed how the 
collective memory and social frameworks of memory come to be formed, for “it is to the degree 
that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that 
it is capable of the act of recollection.”97 Lewis A. Coser points out that Halbwachs’ work 
improves upon the limitations of Durkheim’s original theories, which do not provide an 
explanation for how social cohesion functions in ordinary life (as opposed to periods of 
effervescence, such as a festival or ceremony). Coser wrote that the theory of collective memory 
fills this void:  
It is the collective memory, as an intermediate variable so to speak, that both 
commemorates the events through calendar celebrations and is strengthened by them. 
There are no empty spots in the lives of groups and societies; an apparent vacuum 
between creative periods is filled by collective memory in symbolic display or simply 
kept alive through transmission by parents and other elders to children and or ordinary 
men and women.98  
 
Furthermore, Halbwachs explained that collective frameworks are the exact “instruments” 
collective memory makes use of to “reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each 
epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society.”99 This means that, for example, a nation’s 
memories are understood through the lens of the present situation in a given society. However, 
replacing one group of past collective memories with another is not necessarily straightforward, 
particularly if the memories were made by a very large number of people or groups, for even 
stronger “collective forces” would be needed to override the existing ones.100 This is even more 
so the case if the old collective memory was particularly revered and entrenched, thus leaving 
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behind very strong representations.101 Converting long-held collective memories about topics 
such as the Soviet Union or the dangers posed by the West to new ones of the SED’s making was 
one of the main challenges the National Front faced in each GDR anniversary commemoration, 
and why spreading the SED’s ideological theses was such a difficult, yet important, task. 
As Aleida Assmann explains, “the past cannot be ‘remembered;’ it has to be memorized. 
The collective memory is a crossover between semantic and episodic memory: it has to be 
acquired via learning, but only through internalization and rites of participation does it create the 
identity of a ‘we.’”102 The fact is that the personal memory of individuals, while unique and 
varied depending upon lived experience, has a relatively short temporal range. However, the 
memories possessed by a state or institution are different: when provided with the right kind of 
“symbolic support,” these memories can be extended for a much longer time period. This 
symbolic support can take the form of anything from symbols, to images, to anniversary 
ceremonies, rituals, or monuments, and result in the creation of a strong group identity.103 Vital in 
this process is the presentation of a strong mobilizing narrative via institutions of learning like 
schools, archives, museums or libraries, in the mass media, in monuments and memorial sites, as 
well as through commemorative rites that encourage collective participation.104  
Falling under this category of “commemorative rites” are what David Knottnerus calls 
“ritualized practices,” which he defines as social occurrences distinct from everyday life that 
have a fixed schedule and are linked to other social events.  They also include “stylized activities” 
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and involve numerous participants.105 Furthermore, such rituals help “pattern our social 
behaviour and organize group dynamics in countless social settings.”106 A major reason why 
rituals are able to do this, Knottnerus explains, is because of the way in which emotion impacts 
attendees: 
The more individuals contribute to and are involved in the collective experience, the 
greater the emotional impact of the event, and the greater the number of activities and 
therefore complexity of actions, the greater the sense of collective dependence and co-
participation among individuals, which heightens the impact of the ritual event on 
participants’ emotions. 107   
 
The key here is the participatory aspect. The effect is something that people would not 
experience in the same way in a more passive situation, such as by being a member of an 
audience merely listening to a speech. Further adding to the emotional intensity of the event is 
the presence of other people, who are also participating, which fuels the development of a sense 
of support and consensus, and “ultimately results in heightened feelings of confidence and 
satisfaction about the collective event.”108 Barbara Ehrenreich points out that spectacles such as 
processions, colours, festive clothing and other symbolic objects like statues, together achieve the 
effect of holding peoples’ attention for long enough to be captivated. However, she states that the 
“objects of attention” – that is, whatever was designed to draw the eye of the spectator, is not the 
main point of the ritual. It is, rather, the collective act of attending the event as part of something 
bigger. Ehrenreich writes: “[c]entral to the experience is the knowledge that hundreds or 
thousands of other people are attending the same spectacle.”109 These increases in emotions such 
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as joy, satisfaction, exhilaration or reverence, result in an increased commitment towards the 
ritualized event and the beliefs communicated by the event. 110 Knottnerus warns, however, that 
the effects can be either negative or positive, depending upon various factors.111  
Public holidays are also good examples of rituals that unite groups of people. Amitai 
Etzioni points out that holidays “serve to socialize members of a society as well as their 
commitments to values, and as such, serve to sustain the integration of society.”112 Public 
officials’ awareness of how festivals unite and solidify groups of society can lead to the 
redesigning of holidays, Etzioni argues, “in order to change the beliefs of one or more member 
groups and their orientation to the encompassing society.”113  In this way, holidays can play 
several distinct roles in a society: as “recommitment holidays” –  holidays that encourage those 
who share similar beliefs to participate in the holiday and thereby develop a deeper dedication to 
those same beliefs and their communities than previously, or “tension-management holidays,” 
which reinforce beliefs in an indirect way by releasing any built-up tensions developed as a result 
of complying with a particular society’s ways and beliefs.”114 Taking Etzioni’s categorizations 
into consideration, as we shall see in later chapters, GDR commemorations, in particular, can be 
said to fall under both of these types. During the months leading up to the celebrations, those 
months of all-important preparation (during which time everyone was expected to come together, 
whether in their apartment building, neighbourhood or even nationally), the GDR celebrations fit 
the first type, which indeed served to reinforce their commitment to shared beliefs and 
institutions. The actual day of the anniversary (the celebration), then, fits under the second 
                                               
110 Knottnerus, “Emotions, Pride and the Dynamics of Collective Ritual Events” 46. 
111 Knottnerus, “Emotions, Pride and the Dynamics of Collective Ritual Events” 48-9. 
112 Amitai Etzioni, “Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,” Sociological Theory 18, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), 47. 
113 Etzioni, “Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,” 54. 
114 Etzioni, “Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,” 47-48. 
 
 37 
holiday type, with the celebration serving to release the tension developed during the hard work 
of the preparations, which included extra “volunteer” work, as well as the periodic competitions. 
This theoretical background helps us understand the ways in which collective identities 
and “consciousnesses” are formed through collective rituals or “rites” and how they can be used 
as an instrument of social control. As this work will demonstrate, the SED sought via the 
National Front to calculatingly insert political meaning into collective rituals (i.e. anniversary 
activities and competitions) and therefore the collective memory of that group. Furthermore, by 
targeting their messages and activities to specific communities and groups, the National Front 
was also hoping that already-existing connections amongst group members would encourage 
participation and enable that community to create new collective memories, which would then 
replace any old ones formed under previous governments. For as Assmann observes, political and 
cultural memory eventually becomes monolithic as individual memories converge over time.115 
 
Myths in Transnational Perspective: Transmitting collective national identities  
 
It is important to recognize that however manipulative this wilful creation of a collective 
identity and memory might seem, the GDR was far from the only state to do so. Indeed, this is a 
transnational phenomenon, for all nation states create and reinforce myths. They have to – for 
myths help to legitimize their very existence. Myths can carry many different meanings for 
different countries: such as the feeding of identity narratives, by providing a feeling of security, 
or giving solace in times of defeat or energy in times of distress. 116 George Schöpflin states that a 
myth is one way in which “collectivities,” particularly nations, can “establish and determine the 
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foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values.”117 Furthermore, myths 
create an “intellectual and collective monopoly” on a particular narrative and seek to have this 
narrative established as “the sole way of ordering the world and defining world-views.” 118 
 In contrast to conventionally accepted definitions of the term that refer to something 
untrue, Assmann defines a “myth” in the context of the field of memory studies as a completely 
“neutral description” that simply refers to “collectively remembered history.” More specifically, 
she defines a myth as “an idea, an event, a person, a narrative that has acquired a symbolic value 
and is engraved and transmitted in memory.”119 While any community or group can construct a 
specific collective “myth” about their past, at the present time, the nation state happens to be 
among the best at creating and maintaining such myths.120 As Benedict Anderson writes, the 
nation itself is merely “an imagined political community” where “the members of even the 
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”121 Part of this construction of 
meaning, as described in the previous section on the development of collective memories, is that 
each nation needs to create and maintain a sense of legitimacy by leaning on the use of collective 
symbols, experiences, identities, and the past. In order to be effective, these symbols also need to 
“enhance emotions of empathy and identification.”122 This use of symbols to create identities is 
not a unique function to dictatorships, as all countries must do this in order to continue to exist. 
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Using the example of national anthems, which are often performed on national holidays, 
Anderson explains that: 
No matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an 
experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each 
other utter the same verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance. Singing the 
Marseillaise, Waltzing Matilda, and Indonesia Raya provide occasions for unisonality, for 
the echoed physical realization of the imagined community. […] How selfless this 
unisonance feels! If we are aware that others are singing these songs precisely when and 
as we are, we have no idea who they may be, or even where, out of earshot, they are 
singing. Nothing connects us all but imagined sound.123 
 
The important fact about national anthems and other collective symbols and identities is that they 
must first be created and then successfully transmitted across space and time – that is, adapted 
and used again and again. 
The extent to which states can create identities depend on several factors. For one, it has a 
lot to do with how good the political educational efforts are as well as the degree to which 
“patriotic fervour” has developed.124  One obvious case is the presentation of history in 
educational institutions. Assmann points out that such attempts to rewrite history are common to 
all countries, because even in democratic systems, public education involves “a similar self-
enforcing relationship between history, memory, identity, and power.”125 Assmann argues that 
through learning specific national historical narratives, “the heterogeneous members of a 
population [are] transformed into a distinct and homogenous collective, conceiving of themselves 
as ‘a people’ with a collective ‘autobiography.’ In all cultures, history textbooks are the vehicles 
of national memory.”126 Thus, rewriting history is of key importance in creating national myths. 
Yet, it is not only the classroom that serves to instruct children on their national history. As Mona 
                                               
123 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 145. 
124 Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” 55. 
125 Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” 64.  
126 Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” 64.  
 
 40 
Ozouf points out, festivals are “even better, for they do not provide exactly the teaching expected 
of the schools” because they are “addressed not to the intelligence but to the man as a whole and 
involve the entire community. Schools [are] for public education; the festivals [are] a form of 
national upbringing.”127 For example, officials viewed pageant participation as an instructive 
method in educating children on the way in which the French Revolution unfolded. This is 
because festivals can serve the purpose of expanding education beyond the walls of the schools as 
“supplements” or even “substitutes” for regular education.128  The end result, as Assmann argues, 
is that this education can then be transformed into a “collective memory” by being part of “shared 
knowledge and collective participation.”129  
Another powerful function of myths lies in their ability to appropriate and “change” the 
past, for example transforming a high point in a nation’s/culture’s/people’s history, a so-called 
“historical golden age,” into a “foundational myth” that becomes vital to a nation’s unity and 
stability. The greater these founding myths appear, the easier it is to mobilize and unify people 
around a national idea.130 Their power lies in how the past is perceived in contrast to the present: 
a founding moment can project unity, continuity and ultimately, identity.131 In this sense then, 
foundational myths can play a decisive role in stabilizing fragile periods in a nation’s history. For 
example, in the case of France and the United States, the foundational myth can play a politically 
unifying role, as John R. Gillis points out: “For the left, it was a time of heroes, pure idealism, 
and perfect consensus. For the right, it remained a moment of villainy, degradation, and 
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disintegration. What they had in common, however, was their belief in national memory as well 
as national identity, something that… was evident in all subsequent political struggles.”132  
The construction of the present-day American national identity has developed out of two 
important foundational myths: that of the American Revolutionary War and the Civil War.  
Susan-Mary Grant describes how while victory in the Revolutionary War led to the founding of 
the country, including the establishment of national symbols such as the Great Seal, the eagle and 
the flag, and the Declaration of Independence as the “founding document,” there remained a 
certain lack of a sense of national unity and a distinctive identity.133 Grant argues that the military 
victory over the British in the Revolutionary War thus only began “a lengthy process comprising 
philosophical, ideological, mythological, religious, and political constructions and 
reassessments.”134 The process remained incomplete, however, because during the early-mid 
nineteenth century, there were contested meanings of freedom and equality amongst the populace 
that made developing deep-rooted myths difficult. Grant argues that these only really coalesced 
into a unified concept of national identity with the Civil War.135 Important here in helping this 
identity form was President Lincoln’s reference to the existence of one “nation” in his Gettysburg 
address in 1863.136 Out of the Civil War did not just come unity, but also the development of 
further myths, such as the central myth of “American exceptionalism.” Ian Tyrell characterizes 
the main pillars of this myth as the view of the United States as a distinctive harbinger of the 
values of egalitarianism, material abundance, a democratic mission, and of religious freedom.137 
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As a result of these myths, over time the reality of the country coming into being due to a military 
victory changed into something much more teleological and sacred: its founding became the 
natural end product of a unique populace created out of new ideals and experiences of the 
frontier.138  
In contrast to the American myths of victory, the founding myth of post-war Austria takes 
the form of a “victim” narrative. Rather than acknowledge any guilt or responsibility for its role 
in the atrocities of the Second World War, Austria instead presented itself as a victim of Hitler – 
indeed his “first” with the Anschluss of 1938.  This myth can be traced back to unfortunate 
wording of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, in which the Allies, in an attempt to assure 
Austrians that they would be treated fairly after the war, described Austria as Hitler’s first 
victim.139 After the war ended, this idea of displacing responsibility onto the Germans since 
Austria did not exist as a separate entity from Germany during the war, took on a life of its own 
with many Austrians, ranging from the population at home to the soldiers who had been in battle, 
perceiving themselves as victims. According to this narrative, the Nazis had not been welcome 
and were only accepted in Austria because the people had no other choice in the matter.140 This 
myth of victimization even featured prominently in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 that 
established Austria once again as a sovereign state. David Art explains that politicians from all 
sides disseminated this narrative for several decades afterwards.141 This focus on Austrian 
suffering of course ignored the suffering of the real victims, such as the Jews.  
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 This myth met with little opposition for 40 years, only first beginning to be seriously 
challenged in 1986 when former SS member Kurt Waldheim ran for president. It was during 
what became known as the “Waldheim Affair” that the issue broke wide open and became a topic 
of political debate. As President of the World Jewish Congress Edgar Bronfman stated, “The 
issue is not Kurt Waldheim. He is a mirror of Austria… The real issue is that Austria has lied for 
decades about its own involvement in the atrocities.”142 In the years since the Waldheim Affair, 
the issue of dealing with the Nazi past has remained a polarizing one in Austria, with opposing 
discourses cropping up: on the political right, what David Art calls a “new victim frame,” 
claiming Austria to be “the victim of international forces [including foreign Jews] seeking to 
denigrate its history;” on the political left, another opposing discourse of contrition that proposes 
that Austria can and should deal with its own Nazi past.143 
 Despite the pervasive power of nationalistic frames of reference, powerful myths can also 
be located outside of the purview of a single nation state. As described by George Mosse in his 
ground-breaking work, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, the 
experience of the First World War was a turning point in the European collective consciousness. 
The groundwork for what Mosse calls “the myth of the fallen soldier” was initially laid during 
the French Revolution with its creation of the citizen army, as well as by the Revolutionary 
festivals that celebrated and symbolized the sacrifices for the nation.144 But it was with the end of 
the First World War that the war experience came to be memorialized as “a sacred experience” 
imbued with deep religious feeling and associated symbols.145 Mosse writes: “The cult of the 
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fallen soldier became a centerpiece of the religion of nationalism after the war.”146 Part of this 
appeal, Mosse argues, was the democratized nature of the myth: in previous wars, only the names 
of generals were made visible, but now the death and sacrifice of the ordinary soldier was 
celebrated across countries, including at memorials and sites of memory that were becoming 
places of pilgrimage.147 While there were slight differences in these memorials across different 
nations, the main differences resulted from the incorporation of symbols important to that nation, 
for the “civic religion of nationalism used classical and Christian themes as well as the native 
landscape to project its image.”148 This cult of fallen soldiers then changed after the Second 
World War. Mosse highlights Britain as a good example of this change in perception: there were 
debates as to the usefulness of traditional commemoration with national shrines to worship versus 
utilitarian commemoration with memorials in the form of libraries or parks, with a compromise 
of sorts between these two approaches eventually being reached. 149 In contrast, in West Germany 
after the Second World War, due the negative associations of a show of national pride, this same 
cult of the fallen did not take root, while at the same time in France, while there was slightly 
more national pride and commemoration, there was a more subdued level of “glory” than after 
the First World War.150  
In the end, all states need to create myths to justify their existence. Thus, the East German 
leadership’s use of rituals, i.e. anniversary commemorations, to create new collective bonds, 
encourage their people to memorize new narratives, and present new symbols was not unique, but 
rather, an integral part of nation-building. What was unique about East Germany’s circumstances, 
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however, was that not only was the leadership seeking to create new memories and identities of 
its own, but it also had direct competition in the form of a competing state with the exact same 
past, also seeking to create new identities and narratives in order to move forward. Thus, the SED 
needed to ensure that its founding myths were based on an entirely different source from the 
West so that the SED leadership could underscore the necessity of the split between East and 
West Germany.   
 
West vs East Germany: the “Anti-identity” vs Antifascism 
 
By the 1980s, nearly 40 years after the state’s founding, much academic and popular 
writing had been produced on questions about what and where exactly West Germany’s identity 
was – and who were they, exactly? Were they now their own entity, even though officially their 
constitution allowed for the joining of East Germany at any time? Had the West indeed 
developed its own “German identity” in the interim? The truth is not so easy to discern for West 
Germany presented a unique case. As pointed out by Hans Mommsen, a good way to create a 
national identity is usually by incorporating national histories into the myth-making process.151 
But as Jürgen Habermas has stated, the problem is that “after Auschwitz [Germany] lost its 
power to generate myths.”152  
While East Germany was able to go forward by connect itself to the pre-existing 
communist legacy in Germany, West Germany’s task of successfully disassociating itself with its 
Nazi past was a much more difficult one. Part of the problem was that the Nazis had frequently 
used many traditional “Germanic” symbols, which rendered them impossible to use going 
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forward. Another problem was that the West German government was not entirely able to 
completely cleanse itself of anyone who had held a position under the Nazis, as they needed 
experienced bureaucrats to ensure the country’s recovery. In addition, Konrad Adenauer, West 
Germany’s first Chancellor, was driven by a fear of being encircled by hostile communist powers 
and so was determined to integrate the Federal Republic into the West as much as possible, 
including through rearmament and joining the defence alliance pact, NATO, in 1955. Tied in as 
West Germany was in creating a place for itself on the international stage, it did not have an overt 
sense of national pride like other countries in the West. Indeed, it virtually lacked any sense of 
pride at all. Instead, West Germany was wary of its international reputation (especially with 
regard to other Western nations) and the historical “danger” that a strong united Germany posed 
for world security, especially for its European neighbours. Instead, as Mommsen and others153 
have pointed out, West Germany was more focused on the way it fit in internationally and on its 
strong regional identities.  As Mommsen explained of the situation in 1983:  
The existence of real psychological attachments to the Bismarckian nation-state tradition 
within the West-German population is virtually non-existent, except for conservative or 
neoconservative intellectuals and for a part of the older generation. Indicative of this lack 
of attachment was the failure of the Federal Republic to revive older national symbols, 
demonstrated by the reluctant acceptance of the national anthem or the national colors.154 
 
A good example of this reluctant display of nationalism was in West Germany's unexpected 1954 
World Cup victory over Hungary. As Arthur Sullivan writes, this “triumph of Bern” was a 
“moment of collective bliss,” amidst the background of the economic miracle.155 This victory was 
proof to the world that Germans had learned something and were on the right path, as it was 
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essentially “a re-entry into the world, this time in a civilized fashion.”156 However, even in this 
moment of triumph, the press seemed consumed with downplaying the euphoria so as to avoid “a 
fresh outbreak of nationalism.”157 Indeed to some more skeptical people, the cheering crowds 
who welcomed the players home were reminiscent of the crowds at Nazi rallies and thus 
signalled “a relapse” for the country.158  
 In some ways, however, West Germany did seem to develop a distinct identity.  
Margarete Myers Feinstein argues that West Germany did have an identity, one that was 
inherently part of its position in the Western bloc. She points out that West Germany positioned 
itself as heir to the “bourgeois liberal tradition” in contrast to East Germany’s positioning as heir 
to “German revolutionary history.”159 The challenge was not only due to competing worldviews 
of anticommunism versus antifascism, but rather about a struggle between the two states to be the 
definitive German state and “a natural outcome of German history.”160 In fact, the symbols the 
West eventually chose were intended to appeal broadly to a hesitant populace and unite different 
viewpoints. Thus, symbols like the national anthem, the Deutschlandlied, or the use of the Iron 
Cross effectively “portrayed the Federal Republic’s claim to be the legitimate German state, heir 
to the liberal German cultural and political traditions.”161  
Due to the continued challenge to East Germany’s existence posed by the very existence 
of West Germany, East Germany for its part had to create a myth that would distinguish itself 
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from the West. Yet, the GDR also needed to maintain a connection to the Eastern Soviet Bloc 
states which rooted their own identities in distinct ethnicities. The result was that the SED 
leadership developed “a socialist ideal of nationhood that defined itself through class, local 
affinities, and the local and regional traditions that were specific to the GDR.”162 The most 
important “creation myth” for the GDR was therefore the myth of  “antifascism.” At the 
beginning, “antifascism” at first just referred to the legacy of communist Nazi resisters, but then 
later developed more into a collective identity that could integrate anyone who had opposed 
Nazism (including those who did not), and in the end, win support for the new state.163 Alan 
Nothnagle refers to this myth as one “based upon the ideal unity of the oppressed.”164  
The beginnings of this myth are debated by scholars. While Peter Monteath traces the 
beginning of this myth to fascist narratives formed in the Soviet zone of occupation, Jeffrey Herf 
argues that it first took shape during the Weimar Republic, was later refined by those who 
emigrated to the Soviet Union and elsewhere during the Third Reich, and then, finally, took on a 
life of its own as the official state ideology of the new East German state.165 In this ideology, 
there was a conflation between the Nazis and capitalism in general as per the Marxist 
interpretation of class struggle. As Herf explains: “[b]y using the term ‘fascism’ in place of 
‘National Socialism’ or ‘Nazi,’ Ulbricht presented the Hitler regime as one example of a general 
capitalist crisis rather than as a product of specific features of German history and society.”166 
The result was that throughout the history of the GDR, the official narratives associated the Nazis 
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as belonging to something specifically western and capitalist. Time and again, official SED 
narratives linked the West with this degradation of the capitalist system. Yet, individual and 
collective guilt for Nazi crimes was of lesser concern to the SED: for as per Marxist ideology, 
once the state was converted to socialism, the conditions for Nazism were considered removed. 
This would then be followed by a period of purposeful forgetting.167 “In this way,” Herf remarks, 
“memories of Nazism fostered distrust of popular democracy and legitimated the ‘antifascist’ 
dictatorship.”168 
There are also several possible additional reasons why this myth persisted. The first is that 
due to the redemptive Marxist narrative in which communism would succeed once other political 
systems had been destroyed. The fact that the Soviets were victorious over the Nazis seemed to 
be a prelude to greater victories that were surely to come and  “appeared to confirm the Marxist-
Leninist conviction that history was indeed unfolding along the lines of a bloody and tragic yet 
triumphant dialectical logic.”169 This not only provided a coherent narrative in a transitional time, 
but deepened their communist, even Stalinist beliefs.170 Furthermore, the experience of exile 
during the Nazi period was also a very powerful motive for how antifascism unfolded in the years 
following. As a result, the communists did not see themselves as responsible for the rise of 
Nazism, shifting the blame to stubborn Social Democrats who refused to join forces with them 
during Weimar.171 Many were also bitter towards the Germans who had followed the Nazis and 
grateful towards the Soviets for saving them – emotions that had a great lasting effect.172  
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 Given that in 1949 there were no existing sites of memory that were not shared with West 
Germany, the SED thus needed to construct its own separate sites of memory that would 
reinforce the antifascist narrative.173 As a result, in July 1961, the former Nazi concentration 
camps of Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück were merged into one national memorial 
site called “National Sites of Warning and Memory” that told a heroic story of communist 
resistance during the Third Reich and gave a “tangible” form to the antifascist ideology.174 For 
example, Buchenwald had been the site of several significant events: most importantly, it was the 
place where Ernst Thälmann, leader of the Communist Party during the Weimar Republic, had 
been martyred by the Nazis. Buchenwald also had a history of prisoner resistance which, in the 
cult of antifascism that later developed, became a larger concept that confirmed communist-led 
self-liberation narratives.175  
Not only did these sites of memory act as sites of national unity, but they also gained 
international importance, for as William J. Niven explains, they placed the GDR within the 
context of the wider international struggle of the working class against capitalism, especially that 
of West Germany. The focus of this central myth on the communist resistance placed the human 
suffering that had gone on at these camps “within the narrative of man’s social and political 
journey from fascist capitalism to socialism, and the promise of paradise on earth,” in contrast to 
the West German Christian Democrats’ approach of placing the suffering in the camps “within 
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the narrative of man’s difficult spiritual journey towards the promise of the after-life.”176 This 
allowed the construction of a different conception of victimhood from that of West Germany: 
instead of helpless and passive, victims in the GDR were portrayed as active, forward-looking, 
strong resistance fighters whose strength at Buchenwald helped the Americans liberate them. For 
as Niven writes, “The GDR’s self-legitimation was in part based on the claim that it was 
continuing the struggle for which all anti-fascists in Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, not just the 
communists, had given so much.”177  
Thus, just like the Bolsheviks before them, and the French revolutionaries long before, the 
GDR in its early years developed a founding myth in order to create a unified sense of identity. 
This was a momentous task, especially given that the GDR could not base its new identity on any 
linguistic or national distinctiveness. Rather, it had to first establish new symbols and even 





                                               
176 Niven, Facing the Nazi Past, 20. 
177 Niven, Facing the Nazi Past. 20-1. 
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Chapter One: The Anniversary Theses 
In a meeting of the National Front’s 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution 
Commission in 1957, Hans Seigewasser of National Front President Correns’ office complained 
to his fellow commission members that the SED appeared to have created “theses” (that is, 
important ideological themes) in honour of the 40th anniversary with only themselves in mind, as 
the turgid prose in which they were written was too out-of-touch and theoretical to be grasped by 
the masses.1 In order for these ideological themes to be effectively understood by the populace, 
he argued, it was up to them – the members of the 40th Anniversary Commission – to take every 
opportunity to “bring clarity and meaning to the goals of the commemoration.”2 Making this 
effort, Seigewasser pointed out, would ensure that the theses “do not just remain theses, but 
actually find their way to the masses and give rise to an independent attitude, to a reaction, to 
commitment, and ultimately lead to worthwhile activities.” 3 
The dense tracts Seigewasser was trying to transform were the ideological treatises the 
SED released at the outset of every major anniversary commemoration. These so-called “theses” 
usually consisted of a detailed history of the occasion according to the SED, combined with 
important ideological points the SED wanted the public to understand through participating in 
commemorative activities such as socialist competitions, festivities, and other “cultural events” 
like exhibitions, lectures, or discussion forums.  During the lead up to the day of anniversary 
itself, based on guidelines from the National Front’s Central Committee in Berlin, all lower-level 
                                               
1 Tellingly, the SED found it pertinent to publish the “Thesen” in full in Neues Deutschland in July, 1957, so that the 
everyday masses could read them for themselves.  
2 BArch DY 6/5642. Hans Seigewasser, “Stenografische Niederschrift 3. Stizung der Kommission ‘40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution’ beim Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland 
am 13. September 1957,” p. 29.  
3 BArch DY 6/5642. Hans Seigewasser, “Stenografische Niederschrift 3. Stizung der Kommission ’40. Jahrestag der 
GRoßen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution’ beim Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland 
am 13. September 1957,” p. 29.  
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National Front organizations (from the national to the most local) would design wide-ranging 
commemorative activities in order to expose the East German people to the central messages of 
the theses for that specific anniversary.  
During the 1950s and 1960s in particular, the main theme the anniversary theses tried to 
communicate was the legitimacy of the GDR’s existence and distinct identity as its own state, 
separate from the West. Another vital theme in the anniversary theses during these early decades 
was justifying the necessity of the GDR’s close relationship with the Soviet Union. As time went 
on and the Berlin Wall closed off emigration, the GDR was able to finally achieve economic 
success, something which the SED mostly notably underscored in its 15th anniversary theses from 
1964. Following the “normalizing” of relations with West Germany in 1972 and resulting 
international recognition, the GDR anniversary theses became more confident and emphasized 
the superiority of socialism, as proven not only by the country’s economic successes, but also by 
the very generous social policies that benefitted the entire population. Finally, despite imminent 
economic collapse in the 1980s and growing divergence from reality, the SED’s anniversary 
theses doubled down on its previous themes of international acclaim and economic prowess, 
asserting the permanence of the state. This was particularly necessary given that, in the late 1980s 
its interests had diverged from the Soviet Union, which was undertaking major reforms under 
Premier Gorbachev.  
 
Relations with the West: the Question of Legitimacy 
 
From the founding of the GDR, a major problem for the SED leadership was the GDR’s 
lack of legitimacy and resulting precarious existence on the world stage. This instability forced 
the SED to use careful rhetoric to carve out its own unique identity that would justify the state’s 
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continued independent existence. These attempts to educate the public were not only about the 
GDR creating an identity for itself within the Eastern Bloc, but also about fending off the 
continued challenges to its sovereignty launched by the West, especially the West’s successful 
decade-long diplomatic isolation strategy, known as the Hallstein Doctrine.  
As the theses released in honour of the 15th anniversary of the GDR explain, the East 
German state’s legitimacy was based on the continuation of traditions established a half-century 
before with the October Revolution of 1917. The Revolution heralded the beginning of new 
relationships between peoples, the theses argued, “fulfilled by the noble spirit of humanism.”4 
The example set by the Soviet Union enabled other countries to likewise break away from 
“constant economic crises and war” and allow their citizens to live “free from exploitation and 
fear.”5  The GDR, by relegating capitalism to the past, was thus continuing down this path of new 
beginnings, ensuring the end of the “economic ruin of countless workers and peasants,” as well 
as the end of “poisonous” and “amoral” capitalist evaluations of art and literature, and the willful 
misuse of research and science “for purposes hostile to humankind.”6 Thus, the establishment of 
the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” saved the working masses from continuing to be governed by 
those who exploited others (Ausbeuterherrschaft).7   
The message the SED wanted to communicate to the population was that such a life was 
inherent in the old capitalist social order, which could not be reformed. The only solution was for 
                                               
4 BArch DY 6/5641. Manfred Gerlach, Tagung des Nationalrats der National Front, “Die Aufgaben der National 
Front zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1.  
5 BArch DY 6/5641.“Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 1. 
6 BArch DY 6/5641. Manfred Gerlach, Tagung des Nationalrats der National Front, “Die Aufgaben der National 
Front zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1.  
7 This is a common description used, see for example, BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim 
ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1. 
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the old system to be replaced by an entirely new system (their own socialist order).8 The theses 
also make clear that the GDR would not just be following the Soviet Union’s lead, but rather, 
continuing already-existing German traditions. For the country had been built on the legacy of 
the German workers’ movement, with the GDR being “the most important result of the hundred-
year struggle of the German labour movement since Marx and Engels.”9 Therefore, the 
“democratic legitimacy” of the GDR was “deeply rooted in history” because it “embodied the 
historical teachings of the struggle of the working class and the best German patriots, and 
summed up the great revolutionary and humanist traditions of the German nation.”10  
One of these key legitimizing traditions was the story of Ernst Thälmann, leader of the 
Communist Party during Weimar, who was arrested by the Nazis and murdered at Buchenwald in 
1944. SED propaganda portrayed him as a larger than life figure, a “disembodied, artificial 
symbol,” who was “the symbolic figure of resistance against fascism in all of Germany.”11  
Thälmann was resurrected as a mythical figure at the opening of the first Thälmann memorial in 
1953, where Walter Ulbricht reimagined Thälmann’s and the KPD’s policies prior to 1933 as 
having been the right ones, in the same way that the SED’s policies in relation to the West were 
correct.12 Annette Leo points out that this creation of a continuous tradition effectively 
“legitimized the politics and claim to power of [Thälmann’s] successors.”13 In addition, rewriting 
                                               
8 BArch DY 6/5641. Manfred Gerlach, Tagung des Nationalrats der National Front, “Die Aufgaben der National 
Front zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1.  
9  BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 10. 
10  BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 10. 
11 Annette Leo, “Liturgie statt Erinnerung: Die Schaffung eines Heldenbildes am Beispiel Ernst Thälmanns,” in 
Ernst Thälmann: Mensch und Mythos, ed. Peter Monteath (Amsterdam Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), 19. 
12 Leo, “Liturgie statt Erinnerung,” 25-26. 
13 Leo, “Liturgie statt Erinnerung,” 25-26. 
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the KPD’s history also served to rewrite the background to the rise of the Nazis, laying the blame 
for it squarely on the Social Democratic Party’s actions in the 1930s.14 
 This narrative enabled the GDR to positively define itself as everything the Federal 
Republic was not. The SED’s theses boasted that their own rule in the GDR was entirely free of 
fascists, war criminals, Junkers (the old Prussian large landowning nobility), and in particular, of 
“corporate men” (Konzernherren). The theses argued that the GDR had instead taken the 
“democratic route.”15 In defining themselves as the only democratic German socialist state,16 
SED rhetoric during the 1950s and early 1960s thereby questioned West Germany’s own 
legitimacy, arguing that the real historical truth behind the founding of West Germany was that 
the people in the western zones of Germany had “an illegitimate monopoly capital forced on 
them.”17 Therefore, in contrast to what Western German politicians claimed, their country was 
not built upon democratic foundations, but rather was created through the “rape” of “the German 
peoples’ democratic rights and national interests.”18 The fact that many western Germans had 
actually been satisfied with the conduct of the western Allies in the immediate post-war period, 
especially with western financial support (which had also initially been extended to the East) as 
well as their assumption of governance, was not mentioned.19  
                                               
14 See Detlef Kannapin, “Thälmann im Film der 50er Jahre,” in Ernst Thälmann: Mensch und Mythos, ed. Peter 
Monteath (Amsterdam Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2000), 119-20. 
15 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 7.  
16 The exact phrase used changed over time: before the mid 1960s, the SED rhetoric defined the GDR as a “German” 
nation. This changed later in the 1960 and early 1970s when the SED began de-emphasizing the “German” aspect 
and emphasizing the word “GDR” instead.  See Joanna McKay, The Official Concept of the Nation in the Former 
GDR: Theory, Pragmatism, and the Search for Legitimacy (Aldershot, UK; Brookfield, Vt: Ashgate, 1998) for a 
more detailed take on the issue.  
17 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 9. 
18 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 9. 
19 See Anna J. Merritt, (eds): Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945 – 1949 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1970). 
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One reason the East was so preoccupied with the West was due, in part, to the behaviour 
of Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first Chancellor from 1949 to 1963. Adenauer hated the 
idea of a divided Germany and refused to acknowledge the loss of the eastern territories. He was 
also driven by the fear of being encircled by hostile communist powers. Not atypically for a 
Western leader at that time, Adenauer perceived the Eastern Bloc countries as dangerous because, 
as Jorst Dulffer explains, “one could not trust communists who employed subversive politics and 
propaganda techniques.”20 Adenauer was determined to integrate West Germany into the Western 
Bloc as much as possible, which meant rearming West Germany and joining the defence alliance 
pact NATO in 1955. Throughout this time period, Adenauer presented himself as a reliable leader 
who could guarantee a steady course in a divided world, capable of “steering the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) between the Scylla of Sovietization and Charybdis of permanent 
partition.”21 During the next two decades, easing the tense relations between East and West 
Germany was simply not an option for either Adenauer or his centre-right conservative party, the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU), largely because they refused to consider the GDR a 
legitimate state. 
 Following a trip to Moscow that established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 
1955, West German Minister Wilhelm Grewe drew up a plan that later became known as the 
“Hallstein Doctrine,” which was to define German relations for the next decade. With the 
Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany staked its claim to being the one true German state, 
threatening to break off relations with any country that recognized East Germany. In a speech to 
the Bundestag, Adenauer declared that a “normalization of relations under any circumstance” 
                                               
20 Jorst Dulffer, “‘No more Potsdam!’ Konrad Adenauer's nightmare and the basis of his international orientation,” 
German Politics and Society 25, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 25 
21 Dulffer, “‘No more Potsdam!” 20.  
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between East and West Germany was simply out of the question, especially the “legalization of 
the abnormal state of German division.”22 At the same time, Adenauer affirmed that the 
integration of West Germany into Western Europe was an absolute necessity for the future of the 
country, taking the view that any European state which remained in isolation was politically and 
economically unviable. Integration was not only to be pursued for its own sake, but something 
which Adenauer claimed was in the whole world’s interest.23 In a governmental bulletin of 
December, 1955, Minister Grewe confirmed that any state recognition of the GDR would be 
considered “an unfriendly act” against West Germany that would have serious consequences.24  
While proving itself effective at isolating the East, the isolation campaign conversely 
provided the SED propaganda machine with “proof” that the West posed a threat to the East’s 
very existence, solidifying the SED’s claim that the imperialist West Germany, the successor 
state to the Nazi regime, was starting to show its true warmongering nature. The 1964 
anniversary theses claimed that the West German government’s “revanchist policies” were 
responsible for maintaining the continued tensions that would eventually turn this “post-war 
period into a new pre-war period.”25 The SED further argued that the western “imperialists” had 
been on this path ever since the end of the war, when the Western occupiers, particularly the 
United States, bonded together to form “an unholy alliance against the antifascist-democratic 
                                               
22 “2. Deutscher Bundestag – 101. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 22. September 1955,” p. 5644. Photocopy of 
archival document located at https://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01366/index-
2.html.de.  
23 “2. Deutscher Bundestag – 101. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 22. September 1955,” p. 5644. Photocopy of 
archival document located at https://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01366/index-
2.html.de.  
24 Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung. Bonn, December 13, 1957. No. 233, p. 1993. 
Photocopy of archival document located at 
https://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/bilder_dokumente/01366/index-4.html.de. Note: Even though the 
Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with East Germany, it was considered exempt due to its position as a former 
ally of World War II and Occupying Power.  
25 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938. “Anlage Nr. 8a zum Protokoll 23 vom 14.7.1964. 2. Fassung. 15 Jahre Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik (Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik),” p. 4 
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movement.”26 What was even more significant, according to the theses, was that the West failed 
to prosecute former Nazis and war criminals, thereby preventing the denazification of their 
economy and administration.27 Although an exaggeration to claim that Nazi war criminals had 
not been prosecuted at all, there was a degree of truth in this as West Germany had indeed 
struggled with getting denazification right in those early years. Despite outlawing the Nazi Party 
and its associated laws or symbols, as well as holding the Nuremburg trials that began in 1945, 
the emphasis in the western sectors (and later West Germany) had always been on moving 
forward and creating a so-called “spiritual regeneration of the German people” which was, at its 
core, the re-education of Germans in western democratic ideals.28  However, a later American 
report described this as “a torturous program,” one that had been “based on the premise that the 
German character needed uprooting and modification” while “German society at large required 
drastic alterations as well.”29 The problem was that moving forward with western “regeneration” 
required experienced workers in administration and government, many of whom were not 
entirely untainted by affiliation with the Nazis. Such links to the banned and thoroughly 
denounced National Socialists, even if somewhat weak, were something that the SED reminded 
GDR citizens of for the next thirty years, especially in the anniversary theses.  
                                               
26 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 7.  
27 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 7. For more on the “judicial Cold War” between East and West Germany, 
see Gary Bruce, “From Perpetrator to Cold-War Pawn: The Atrocities and Trial of Heinz Barth,” Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies 29, no. 3, (2015): 374-399. 
28 Kurt Jürgensen, “The Concept and Practice of ‘Re-education’ in Germany 1945-50,” in The Political Re-education 
of Germany and her Allies After World War II, ed. Nicholas Pronay und Keith Wilson (London und Sydney: Croom 
Helm, 1985), 83-91. See also Herf, Divided Memory. 
29 Paul W Gulgowski, The American Military Government of United States Occupied Zones of post-World War II 
Germany in relation to policies expressed by its Civilian Governmental Authorities at home, during the course of 
1944, 1945 through 1949 (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag und Herchen 1983), 333. 
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Despite the pervasiveness of this anti-western narrative, the populace remained 
unconvinced that the West actually posed such a great threat. 30 When National Front 
representatives sought out ordinary citizens’ opinions on the subject, hoping to find evidence that 
its message about the West had been absorbed, the National Front often found evidence to the 
contrary. For example, one person stated that based on various individual conversations they had 
had, they were of the opinion that no one in West Germany was actually talking about war.31 In 
another instance, a group of people pointed out the contradiction in the leadership’s claim of 
attempting to ease tensions between the two Germanies, asking National Front representatives 
whether it was really necessary for the East German press, especially Neues Deutschland, to 
continue to use “such harsh language against the imperialists, especially the West German 
imperialists, as it could only deepen the division [between the two countries]?”32 In Frankfurt 
(Oder), others wondered what was really going on with negotiations with the West. For one, 
ordinary people noticed how the state’s opinion of West German Chancellor Adenauer appeared 
to change once he had been replaced by Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. One person commented that 
“based on what Willi Stoph is saying about his negotiations with the West, it now appears as 
though Erhard is even more dangerous than Adenauer, who now seems to be not bad at all.”33 On 
this point of government deception, someone else asked: “how is it that the governments publicly 
insult each other, but then negotiate in secret?”34 Another East German was of the opinion that 
                                               
30 Mark Allinson also argues that East Germans did not believe that the West posed a threat. See Mark Allinson, 
Politics and Popular Opinion in East Germany, 1945-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 120.  
31 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage zum 
Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 2-3. 
32 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage zum 
Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 1. 
33 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage zum 
Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 3. 
34 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage zum 
Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 3. 
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the difficulties lay solely at the feet of the politicians, as “[w]e German citizens have been in 
agreement for a long time, it is ‘those at the top’ [die da oben] who are not yet in agreement.” 35  
That ordinary people were asking such questions clearly shows that many East Germans 
were neither fooled by the state’s official claims that the West posed a great danger to GDR 
citizens, nor interested in pretending to officials that they did not see inconsistencies with the 
official message in general. The complaint that neither ordinary East Germans’ own family 
members nor other Westerners were actually seeking war with the GDR was also a very common 
one, and Bezirk Dresden’s propaganda department actually published a direct response to be 
distributed in a pamphlet in 1964. Crafting its side of the argument in the form of a “Question 
and Answer” format, the propaganda department wrote:  
You are undoubtedly right that your sister in West Germany and her family pose no 
danger to our GDR. There are hundreds of thousands of families between Hamburg and 
Munich, with whom we feel connected and whom we are certain are as interested in peace 
in Germany as we are. If these people were to hold the political and economic power in 
West Germany in their hands, then we are certain that there would be no aggressive 
NATO, no pursuit of nuclear weapons, and no claims on foreign territory, no military 
drudgery [Soldatenschinderei] in the Bundeswehr, no Nazi generals or Hitler-judges.36  
 
However, the pamphlet went on, though “these millions of simple, peace-loving, reasonable 
Germans in the Federal Republic are working to the best of their ability, [they] have no legal 
power to determine the political path of that state.”37 Ironically, neither could East Germans, for 
as Mark Allinson remarks, the state’s purpose in even inquiring about the ordinary person’s 
                                               
35 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage zum 
Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 3. 
36 BArch DY 6/ 2395. Bezirk Dresden National Front Committee, Kommission für Agitation,“5 Fragen – 5 
Antworten zum Vertrag über Freundschaft, gegenseitigen Beistand und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der 
UdSSR. Ein Offener Brief an Frau Else Walther,” 1964, p. 3. 
37 BArch DY 6/ 2395. Bezirk Dresden National Front Committee, Kommission für Agitation,“5 Fragen – 5 
Antworten zum Vertrag über Freundschaft, gegenseitigen Beistand und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der 
UdSSR. Ein Offener Brief an Frau Else Walther,” 1964, p. 3. 
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opinion was more about “equip[ping] state and party to react to difficulties which arose, not to 
take account of popular demands in the policy-planning process.”38  
 
Close Relations with the Soviet Union: Necessity and Obsession 
 
In addition to creating legitimacy, the anniversary theses in the 1950s and 1960s also 
sought to underscore the necessity of the GDR’s close connection to the Soviet Union. In honour 
of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957, the theses justified the GDR’s 
following of the Soviet Union’s lead, given that it was the country that “show[ed] the others the 
way, by placing power in the hands of the working people” thus demonstrating how “every 
citizen can influence the shape of state policies.”39 As such, the theses went on, it made sense for 
the Soviet Union to continue on in its capacity as the socialist world’s “guiding light,” especially 
for the young GDR, since:40  
the interests of the Soviet Union are in complete accord with the class interests of the 
German workers and the national interests of the German people. Their experiences in the 
progressive development of society as well as in the struggle for peace, democracy and 
socialism are also entirely valid for the German people. The strengthening of the 
friendship between the German and the Soviet people is a matter of the heart of every 
upright German patriot as it serves the peaceful development of all of Germany.41 
 
By closely following the Soviet Union down this righteous path, the SED proclaimed in their 
theses, the young GDR could identify itself as being part of the “socialist world system,” which, 
                                               
38 Mark Allinson, “Popular Opinion,” in The Workers and Peasants’ State: Communism and Society in East 
Germany under Ulbricht, 1945-71, ed. Patrick Major and Jonathan Osmond (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, UK, 2002), 98.  
39 BArch DY 6/5641. Manfred Gerlach, Tagung des Nationalrats der National Front, “Die Aufgaben der National 
Front zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1. 
40 BArch DY 6/5641. Manfred Gerlach, Tagung des Nationalrats der National Front, “Die Aufgaben der National 
Front zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” 1957, p. 1. 
41 BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” p. 16. 
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at the time, was preoccupied with overthrowing colonialism and fighting to achieve freedom in 
the world.42 
 The anniversary theses also highlighted the sacrifices that the Soviets had made on behalf 
of the Germans during the previous 40 years. For one, they reminded East Germans of what 
“loyal friends” the Soviet Communist Party had been to the German KPD in the 1920s.43 
Secondly, they reminded East Germans that the Soviets had sacrificed many men and a great 
amount of money during the war to defeat the Nazis, who had “left chaos and hunger in their 
wake.”44 Through sacrifices such as these, the theses claimed, the Soviet Union was an example 
to others, for they had “pure” motives in wanting to “liberate” people instead of conquering 
them.45 Holding up the Soviets as saviours and highlighting the sacrifices they made in this way 
not only justified the GDR’s closeness to them, but also sought to rewrite the negative 
experiences East Germans had had at the hands of the Soviets during the occupation. The GDR 
was also not only using this as a basis for its legitimacy, but also as a means for ensuring a 
closeness developed between the two countries so that the Soviet Union would continue to extend 
economic, military and political assistance far into the future. The theses stated that: 
The German-Soviet friendship, the solid and extensive ties between the German 
Democratic Republic and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics, are a formidable 
historic achievement for the democratic forces of the German and Soviet peoples. The 
historical experiences of our people have shown that the close friendship between the 
German and the Soviet people is vital for the whole of Germany. If the German and 
Soviet people fight together for peace, then there will be no more war in Europe.46 
                                               
42 BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” p. 13. 
43 BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” p. 9. 
44 BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” p. 15. 
45 BArch DY 6/5641, Abteilung Agitation und Propaganda beim ZK der SED, “Thesen zum 40. Jahrestag der 
Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” p. 12. 
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Although this closeness to the Soviet Union (especially its military and economic support) 
was necessary to safeguard the GDR’s existence during the GDR’s early years, the extreme 
degree to which Sovietization occurred in the GDR was largely due to the obsessive nature of its 
leader. No one was more dedicated to maintaining these close ties to the Soviet Union than 
Walter Ulbricht, the first General Secretary of the GDR, who was enthralled with Leninism and 
the role the Communist Party played in the Soviet Union. He was described by a contemporary as 
a “half-Bolshevik,” who, along with his authoritarian style of rule and personality cult, made him 
very much a “creature of the KPD apparatus.”47 Ulbricht managed to become General Secretary 
of the SED in 1950 following several years of power struggles. Although the SED was originally 
created as a “Marxist party committed to parliamentary democracy” with roots reaching back to 
both the socialist and KPD ideology in Weimar Germany, it was also highly influenced by the 
theories and practices of Marxist-Leninism, and by 1953, Ulbricht had successfully turned the 
SED into a Stalinist interpretation of Marxist-Leninism based on the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union.48 What this meant in practice was that the SED took over complete control of the 
country’s “political, social, and economic machinery and infused it with a Marxist-Leninist 
ideology.” 49 Or as Jürgen Kocka describes it, Ulbricht and his party “completely subjugated the 
state, sucked it dry as it were, and took its place.”50  
Walter Ulbricht’s style of governing soon became one of “control, unassailable control,” 
which he characterized as entirely necessary due to the existence of the aggressive imperialists on 
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the GDR’s western border.51 Yet, Ulbricht was also “slavishly” devoted to Soviet interests, and, 
as Joanna McKay puts it, he “personally embodied the fundamental dilemma facing the SED” of 
“convinc[ing] the population that it could serve the national interest and Soviet interests 
simultaneously.”52 Beginning in July 1952, at their second party conference, the SED decided to 
increase the pace of their so-called “building up of socialism.” This came in response to the 
Soviet Union’s decision to support the GDR’s continued existence once Adenauer had taken the 
step of signing the Paris Treaties, formally anchoring West Germany to the Western Allies.53 The 
SED started implementing increasingly draconian political, economic and social policies, such as 
policies of hindering private enterprise (like employing increasingly coercive tactics to promote 
agricultural collectivization), imposing stricter private property laws, as well as increasing the 
efficiency of factory working hours. As a result of the labour shortages caused by the masses of 
people who had already left for the West in combination with the increased movement of 
agricultural workers into the factories, the population that remained in the GDR suffered from 
food, goods, materials, and equipment shortages. 54 The SED and the trade union (FDGB) also 
tried to increase labour productivity and decrease pay: although resisted by the population, there 
was an increase in imposing (increasingly by coercive means) industry and agricultural quotas, 
such as a raise of 10% by May 1953. In addition, increases in taxes and prices caused workers’ 
wages to decrease by one third.55 Then there also were political changes such as converting the 
German Länder into smaller, Soviet-style “districts” (Bezirke), as well as educational system 
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reforms, such as pressures to implement Soviet-style classes and to emphasize the role of the 
party; finally, the influence of religion and the churches was also curbed in schools.56  
As a result of these oppressive “reforms,” the population soured on the leadership, and 
Peter Grieder describes the atmosphere in the GDR by early 1953 as one “approaching a state of 
civil war.”57 The SED, however, refused to see the seriousness of the situation. Amidst a general 
feeling of instability in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death that March, the SED leadership 
was summoned to Moscow in early June 1953 and informed that they needed to reverse their 
policies by implementing a so-called “New Course.” The Soviet Communist Party had decided 
that the SED’s build-up of socialism was happening too fast and recommended this change in 
course in order to avoid disaster. The SED was instead supposed to work towards establishing a 
democratic and united Germany.58  Moscow argued that the conditions necessary in order to 
successfully build up socialism did not exist in the GDR at the time, as not only did they lack 
certain key material goods, but most importantly, they had not yet prepared enough of the 
ideological groundwork needed in order to attract certain social groups such as farmers, the 
intelligentsia, or artisans.59  The “New Course” was thus intended to slow collectivization, the 
focus on heavy industry and the attacks on private enterprise; improve the availability of 
consumer products; protect human rights; stop the persecution of certain segments of society 
such as the religious and the intelligentsia; and increase the power of other mass organizations 
with respect to the SED.60 Implementing these directives, however, confused the SED leadership 
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and caused heated debate.61 Ulbricht was naturally opposed to all of these recommendations, 
particularly with regard to unifying Germany. Nevertheless, the so-called “New Course” was 
proclaimed on June 11, 1953. However, it was already too late and on June 16, near the large 
building site on Stalinallee in Berlin, major strikes began.62 Construction workers were then 
joined by other workers, all of whom were protesting poor working conditions and low pay. The 
protests soon turned away from the issue of the remaining quota increase, and became 
increasingly political, with protesters demanding free elections. By June 17, the strikes had 
grown exponentially, turning into an uprising and spreading to other cities throughout East 
Germany. This was only brought to an end on June 18 with the arrival of Soviet troops and 
tanks.63   
In the aftermath of the uprising, although Ulbricht came close to losing his position as 
leader and despite the likelihood he would continue his hardline attitudes, the Soviets chose to 
keep him in power. As Harrison explains, this was due to the struggles within the Soviet 
leadership at the time, particularly the fall and arrest of First Deputy Premier Lavrentiy Beria, 
who had advocated liberalization and a softer stance with regards to the West. Instead, the Soviets 
focused on providing the GDR with financial assistance, including the cancelling of their debts 
with the Soviet Union, in order to raise the standard of living, as Soviet Premier Khrushchev 
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wanted the GDR to establish its own legitimacy and stability without relying on Soviet military 
intervention.64 
In the years following, two of Khrushchev’s main goals were to consolidate his own 
power in the Soviet Union while simultaneously easing tensions with the West. 65 During these 
years, the East Germans were granted increasing independence from Moscow, including the 1955 
establishment of a friendship treaty and the granting of full sovereignty (which the Soviets also 
granted to West Germany in the hopes of pulling them away from the West). This era became 
known as the “Khrushchev thaw” in the Soviet Union and it remained a turbulent period in the 
Eastern Bloc. As had occurred in East Germany in 1953, strikes in Poland and a revolution in 
Hungary in 1956 required Soviet military intervention. Throughout these years of instability, 
Ulbricht remained steadfast in his policies, using the “SED apparatus” to his own advantage and 
the “authoritarian political culture” of the GDR to consolidate his hold over society.66 In 1955, 
Ulbricht even declared that the New Course had been a bad move that had only given people 
wrong-headed ideas.67   
Even though the Soviets were deeply concerned with the people fleeing to the West due in 
part to the lack of freedom, Ulbricht continued his authoritarian course of action, as well as his 
devotion to Soviet interests. This was reflected in the anniversary theses. As mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, the SED theses written in honour of the 40th anniversary of the October 
Revolution in 1957 continued to present the Soviet Union as the vanguard that would continue to 
show the GDR the way forward. Despite the obvious contradiction with reality, the theses 
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claimed this path was about placing power in the hands of the working people, thereby allowing 
every citizen to influence state policies. There were great social benefits to be had, the theses 
went on, as Soviets citizens’ lives had been improved by policies that ensured full employment, 
women’s rights, access to education and financial support for students, free healthcare, many 
holidays and sports, an ability to participate in the cultural life of the nation, freedom to conduct 
research, and the lowering of prices resulting in ever greater prosperity.68  
Nonetheless, in spite of such claims, there is no evidence that the people were convinced 
of the necessity of their overly close connection to the Soviet Union, either in the 1950s or in the 
following thirty years. That the 1957 theses (or later ones, for that matter), did not convince the 
public of the necessity of the Soviet connection becomes clear when looking at ordinary East 
Germans’ opinions on the anniversary theses in honour of the 15th anniversary of the GDR. On 
June 12, 1964, the GDR signed a so-called “Friendship Treaty” with the Soviet Union, which the 
theses described as follows: 
The treaty grants our Republic security against all external attacks and strongly supports 
the fight for peace and peaceful coexistence in Germany. It allows forces to take effect to 
such an extent that the imperialist system in West Germany has nothing equivalent with 
which to counter. Thus, on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the GDR, more than 
ever before, it is not imperialism but socialism that will determine the fate and future of 
the German nation.69     
 
In order to stop the spread of any misinformation and stem the development of further negative 
opinions, as previously mentioned, the National Front secretariat in Dresden had created an 
accessible pamphlet defending the newly-signed “friendship treaty,” which the theses extolled as 
completely necessary.”70 Furthermore, the pamphlet defended the treaty in economic terms: that 
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it would improve quality in exports and fix deadline delays, high costs, and lower production. It 
pointed out the Soviet Union was the GDR’s largest trading partner with 11.2 billion MDN in 
trade in 1964 alone, and was also a major raw materials and consumer goods provider, supplying 
the GDR with technical assistance in return for the machines, materials, ships and chemicals 
produced by the GDR.71 The pamphlet also claimed that “the stronger our republic is, the better a 
partner it will be for the Soviet Union in the next twenty years, and the greater its international 
reputation will become.”72  
In this pamphlet, the National Front also betrayed the SED’s continuing insecurity about 
the GDR’s international status, especially vis-à-vis the West, by stating that the friendship treaty 
had put East Germany in a better position to compete with West Germany.73 For, as the theses 
claimed, a deeper connection to the Soviet Union, “the world’s strongest peaceful power and the 
strongest socialist economy,” would encourage the GDR’s own “rapid technological 
development,” increase its productivity, as well as increase East Germans’ “work satisfaction.”74  
The theses also underscored the necessity of the Soviet connection by using scare tactics, arguing 
that closeness to the Soviet Union was the GDR’s only chance of preventing war and ensuring 
peace. For, according to the pamphlet, the German “capitalists” in the West – people like 
Thyssen, Siemens, Adenauer, Strauß, Erhard and Seebohm – wanted to prevent international 
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recognition of the GDR because they were planning to expand onto Eastern territory.75 In 
response to the question as to whether this new “friendship treaty” would now make German 
unification more difficult, the pamphlet asserted that the GDR leadership remained interested in 
reunification and had indeed been trying to ease tensions between the two countries. However, 
the pamphlet claimed that the problem lay entirely with the West: that West Germany had caused 
the division in the first place and was still trying to deepen it.76  
Based on some of the anti-Soviet views they had already heard from the populace, 
Comrade Rogowski of Berlin’s central Agitation Commission remarked that it should be a top 
priority for their office to quickly respond and correct them. He said: “We must enable our 
friends, spokespersons, officials, and agitators to respond more concretely to what ‘flies through 
the ether’ into the heads of our people.”77 The problem for the Agitation Commission was that 
people in the streets had been asking questions like: “Why do we even need a friendship treaty? It 
is not like it is going to change anything” and “We understand the treaty – why is there such great 
discussion around it? This is totally unnecessary.” Other East Germans were of the negative 
opinion that “as a result of this pact, we (the GDR) will become completely dependent on the 
Soviet Union,” which will certainly result in “at least twenty more years of [German] division.” 
Still others questioned Soviet motives, asking “Why does the Soviet Union even need us? We are 
such a small country.”78 Others voiced the opinion that what the friendship treaty between GDR 
                                               
75 BArch DY 6/ 2395. Bezirk Dresden National Front Committee, Kommission für Agitation,“5 Fragen – 5 
Antworten zum Vertrag über Freundschaft, gegenseitigen Beistand und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der 
UdSSR. Ein Offener Brief an Frau Else Walther,” 1964, p. 2-3. 
76 BArch DY 6/ 2395. Bezirk Dresden National Front Committee, Kommission für Agitation,“5 Fragen – 5 
Antworten zum Vertrag über Freundschaft, gegenseitigen Beistand und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der 
UdSSR. Ein Offener Brief an Frau Else Walther,” 1964, p. 2. 
77 SED Ideological Commission members also belonged to Berlin’s central Agitation Commission. BArch DY 
6/2396. H. Rogowski of Agitationskommission, “Bericht: Sitzung der Bez. Agit.-Kommission Leipzig am 8.7.1964,” 
July 9, 1964, p. 2-3.  
78 BArch DY 6/2396. H. Rogowski of Agitationskommission, “Bericht: Sitzung der Bez. Agit.-Kommission Leipzig 
am 8.7.1964,” July 9, 1964, p. 2. 
 
 72 
and the Soviets really meant was that it would be “at least twenty years” before they could visit 
West Germany.79  
Suspicion and distrust of the Soviet Union was to be found everywhere, with a group of 
people in Leipzig asking if the “revolution” the GDR was supposedly taking part in was really 
“of their own making,” as “it sounds more like it is the Soviet Union’s revolution.”80  This same 
group of people went on to argue that, in direct contrast to what the theses were claiming, it did 
not appear to them that the goals of the Soviet Union and other socialist states actually intersected 
with those of the GDR, especially not in the way that the theses were claiming.81 Rather, in spite 
of the genuine economic benefits the GDR enjoyed from being part of the Soviet economic 
system, ordinary Leipzigers actually suspected that the Soviets were taking advantage of them 
since “we are delivering high quality machines, but only receive bad quality metal and bad 
automobiles in return.”82 This distrust extended to their other socialist “brothers” as well, as some 
East Germans expressed the view that other socialist states were not pulling their weight 
agriculturally.83  
 Overall, responses such as these show that there was a balance the state needed to strike 
between creating enough legitimacy (via their connection to the Soviets and their history) so as to 
create stability, and limiting its pro-Soviet rhetoric enough that a public already hostile to the 
Soviet Union would not be further alienated. Although the GDR was stable enough (due to the 
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building of the Wall) by the 1960s to prevent people protesting by fleeing, the SED was still 
invested in convincing people of its narrative.  
 
Creating a new East German Identity through Economic Progress, 1960s-1970s 
 
The 1960s were a time when the SED was particularly intent on creating a separate 
identity from West Germany. Jan Palmowski characterizes this as part and parcel of the SED’s 
attempt during the decade following 1958 at “creating a new socialist individual” by first creating 
a “socialist national culture” in economy and society.84 With the erection of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 making clear unification was nowhere on the horizon, the East German leadership was able 
to negotiate a distinctively German socialist identity. After changing the wording of GDR 
passports in 1964 to proclaim their holders as “citizens of the German Democratic Republic,” in 
1967, the GDR created an independent citizenship law that directly challenged the West’s 
longstanding claim to represent all Germans living within the 1937 borders of the former Third 
Reich.85 Other legitimization measures the SED undertook included rewriting the GDR 
constitution, first in 1968, and then again in 1974, to be “solely based on principles of socialist 
law,” altering the original 1949 constitution’s basis on the German people and “German 
nation.”86 As Sebastian Gehrig explains, the legitimacy of this new constitution and the concept 
of a GDR citizen was based on the idea of a people’s free choice to self-determination.87 In a 
sharp rebuke of the West, the National Front described the GDR as the first “truly democratically 
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legitimate German state” as determined by “the majority of the German people [who] want their 
own peace loving and anti-fascist, democratic Germany.”88 
This attempt at identity creation pervades the GDR’s 1964 anniversary theses. In them, 
the SED explains what characteristics set the people of the GDR apart. They were a society of 
“educated people” who took part in research, especially in the sciences, math, medicine and 
agricultural disciplines.89 The SED claimed it was dedicated to increasing education in all 
subjects while simultaneously connecting these to practical life experience in a so-called “unity 
of the classroom and productive work experience.”90 The theses argued that socialism was 
dedicated to the youth, and provided both boys and girls with all the opportunities they would 
ever need, including learning about their responsibilities and how to work “creatively.”91 
Furthermore, through its antifascist-democratic school reforms, the theses claimed the state was 
“freeing” the youth from the influences of militarism and fascism and offering children of all 
socio-economic backgrounds the chance to be educated for the first time. In school in the GDR, 
these children would learn about “peace, friendship amongst peoples, and humanism.”92 The SED 
was certain the schools teaching such principles would begin the transformation of ordinary 
people “into socialist human beings who look confidently into the future, and who serve the 
further development of society with all their talents and abilities.”93  
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Ultimately, the theses were intended to demonstrate a sense of the country’s progress: that 
the more difficult times were behind them, and that the socialist system would ensure a great 
future for everyone. In contrast to the West, the theses point out that all regions of the GDR were 
committed to ensuring women were valued in society and government, claiming that “for the first 
time in the history of Germany, the girls and women of the GDR have the opportunity to 
demonstrate their abilities and talents and to take an active part in societal life.”94 The theses cite 
the fact that women made up 27% of the Volkskammer compared to only 8% of the West German 
Bundestag as “proof” of the growing power of women – even though the Volkskammer in 
actuality exercised very little real power.95 Furthermore, the Party was proud to say that 650 000 
women were competing in production collectives for the title of “Socialist Work Collective,” 
with 33 330 women awarded medals for their extraordinary work efforts.96 The theses also 
pointed out how egalitarian high culture was in the GDR: “the arts, which in the capitalist society 
are accessible only to a small group of chosen people, can be taken in by all in the GDR.” 97 In 
effect, the socialist GDR was a “true people’s culture” with a variety of artists and genres of 
artistic culture that could serve all levels of society, with 100 000 workers belonging to artist 
movements in 1964.98 Ultimately, the theses point out that the country’s “spiritual foundation is 
the connection of art with life, the artist with the people, and the people with art.99  
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The reason the SED leadership could finally begin to define what being East German 
meant was because of the massive changes that came about in the early 1960s. While the 1957 
anniversary theses had celebrated the fact that, in 1955, Moscow granted the GDR full 
sovereignty, as well as the fact that the GDR had joined the newly-formed Warsaw Pact, thus 
better enabling them to defend “the building of our socialist state,” in reality, these were small 
victories that ultimately did not solve the main problem of the era.100 What the leadership actually 
needed to do was overcome the economic and social issues that were causing hundreds of 
thousands of East Germans to flee to the West each year, amounting to millions by the end of the 
decade. While such a population loss certainly did not help with the state’s international 
reputation, even worse was the economic effect that it had on the already struggling economy. In 
comparison to West Germany, which grew by nearly nine million people between 1948 and 
1961, the GDR’s population declined by two million, from 19.1 to 17.1 million people, during 
the same time span.101 Many of those who left were young, educated and skilled, which caused a 
major problem not only for the country’s economy, but it also did not bode well for the GDR’s 
existence.  
In response, during the late 1950s, the SED carried out some economic and social 
transformations more in line with Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s destalinization measures. At the 
SED V Party Congress in July 1958, for example, the Party decided to embark on a 7-year-plan 
that would “build up” socialism and increase consumption of basic consumer goods.  During the 
first half of 1958, food rationing also finally ended, although prices rose slightly as a result. For 
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those who could not afford any higher prices, the SED promised wage increases, while 
necessities such as bread, cereals, potatoes, as well as utilities and public transportation would 
continue to be subsidized.102 These social reforms were also undertaken partly due to Khrushchev 
wanting to flaunt East Germany as the most successful socialist state, “a vanguard in the struggle 
against capitalism.”103 Further “reforms” included increased agricultural collectivization efforts, 
which inevitably led to food shortages and certain regions needing to begin rationing items such 
as butter again.104 While the war had only ended a decade before and the quality of life had 
certainly improved since then, the reality was that just across the border, West Germany was 
booming as a result of its “economic miracle.” The contrast was stark.  
As the 1950s wore on, the refugee crisis did not abate, but rather, grew progressively 
worse. In total, 2.7 million people escaped into West Germany between the founding of the GDR 
in 1949 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Of these, nearly one million had been 
gainfully employed in East Germany, amounting to 13.4% of the working population.105 After 
1953, the year of the June uprising (when over 330 000 people fled), the second highest volume 
of departures was in 1956 (with 1957 following a close third), during which almost 280 000 
people left for West Germany. In fact, in 1956, more people were fleeing every month than the 
previous month.106 This was due to the crises in Hungary and Poland that had caused shortages 
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for the GDR population, especially because industrial production was held back by a shortage of 
raw materials, including coal and steel.107  
While there were many reasons that people fled, three of the most common reasons were 
political, economic and situational. 108 Economically, there was good reason to leave, especially 
for skilled workers, for due to its “economic miracle,” West Germany was growing very rapidly 
and offered opportunities for good and well paid work. There were also political reasons that 
ranged from disagreement with the SED’s political ideology to simply fearing instability and 
repression. Patrick Major points out that any changes in the political atmosphere increased the 
number of those fleeing, such as a surge in the aftermath of the June 1953 uprising, and a decline 
during more relaxed periods in international relations, such as following the Geneva conference 
in 1955.109 For other people, leaving was more about reunifying with family members who had 
left previously, which resulted in so-called “chain departures,” where once one family member 
departed for the West, slowly other members followed.110 
As can be traced in the theses, rather than see any deficiencies in their own system, the 
SED blamed this flood westward on external factors such as, for example, the West, which, 
“under the pretext of easing tensions, [was] using propaganda about a so-called ‘ideological 
coexistence’ to spread imperialist ideology in the GDR.”111 In response, the SED attempted to 
combat this supposed problem through “‘increased vigilance,’ heightened ‘ideological struggle,’ 
and strengthening the ‘educational and mass cultural work’ within the populace.”112 What this 
                                               
107 Steiner, The Plans that Failed, 87.  
108 Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers of Power (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 191. 
109 Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, 198-9 
110 Patrick Major, “Going West,” 191. 
111 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 56.  
112 Corey Ross, “Before the Wall: East Germans, Communist Authority, and the Mass Exodus to the West,” The 
Historical Journal 45, vol 2. (2002), 464. See also, Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, 194. 
 
 79 
meant was that, as Corey Ross explains, the SED wanted to present Republikflucht as resulting 
from East Germans either having been “seduced by western agents or [having] succumbed to 
empty promises of a better life.”113 Another explanation the Party offered was a “lack of 
‘ideological steadfastness’ on the part of people who were ‘betraying’ or ‘deserting’ the socialist 
project.”114 Ross concludes that the way the Party dealt with these situations was essentially 
through a “tightening of political control” which, of course, was often a main reason that people 
left in the first place.115 It was a self-defeating strategy. 
The building of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 finally solved the “problem” of the 
open border. Indeed, the GDR’s 15th anniversary theses boasted of having “secured the state 
border” (Sicherung der Staatsgrenze) against the dangers posed by the West.116 Overnight, the 
Wall reinforced the GDR’s existence as a distinctly separate state from the West and made the 
division of the two countries much more permanent. Although Ulbricht had long desired a more 
secure border, it was only during a three-day meeting of the political consultative committee of 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization in early August 1961 that the decision was made to create a 
border wall.117 It is likely that the decision to build the Wall was influenced in part by US 
President Kennedy’s televised speech in July 1961 from Washington, in which the president 
made clear to the world that the US would continue to defend West Berlin’s existence. It is also 
likely that the Soviets made this decision because they resented the economic drain that the GDR 
was on the Soviet economy, at essentially “supplying [the] bottomless pit of the GDR economy” 
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whilst itself struggling with shortages.118 As Patrick Major explains, the other alternative, that of 
organizing another blockade of West Berlin, was just too difficult to implement, especially as the 
Soviets failed miserably the first time in 1947-48.119  
Once the border was closed, the SED could go about “building up” socialism without the 
constant threat of people fleeing in reaction to any unpopular measures. In the anniversary theses 
of 1957, pride and legitimacy in the state had been mostly based on the GDR’s membership in 
the great “socialist world system” led by the Soviet Union. However, the existence of the Wall 
slightly changed this messaging: it is clear from internal memos that the Party designed their 15th 
anniversary theses of 1964 to remind GDR citizens of their recent past in order to contrast it to 
their present successes. By the mid-1960s, the SED thought new opportunities would lead the 
economy to grow even stronger, which would in turn raise the living standard, as it claimed 
industrial production had risen a total of 344% from 1950 to 1963.120  The SED also claimed the 
construction of the Wall resulted in increased investments in production from 1960 to 1963 by 
108% and in individual consumption by 105%.121 Impressive numbers like these were designed 
to encourage East Germans’ “pride in their own efforts,” as well as to develop confidence in their 
own abilities.122  The truth was, however, that closing the border did not entirely solve the GDR’s 
economic problems. Initially, the supply of basic goods actually got worse, and by the summer of 
1962, there were fewer supplies than a year before, with some regions having less butter and 
meat than when rations were still in effect, while fishmeal and water was being added to meat 
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products elsewhere.123 These food and manufactured goods shortages lasted into 1963 and it was 
only through raising prices to decrease demand while also increasing imports from the West that 
the SED was able to gain control of the situation.124 Although the intensification of agricultural 
collectivization had seriously affected agricultural production, goods and food production did rise 
from 1963 onwards.125  
 Ulbricht was a main proponent of the New Economic System (NES) of 1963/1964, 
which aimed to modernize the economy and increase productivity and quality, all while lowering 
costs in an attempt to “simulate market mechanisms” without actually introducing them.126  The 
way to achieve this increased productivity was through opening up to western technologies and 
increasing further scientific technological development.127 Indeed, the SED described the NES as 
combining “the great goals of scientific and technological advances directly with the material 
interests of individuals and collectives of our society.”128 The technological advances taking 
place “under the rule and leadership of the working class” included new blasting furnaces and 
steelworks, brown coal collectives, large chemical plants, modern shipyards, a deep-sea fleet, a 
capable mechanical engineering industry, and an electronic industry.129  The closed border 
allowed a certain relief in the pressures of consumer demand: now the SED would have time to 
carry out improvements in order to increase the supply to the consumer.130 In doing all of this, 
Andre Steiner argues that the SED was essentially “wooing” the populace “for acceptance.”131 
                                               
123 Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, 166. 
124 Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand, 210-11. 
125 Steiner, The Plans that Failed, 129. 
126 Steiner, The Plans that Failed, 109- 111.   
127 Major, The Behind the Berlin Wall, 166. 
128 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 18. 
129 BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/938, Thesen des Zentralkommitees der SED zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 16. 
130 Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand, 212. 
131 Steiner, The Plans that Failed, 112. 
 
 82 
Indeed, the SED claimed that by 1963, huge gains had been made in the availability of consumer 
goods, amounting to 38/100 households owning a television set (up from 5/100 in 1958), 16/100 
households having refrigerators (from 2/100 in 1958), while 18/100 households owned electric 
washing machines (up from 2/100 in 1958).132 The National Front argued that continuing to 
strengthen the economy through the technical revolution and the NES was not only their best 
defence against the West, but would also result in them overtaking the West economically. Once 
this happened, the SED argued in the 15th anniversary theses, it would prove that the modern 
socialist economy could stand strong on the international stage. 133 
However, these reforms ran into difficulties just a few short years later. In reality, 
simulating market mechanisms never worked because central control was only slightly and 
temporarily eased, prices were never reformed, and Moscow was never really supportive of them, 
especially after Leonid Brezhnev replaced the more reform-minded Khrushchev as Soviet 
Premier.134 Other problems with the reforms included workers complaining about the continued 
use of outdated and substandard equipment and a lack of raw materials.135  This was made worse 
when in 1964-65, the Soviet Union cut deliveries of raw materials and agricultural products, 
forcing the GDR to turn to the West.136 During 1965/66, as a result of further difficulties, 
Ulbricht announced at the 11th Plenum meeting in December 1965 that there would be a partial 
return to the centralized economy.137 Then, in 1967, a different “Economic System of Socialism” 
replaced the original New Economic System, involving long-term forecasts determining 
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production and consumption, with sectors such as chemicals, engineering, electronics, 
manufacturing of data-processing technology and automation given priority in resource 
allocation.138  Despite all of the economic growth the GDR experienced in the 1960s, including 
importantly in investments, the gap between East and West continued to grow.139 All economic 
reform came to an end when the SED reintroduced central planning after the events of the 1968 
Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia and Moscow took a hardline position against any further 
liberalization measures.140  
 
Public Opinion: Struggling to Adapt to State Policy  
 
An important aspect of disseminating the anniversary theses was for the National Front to 
find out what messages the populace had actually absorbed. During the 1960s in particular, 
officials were curious to see whether ordinary people believed the anniversary messaging that 
promoted the growing economic prosperity and the ever-expanding welfare state. In inquiring 
about the populace’s thoughts on the theses, which likely happened at forums, discussions after 
lectures, and other gatherings, National Front representatives reported that for many East 
Germans, the most pressing issues were those of the travel restrictions and their frustrations with 
contradictions in the state’s messaging vis-à-vis the West. As previously discussed, East Germans 
told officials time and again that based on their personal experiences with Westerners, the West 
was neither as dangerous nor as economically disadvantaged as the official propaganda made it 
out to be and thus the border need not be closed. But the National Front also discovered that 
many East Germans simply did not believe the anniversary theses’ outlandish claims that eastern 
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economic prosperity exceeded that of the West, especially as they could not travel there to see for 
themselves. 
One major result of putting up the Berlin Wall was that the GDR population’s travel 
options during the 1960s became very limited to places within the GDR (Baltic resorts, Harz 
mountains, Erzgebirge) and also to certain areas within the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc 
countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland (opportunities that were reduced after 1968 and 
1980 respectively) as well as Bulgaria. Even in these cases, there were bureaucratic delays in 
obtaining the necessary visas before visa-free travel was introduced in 1972.141 Yet, opportunities 
to travel elsewhere, particularly westwards, were simply not available for most of the GDR 
population. Indeed, by the 1970s and 1980s, as Charles Maier comments, many young people 
would have preferred travel opportunities to even “abstract intellectual freedoms.”142  
While preventing a further drain on the economy, the SED’s decision to limit western 
travel to the elderly was not a popular one amongst the rest of the population, as everyone wanted 
the chance to travel. Although most regions reported some people expressing the opinion that 
allowing the elderly to travel was a step in the right direction towards easing border tensions, 
others had many objections. Questions the public raised included those from young people from 
Halle, who asked: “Why are the travel restrictions not applied in the same way to all? Do they 
really not trust the younger citizens at all?” At the very least, these young people argued, the 
leadership could “loosen the restrictions in the event of a severe illness or death in the family” to 
all age groups.143 Another option people wanted implemented included allowing the elderly who 
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were overly ill or frail to be accompanied by younger caregivers.144 Others pointed out that only 
allowing the elderly to travel was very convenient for the leadership because “if they were to stay 
over there, then the state will no longer have to pay them their pensions, and their apartments will 
then become vacant [and thereby help ease the housing shortage].”145 In another instance, some 
young Berliners put it even more directly, commenting that “those who are retired are just a drain 
on the country, so we are giving them the opportunity to just take off.”146 
Meanwhile, youth in Bezirk Gera, seemingly unafraid of posing difficult questions, asked 
the National Front representatives directly if it “was really necessary to shoot people at the 
Wall?”147 Others in Gera cynically picked up on the National Front’s continuously evolving 
rhetoric and asked why those GDR citizens who had fled West had been previously denounced as 
“traitors” or “the enemy,” but were now suddenly being courted as “welcome guests” back in the 
GDR?148 In Karl-Marx-Stadt, some people questioned why exactly the GDR’s border control 
“was so strict, even between other socialist nations?,” rightly pointing out that “this is not the 
case between capitalist countries like West Germany and Italy.”149  Others, knowing that the SED 
was trying to entice West Germans to visit the GDR during their anniversary celebrations in 
order to get them to participate in the “demonstrations” that took place, asked why these West 
                                               
144 BArch DY 6/2397. Agitationskommission, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, “Bericht über die Thesen 
zum 15. Jahrestag der DDR,” September 25, 1964, p. 2. 
145 BArch DY 6/2397. Agitationskommission, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, “Bericht über die Thesen 
zum 15. Jahrestag der DDR,” September 25, 1964, p. 2; BArch DY 6/2397. Kreissekretär Schipporeit of the National 
Front Kreisausschuß Schwerin-Stadt, “Informationsbericht Nr 3. Über die Vorbereitungen zum 15. Jahrestag der 
DDR,” September 21, 1964, p. 2. 
146 BArch DY 6/2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates, Kommission für Agitation/Presse, “Presse Information Nr. 33,” 
(Kirchhof copy), September 21, 1964, p. 2. 
147 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage 
zum Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 5.  
148 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage 
zum Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 5. 
149 BArch DY 6/ 2396. Horst Brasch to Paula Acker, Zentrale Agitationskommission beim ZK der SED, “Anlage 
zum Brief von 14.9.1964,” September 14, 1964, p. 5. 
 
 86 
Germans could not just visit their East German relatives instead?150 In Pirna, in Bezirk Dresden, 
people even described the futility of expressing such opinions: “Since August 13, 1961 the 
citizens of the GDR have been living in a prison. We can make however many suggestions we 
want, but it will change nothing in the relationship between the two German states.”151 Surely, 
these are not the comments of a public that was onside the state’s message. Feelings of mistrust, a 
“prison-like” atmosphere, a sense of unfairness amongst the younger segment of the population, 
and a generally cynical view towards official state policy point toward a public that was unhappy 
with – yet resigned to –  the drudgery of their existence.  
From the official perspective, Comrade Rogowski of the Agitation Commission in 
Leipzig was of the opinion that a major reason the populace was challenging the official version 
of events as laid out in numerous propaganda – the anniversary theses included – was due to the 
population’s access to Western media. People on the streets repeatedly cited their opposing 
opinions as having come from the West German press, what the National Front referred to as that 
“hostile” (feindliche) television and radio.152 It is also clear from the markings in the margins of 
the regional opinion reports that officials in Berlin were indeed reading these reports and taking 
stock of the negative opinions. The Agitation Commission of Dresden stated that: “The question 
that is becoming more urgent is: How can we help our activist friends and helpers answer the 
many questions of our population in the enterprises and residential areas in a better and more 
convincing way?”153 As a result, the National Front recommended the press and representatives 
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leading subsequent theses discussions to address any critiques by presenting counter-
arguments.154 What this continuing presence of negative opinions tells us is that many East 
Germans, at least in this time period, felt able to express their misgivings about state policy 
directly to National Front officials themselves (albeit lower-level ones) to the point where 
officials came to expect such responses. 
Some East Germans were even willing to go beyond criticizing individual policies and 
cast doubt on the entire socialist project. In a few instances, several people directly contradicted 
the theses’ claim about the GDR’s current economic prosperity, questioning whether the GDR 
would actually “ever catch up and overtake the West.” They pointed out that the GDR press itself 
had admitted that the GDR was still currently behind the West. One person in Schwerin made the 
point that “overtaking capitalism is not really possible because capitalism itself does not stand 
still in its development.”155 In Dresden, some people stated that while they found socialism in the 
GDR to be “okay,” they did not much like the accompanying difficulties in obtaining and 
distributing goods, which seemed to them to be “a contradiction” (Widerspruch) of what 
socialism should be about.156 In Karl-Marx-Stadt, people argued that the GDR was certainly not 
as strong economically as the theses were claiming and that other socialist countries were 
struggling as much as they were: “If we are as strong as the theses claim, then why does our East 
Mark not have the same international recognition as the West Mark?”157 
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Overall, negative opinions such as these are a strong indicator that many East Germans 
were not absorbing the anniversary theses in the way that the SED wanted. Access to western 
media certainly played a role in this rejection, but also, the inability of ordinary people to be 
heard by those in power in order to be able to effect change was also an important factor. Even 
though some East Germans were so cynical that they voiced some misgivings about the socialist 
project directly, such opinions indicate that while many had accepted the situation in the GDR, 
they nevertheless desired the ability to change specific policies they felt were unjust – such as the 
shooting deaths of those trying to escape over the Wall or the SED’s mischaracterization of the 
dangers of the West.  
Although the peoples’ inability to effect substantial political change from within their 
own country would never change, a change in the international situation at the end of the 1960s 
led the East German leadership to begin to make changes of their own accord from within, such 
as replacing Ulbricht with Erich Honecker, as well as taking real steps on the outside towards 
achieving legitimacy on the world stage. As early as the 1964 theses, the SED had boasted that 
despite West Germany’s attempts to isolate the GDR, “the reactionary Hallstein Doctrine has 
been breached.”158 Although such a claim was premature at that time, it became a reality just a 
few years later. While the conservative wing of the ruling western CDU/CSU had long been 
opposed to rapprochement with the East, beginning in the mid-1960s, the West German SPD 
became open to détente, with the process accelerating when it came to power in May 1969.159 
One of the main goals of the SED in pursuing rapprochement with the West was that of economic 
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benefit, as the leadership wanted “increased trade in desirable goods, easy terms of payment and 
credit, and direct financial transfers and payments.”160 Both Ulbricht and later Honecker wanted 
to prove that the East could be made into “a model of socialist economic success” every bit as  
economically viable as the West.161 However, as Mary Sarotte argues, détente was less about the 
two Germanies working it out amongst themselves, than it was about the relationship between the 
Soviet Union and the US. She describes SED negotiations during Ostpolitik as “a mixture of 
financial and political motives and constrained by the need to follow Soviet guidance” where the 
SED’s most important priority alternated between international recognition and financial gain.162  
Despite the fact that the West ultimately refused to officially recognize the GDR, 
“normalized” relations were established between the two countries when the Basic Treaty was 
signed in 1972 (and the East conveniently accepted hundreds of millions of West German Marks 
worth of credit at the same time).163 This meant increased movement of goods, representatives 
instead of ambassadors, reconnecting telephones between East and West Berlin, and importantly, 
a loosening of travelling restrictions for Western visitors to come see their close Eastern 
relatives.164 In 1971-72, there was also a predictable rise in Western visitors, something which 
also helpfully increased the flow of West German currency into the country.165  
 
The Superiority of Socialism: Improved Social Policies and International Legitimacy 
 
A month prior to the 25th Anniversary of the Founding of the GDR in 1974, the National 
Front Central Committee told its regional counterparts to remind East Germans in the events for 
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the upcoming anniversary that “during the years of the growth of the republic –  our very 
successful years – socialist society has become much richer, and the social ownership of every 
citizen has become much more valuable. This is what is driving our growing prosperity.”166 
During the same year, new GDR leader Erich Honecker echoed a similar idea when he told a 
regional SED delegate conference that: “Our country has successfully entered a new phase in the 
development of socialism. Great advances are as noticeable in people's everyday lives as they are 
in the economy and in the development of spiritual and cultural life.”167   
The SED was proud of what it had achieved in just twenty-five years, arguing in its 25th 
anniversary theses that the obvious vitality of socialism on German soil had proven once and for 
all “the superiority of their humanitarian (menschenfreundlichen) society over [an] inhumane 
(menschenfeindlichen) imperialist society.”168 Also noteworthy was that the anniversary theses 
from the early 1970s onwards, such as those in honour of the 30th anniversary of the end of 
World War II, the Befreiung vom Faschismus in 1975, began referring to the existence of “two 
states on German soil: the socialist German national state of the GDR and the mono-capitalist 
West German Federal Republic, an imperialist NATO-state.”169 This new era also heralded 
important changes in rhetoric, where the Party dropped references to reunification and a reunited 
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German people and began reinforcing the GDR’s separate and independent existence by 
replacing references to a “German nation” with simply “GDR.”170  
What had changed was that the international recognition of the existence of two German 
states through détente and West Germany’s new policy of Ostpolitik had given the GDR the 
legitimacy and international recognition it had craved for so long. The GDR could now focus on 
establishing itself on the world stage by joining organizations such as the Helsinki Accord, as 
well as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). However, it was its 
admission to the UN in 1974 that the SED counted as one of their greatest achievements, as was 
diplomatic recognition by a 100th state, Madagascar, in November 1973.171 In addition, the Basic 
Treaty of 1972, by establishing “normalized” relations with the West, resulted in important 
domestic implications such as allowing the East greater access to the Western markets, hard cash 
flow, and most importantly, loans, thus enabling Honecker to improve social welfare programs 
available to the people of the GDR. 
Fulbrook describes this period in the early 1970s as the GDR’s “brief ‘golden age’” in 
which “the early anger and repression of the 1950s was replaced by a more smoothly functioning 
if drab and oppressive system in the 1960s and 1970s.”172 Improvement to social programs had 
first begun under Ulbricht after the SED VII Party Congress in 1967, when the five-day work 
week was implemented, child benefits and pensions grew slightly, and the minimum wage rose 
from 220 to 300 East Marks monthly.173 At the SED’s VIII Party Congress in 1971, Honecker set 
the tone for his tenure by promising wage increases and more availability of consumer goods, as 
                                               
170 McKay, The Official Concept of the Nation in the Former GDR, 99. See also Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, 164.  
171BArch DY 6/ vorl. 2987. Abteilung Agitation beim Sekretariat des Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, “25 
Jahre DDR-Entwicklung und Ergebnisse: Arbeitsmaterial für die Bezirks- und Kreissekretäre der Nationalen Front,” 
September 2, 1974, p. 8. 
172 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 172-173. 
173 Schmidt, “Social Policy in the German Democratic Republic,” 65. 
 
 92 
well as further increases in social services and basic material security. 174 It was also at this time 
that Honecker first established what would, by 1976, become the official “unity of economic and 
social policy” (Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik) –  that is, the creation of social policies 
and subsidization of consumer goods in the short term that would, Honecker believed, eventually 
result in long-term economic gain.175 At its most basic level, the SED thought its social policies 
would “rouse workers to increased work discipline and performance and thereby lift labor 
productivity,” which would, in turn, create more revenue for the state to fund those same social 
policies.176 For, as the National Front explained it, “the higher standard of living we are aiming 
for is, and remains, a commitment to higher performance.”177 
Mark Landsman describes these years of “real existing socialism’” as a time when 
Honecker was actually “expand[ing] consumption and material security in return for political 
quietude, if not loyalty.”178 Improving the availability of and subsidizing the cost of consumer 
goods, as well as by heavily subsidizing public transit and housing, made it appear as though life 
had improved for the average citizen.179 This was not entirely inaccurate, for while still not 
comparable to the prosperity of the West, East Germans’ “moderately comfortable material 
existence,” in spite of some material shortages, was at least superior to elsewhere in the Eastern 
Bloc, especially Poland.180  
The emphasis Honecker placed on his new social policies and their positive impact on the 
economy translated directly into the anniversary theses discussions during the 1970s. For one, the 
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National Front in Berlin told its regional committees to remind the populace that “we can afford 
more now than ever before because we are achieving more economically.”181 The National Front 
also claimed that it had long been common knowledge that “the GDR is above the European 
average for all major consumer goods in terms of per capita consumption or stock per 100 
households.”182 The regional committees were also instructed to communicate to the populace 
that, by 1974, the state was offering 50% more social benefits than had existed between 1966-
1970, benefits that were “an advantage for everyone,” including subsidies for education and 
health care, ensuring low prices of basic needs, and maintaining low and stable rents.183 For a 
four-person family, these subsidies amounted to approximately 290 East Marks per month in 
1965, grew to 360 Marks in 1970, and then grew even more to 470 Marks per month by 1973.184 
At the same time, the state also ensured that workers’ wages increased. The National Front 
reported the average monthly income for an “industry” worker as having increased from 310 
Marks in 1949 to 846 Marks in 1973, while for someone working in the construction industry, the 
average monthly income rose from 300 Marks in 1949 to 901 Marks in 1973.185 The minimum 
wage had also increased, to 350 Marks per month in 1971, and then up to 400 Marks per month 
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by 1976, while working hours had lessened and vacation days had increased.186 The regional 
committees were also to remind the populace of the next great building program that the SED had 
decided upon at their VIII Party Congress. The National Front pointed out that between the years 
1949 to 1973, 1.6 million new apartments had already been built GDR-wide, while in Berlin 
alone, 127 535 new apartments had been constructed, with a further 163 292 being renovated.187   
Overall, the National Front’s theses characterized their jubilee year of 1974 as a 
culmination of years of successful efforts. The anniversary intended to make clear to the East 
German people that their years of sacrifice had resulted in a good standard of living, and that they 
now enjoyed a social safety net that was “better than the uncertainty offered by capitalism 
because no landlord or raising of prices can land us on the street.”188 It seems that the SED’s goal 
went beyond merely trying to keep up with the West, however, and was more about ensuring that 
East Germans were able to realize the social advantages provided by their socialist system could 
not be found in the individualist capitalist West. Therefore, reminding East Germans of such 
benefits was intended to convince them that after years of hard work, their benevolent socialist 
state by the 1970s was not only a success internationally, but also domestically – and was a place 
where people could now flourish.  
 
Diverging with Reality in the late 1970s and 1980s 
At a conference in honour of the 30th anniversary of the GDR in 1979, prominent SED 
ideological strategist Kurt Hager proudly proclaimed that 127 countries had now recognized the 
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GDR’s statehood.189 This widespread recognition of the GDR’s legitimacy was something the 
SED had craved for so long, and yet, contrary to the anniversary theses’ continued claims of 
prosperity, this time period at the end of the 1970s marked the beginning of the GDR’s final 
period of instability and decline. Major describes the advances of the 1970s as having “merely 
created consumerist aspirations which could not be met in the shadow of the Wall.”190 The 
underlying problem was that Honecker and his close advisors, such as Günter Mittag, had chosen 
to maintain the GDR’s “traditional Soviet centralized planning” despite it costing them heavily in 
the form of price subsidies, western goods imports, and expensive social benefits (of which they 
were so proud), all financed through loans from the West.191 Although this plan of taking on 
more debt had initially improved living standards in the early 1970s, it eventually led to trade 
deficits, with the GDR consuming most of their imports, not making enough long-term 
investments, and thus requiring ever more loans (resulting in astronomical interest payments).192 
GDR exports were uncompetitive abroad as their “advanced” technology did not meet Western 
standards of quality, delivery, service and availability of replacement parts, resulting in the GDR 
even more heavily relying on expensive imports.193 Worldwide oil crises in 1973 and 1979 and 
the resulting increases in prices for foreign goods and decreasing deliveries from the Soviet 
Union (especially in 1979), placed the GDR in an increasingly desperate economic situation.194  
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Unsurprisingly, the anniversary theses made no mention of this economic situation and 
indeed claimed the opposite, proudly maintaining the rhetoric of the early 1970s describing the 
GDR as economically sound and still able to offer substantial social benefits. The theses thus 
continued to offer the now 30-year-old justifications as to why socialism was superior to 
capitalism – which betrayed the SED’s continuing insecurities. In a speech in honour of the 30th 
anniversary of the GDR in 1979, Hager reiterated the now rote argument of the GDR as a 
nurturing and benevolent state that cared for its people, in stark contrast to the “old” system of 
capitalism that took advantage of its people. Hager repeated the narrative that it was the initiative 
and willingness of the workers that strengthened state power, “all for the benefit of the whole of 
society and every individual citizen.”195 Even better for the people, Hager pointed out (as so 
many SED officials had done in the 1950s, itself an argument made by the Soviet Communist 
Party), was that the people’s “workers party” continued to run their state.196  Worthy of pride, 
Hager went on, was the GDR’s great “modern education system, ” which, in combination with 
the state’s focus on science, technology, education, health, and culture, had made the GDR into a 
great socialist society and provided great potential for the future.197 In such a country, all workers 
were useful, as they led to the creation of a “healthy and progressive democracy” – something 
which, as Hager made clear, demonstrated socialist culture’s complete superiority over capitalist 
culture.198 Further demonstrating the superiority of the socialist state, Hager declared the GDR as 
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being the embodiment of the values of “true freedom and equality,” a state that “guarantees all 
citizens political freedom and social rights, including equality for all, irrespective of race or 
national identity, worldview, religion or social status.”199 Despite the growing indications to the 
contrary, Hager concluded that “socialism was the future.”200  
The reason the SED sought to continue to emphasize the superiority of socialism from a 
moral standpoint was because as the years went by, it became increasingly obvious to everyone 
that the GDR would never catch up to or surpass the West economically, even if the true nature 
of the state’s debt and impending collapse remained unknown to the public (or even most of the 
Politburo, for that matter). For example, in 1975, locals from Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt pointed out 
to National Front representatives the various inconsistencies in the information they had been 
given by official sources, specifically, the misrepresentation by the state of the level of 
unemployment in the West. They said that visitors who came to the GDR had assured them that: 
“In spite of the crisis, a good standard of living can still be seen in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.”201 Not only did such opinions directly contradict the official Party portrayal of the 
West as teetering on the brink of catastrophe due to widespread unemployment, it also directly 
pointed to the fact that state efforts at painting the GDR as a more successful state than the West 
were not resonating. Other ordinary GDR citizens were even more critical of their state, arguing 
that the capitalist West actually had a better social welfare system than the socialist East, since 
the crises in the West “have brought no significant deterioration in peoples’ living conditions; 
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even if they [the West Germans] are unemployed, they receive higher unemployment benefits 
than we earn in the GDR.”202 
Despite SED Politburo Secretary Günter Mittag and SED State Planning Commission 
Chairman Gerhard Schürer’s best attempts to get Honecker to address the growing debt crisis,203 
Honecker did not wish to cut those social policies of which the SED was so proud and which 
provided some of the last pieces of real proof they could use to argue for the superiority of their 
system over the West. As early as 1974/75, SED banking experts had warned that this course of 
continuing to accumulate foreign debt without making sufficient investments would lead to 
disaster.204 By 1977, Schürer and Mittag urgently wrote to Honecker, stating bluntly that “we are 
in acute payment difficulties,” and asking him to put in place austerity measures, but Honecker 
would hear none of it. 205 Meanwhile, officials like Hager worked to dismiss rumours of 
economic difficulties and the permanent “backwardness of socialism” as merely disinformation 
being spread by western propagandists, specifically originating in the Pentagon and NATO. 
Hager said: “If one wanted to believe the Western media, then the Soviet Union has remained 
hopelessly technologically backwards, torn apart by inner contradictions, without real economic 
growth, all while the remaining socialist countries have found themselves in a permanent state of 
crisis.” 206 
As was the case with the theses in the late 1970s, anniversary theses in the following 
decade continued to boast of the GDR’s almost 40 years of achievements, in spite of the looming 
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insolvency of the country and despite growing opposition movements. By this time, as Fulbrook 
points out, the continued lack of material goods and the political restrictions, as well as the fact 
that East Germany had “a richer neighbour” that allowed Eastern citizens “automatic citizenship” 
contributed greatly to growing domestic instability.207 Nevertheless, the Party’s approach 
remained that  “the greater the difficulties, the more the central authority intensified its 
control.”208 
In a radical departure from all anniversary theses past, the theses created in honour of the 
750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987 entirely omit the GDR’s close relationship in the past and 
present with the Soviet Union, which had been, at its core, about paying homage to the Soviet 
Union as not only the saviours of German socialism (through their defeat of the Third Reich), but 
as the template upon which the SED built its own state. This change was due to the GDR’s break 
with the Soviet Union over new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s implementation of the 
liberalization policies of Glasnost and Perestroika. As is clear from the tone of the 1987 theses, 
whose core messaging remained otherwise unchanged from the 1970s, for the first time in its 
history, the GDR was not about to follow the Soviet Union’s lead. Instead, Honecker sought to 
distance the GDR from any liberalization measures, which meant not looking to Moscow for 
guidance and legitimacy.209 
In preparation for the upcoming 750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987, the SED Central 
Committee commissioned professors and researchers at Humboldt University to prepare a book 
of theses, highlighting the GDR’s achievements. As with the theses of previous decades, a large 
part of the focus was on re-telling GDR history, a teleological view that presented all of Berlin’s 
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history as leading up to the moment when the GDR came into being.210 With the goal to contrast 
East Berlin’s festivities with West Berlin’s own celebrations, the theses attempted to justify the 
SED’s policies over the past four decades and explain how they had helped shape East Berlin into 
a world-class city, located in a country that was “a bastion of peace in Europe.”  The theses 
sought to convince GDR citizens of how proud they should be of themselves for having “built 
up” socialism and for having helped to facilitate Berlin’s transition into a political, economic, 
cultural, and intellectual centre, “the powerful beating heart of our socialist German state.”211 
Certainly, the theses went on, none of these achievements could have occurred without 
the historical communist influence on the development of the city, from the workers’ revolution 
in 1848 to the communists’ ultimate defeat of the fascists in 1945. Featuring prominently in the 
theses were the years immediately following the Second World War, when the SED shaped 
Berlin into the great city of the present day (apparently singled-handedly, as the Soviet influence 
in the post-war period had been likewise erased from this history). Although the 1950s were 
recast as “a transitional period,” the theses described the 1960s as a momentous time when the 
SED put in place the policies that built up socialism, as well as the city. Examples of this were 
the Mach mit! socialist competition initiatives and other “vital” building programs.212 Another 
significant event, the theses noted, was the building of the Wall, which the theses referred to as 
the “protective measures” (Schutzmaßnahmen) taken by the SED on August 13, 1961 that “saved 
the threatened peace by reliably securing the borders of the GDR.”213 
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Featuring most prominently of all in the 1987 theses were the golden years of the early 
1970s, when “the imperialistic blockade” of the GDR and its capital city (i.e. the Hallstein 
Doctrine) “definitively collapsed.”214 This was a time when the GDR finally achieved the 
international standing that it had been looking for, as exemplified by the 100 countries who had 
recognized it by the end of 1973.215 The theses laud the state for finally being able to establish 
“new embassies, diplomatic and trade agencies” as well as organize “state visits, international 
discussions, congresses, and acts of solidarity that underpinned Berlin’s growing international 
prestige.”216 It was these kinds of international interactions that gave the GDR the legitimacy and 
world-wide perception of permanence its leadership so craved, especially the treatment of Berlin 
by outsiders as an official capital city, despite its fraught western status as merely the location of 
the East German government, not its capital. Furthermore, the theses declared with pride that 
after 40 years of hard work, Berlin was a thriving metropolis that stood “in the name of socialism 
and peace, as a politically stable, powerful and attractive cosmopolitan city, a city characterized 
by economic growth and social achievements, and a flourishing of science and art. This city is the 
work of its inhabitants, indeed the work of the entire population of the GDR.”217 
Despite such bold claims, the reality was that by 1987, the GDR’s “golden years” were 
certainly at an end. Given the worsening economic situation, they were also unlikely to return, 
thus motivating the state to outright deny this fact, resulting in a theses’ narrative more divorced 
from reality than ever before. Thus, the 1987 theses looked to predict the future success of the 
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GDR, declaring that although the Party would be continuing its fight against the “revanchist 
policies of the West,” it would be focusing more on expanding the GDR’s role in the world, 
while still maintaining its good relations with its communist allies such as the Soviet Union and 
more recently, Chile.218 Also important in the future, the theses went on, was the preservation of 
the “relationship of peaceful co-existence” with West Germany, thus fulfilling East Germans,’ in 
particular East Berliners,’ desire for “peace and security.”219  
Outwardly, it certainly seemed like the GDR’s legitimacy on the world stage could 
continue to grow. In fact, in the same year, Honecker made a successful state visit to West 
Germany, where it appeared as though he had been welcomed to the West as a foreign head of 
state, with the GDR national anthem playing in the background and with the GDR flag flying on 
West German soil.220 However, appearances were deceiving, and the truth of the matter was that 
however stable the GDR appeared to be on the outside, this was not the case internally. The GDR 
was in an economic decline, and despite the 1987 theses attempting to convince everyone 
otherwise, their message of prosperity was shown to be sham just three years later when the GDR 
ceased to exist. 
 
Anniversary Theses Conclusion   
Despite the fact that outside realities directly contradicted what the SED anniversary 
theses often declared, the Party managed to uphold many of the same core messages – that of the 
dangerous West, the importance of the Soviet friendship, and the superiority of socialism – and 
                                               
218 Komitee der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zum 750 jährigen Bestehen von Berlin, 750 Jahre Berlin: 
Thesen, 79. 
219 Komitee der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zum 750 jährigen Bestehen von Berlin, 750 Jahre Berlin: 
Thesen, 80. 
220 McKay, The Official Concept of the Nation in the Former GDR, 130. 
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managed to maintain tight control of these messages. It had to, for in order to justify its own 
existence, the SED needed East Germans to at least half-heartedly believe the fictions of the 
social plight of the people in capitalist countries and the ongoing military threat posed by the 
West, despite the GDR’s growing economic dependence on them in later years. The SED also 
thought it important for the populace to understand the “socialist ideals” that supposedly set the 
GDR apart from the West – their existence as a peaceful, anti-fascist society that upheld equal 
rights for women, championed youth, the arts, and culture, and which continued to demonstrate 
significant economic and scientific progress.  In addition, the state offered generous housing, 
transport, consumer goods, and childcare subsidies to make life even better for their citizens. 
Throughout most of their history, but especially in the early decades, the theses also defended the 
country’s connection to the Soviet Union for the protection it afforded its people (militarily and 
economically). It was this connection to the Soviet Union that gave both legitimacy to the SED’s 
revolutionary ideas and a way to define the GDR in opposition to the West. At the same time, 
however, the SED used the theses to carefully establish legitimacy by highlighting socialism as a 
German phenomenon that had been brewing since the nineteenth century which, while improved 
upon by Thälmann and the KPD in the 1930s, was finally brought to fruition by the SED with the 
founding of the GDR in 1949.  
Though the core messaging remained relatively static throughout the decades, a certain 
change in the tone of the theses can still be traced over the years. In 1957, a time when the GDR 
was young and relatively unstable, the theses are thick with slavish devotion to the Soviets: they 
were the saviours who showed the GDR the way to successfully “build up” socialism and without 
whom the Nazis would never have been defeated. By the late 1980s, however, the theses instead 
highlighted the success of the GDR’s home-grown socialism – most notably its social progress – 
and left out the Soviets’ role entirely. This change was not entirely unwelcome since the Party 
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was well aware of the less-than-enthusiastic way in which the populace had always viewed the 
Soviet Union. While the Party’s change in tone was a direct result of its opposition to Glasnost 
and Perestroika, it also sought to show that over time, the GDR had developed its own identity: 
that of a very successful socialist state, one that had managed to persevere against all odds 
through the difficult years of the Hallstein Doctrine and which seemed poised to survive for 






Chapter Two: The Festivities 
On the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the so-called “Liberation of Fascism” 
(Befreiung vom Faschismus) in 1979, Comrade Schilder, a driver at the VEB concrete factory in 
Röcknitz/Hohstädt, told National Front officials that from his perspective, “the festivities were a 
highlight of our evolution that will long be remembered not only by myself, but also by many 
other of our citizens, as well as those abroad.”1 Comrade Schilder admitted that he was surprised 
that so many foreign delegations had arrived for the celebrations and was very impressed with 
Soviet Premier Brezhnev’s speech at the main festivities, which he said gave him great hope for 
the future. For another ordinary citizen, Comrade Sojca, a machine typesetter at the newspaper 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, the high point of the 30th anniversary celebrations had been the 
auspicious military parade, which convinced him that “no aggressor will succeed in invading our 
socialist states without being destroyed themselves.”2    
While we cannot be certain whether these ordinary citizens’ opinions were completely 
truthful, there is no doubt that they were genuinely impressed by at least some aspects of the 
celebrations. It is for this reason that the National Front integrated the core themes of the 
anniversary theses – the threat of the West, the necessity of Soviet “friendship,” their thriving 
economic and social lives, and their world-established legitimacy – into cultural events, exhibits, 
group activities, and festivities of all kinds as a means of effectively communicating them to the 
East German population. Although likely lost on the SED Central Committee, the National Front 
                                               
1 BArch DY 30 IV B 2/5/1142. A. Barth (Leiter der Abteilung Parteiorgane) and P. Kosiol (Sektor 
Parteiinformation). “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung und Meinungen zum Verlauf der feierlichkeiten anläßlich 
des 30. Jahrestages” October 8, 1979, p. 3. 
2 BArch DY 30 IV B 2/5/1142. A. Barth (Leiter der Abteilung Parteiorgane) and P. Kosiol (Sektor 
Parteiinformation). “Kurzinformation über die Stimmung und Meinungen zum Verlauf der feierlichkeiten anläßlich 
des 30. Jahrestages” October 8, 1979, p. 4. 
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for its part astutely realized how ineffective the theses were in their original, static, turgid form. If 
the SED was to ever succeed in turning the East German people into “new citizens,” or teaching 
them the importance of the GDR’s place in the world, or of the importance of their tight 
connection to the Soviet Union, then creating events that showcased these themes stood a far 
greater chance of success than ordinary people attempting to read and interpret the densely-
written pamphlets on their own. This way, the populace would not only observe ideological 
themes in action, but also, and far more importantly, participate in the carefully-crafted activities 
themselves. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the greater the participation in an event, the 
greater the emotional intensity of an individual’s experience of the event. This, in turn, fuels the 
development of a sense of consensus amongst those in attendance and “ultimately results in 
heightened feelings of confidence and satisfaction about the collective event.”3 
GDR anniversary festivities had to begin well in advance of the actual anniversary. Not 
only did streets and shop windows need to be decorated and the cities cleaned, but the National 
Front always reminded the populace that in order for these practical considerations to be as 
successful as possible, “ideological work” was still required to go hand in hand with it. So, in the 
lead up to all anniversary celebrations, all National Front committees, political parties, 
organizations, and institutions would develop wide-ranging educational activities such as 
lectures, publications and exhibitions that local people could attend in order to learn about the 
anniversary theses.4 While the theses themselves were laid out by the SED Politburo’s 
propaganda wing, the form that the activities took (including individual topics) was dictated by 
the National Front in Berlin, with the aim of getting across the central message of the theses for 
                                               
3 David Knottnerus, “Emotions, Pride and the Dynamics of Collective Ritual Events” 46. 




that anniversary in the most effective way possible.5 All cities in the GDR were expected to 
prepare for the celebrations and follow the guidelines laid down by the National Front, as the 
celebrations usually drew considerable interest and participation from the GDR populace. So a 
large part of the festivities programs were dedicated to events that while designed to be fun, were 
simultaneously supposed to help “heighten the peoples’ patriotic consciousness.”6 In addition, the 
festivals also provided the symbolic end to many of the socialist competitions (which will be 
discussed in depth in the following chapter) that also took place in the months leading up to the 
festivals, with many awards handed out over the course of several days at both the local levels as 
well as at the main festival in Berlin.  
The purpose of the National Front holding these forums and lectures (especially at the 
local level) was so that residents could drop in and discuss the themes in the theses. However, dry 
theoretical lectures were not necessarily very effective pedagogical tools, as confirmed by 
functionaries who complained the attendees preferred to come to the meetings to discuss local 
issues of little national import, rather than the theoretical underpinnings of the theses. For 
example, over the course of four days in September 1964, the ideological wing of the National 
Front Committee of Kreis Leipzig-Land organized 52 seminars discussing the 15th anniversary 
theses and had a mere 1425 people attend. 7 In another example from Erfurt in the same month, 
                                               
5 For example, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957, topics local organizers had 
to work with included: “Socialism is the future,” the German-Soviet friendship, “Socialism providing youth with 
glorious prospects,” “the realization of the directives of the Soviet Central Committee,” “women’s political and 
economic equality,” “Soviet literature and art criticism,” and “scientific and technological critiques in the Soviet 
Union.” All of these topics were created by the National Front in Berlin, using the anniversary theses as a guide. 
BArch DY 6/5641, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen 
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution.” By the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, 
Kommission 40. Jahrestag. Undated, p. 11.  
6 BArch DY 6/2395, Ausschuß der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland der Hauptstadt. Berlin, “Zur 
Sekretäriatssitzung: Information über die Vorbereitung des 15. Jahrestages in der Hauptstadt der DDR Berlin,” 
September 11, 1964. p. 29-30.  
7 BArch DY 6/2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates, Kommission für Agitation/Presse. “Presse Information Nr 31. 
Fakten aus der Thesen-Diskussion,” September 11, 1964, p. 1-2.  
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the National Front’s leading functionaries of the Bezirk held 21 forums attended by 1403 people, 
as well as 12 other discussion groups attended by 477 people. Predictably, the main issues that 
dominated these discussions were not the content of the theses, but rather, the conditions of the 
streets and housing, value retention of houses and repairs, availability of building materials, as 
well as questions of trade and daycare spaces.8  
Thus, a more certain way to achieve its pedagogical goals was for the National Front to 
combine theory with some form of entertainment. For example, representatives of residential area 
(Wohngebietsausschuß) 2 in Kreis Schwerin-Stadt created an exhibition called “Come see how 
we’ve turned out!” which showed how the area had developed since 1949. This display piqued 
the interest of the locals, who were invited to come see the exhibit and while they were there, 
discuss the theses as well.9 It was these latter kinds of activities, targeted to specific, usually 
local, groups that dominated the GDR anniversary landscape. These activities were indeed 
typically designed to be relevant to the area and to intrigue ordinary people enough to get them to 
participate in these events. The National Front hoped that the citizenry would at the same time 
absorb some of the ideological messaging from a lecture or in the form of the content of an 
exhibition. While people would come to enjoy themselves, the National Front could take solace 
in the fact that they were possibly “learning” and developing a sense of national identity, 




                                               
8 BArch DY 6/2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates, Kommission für Agitation/Presse, “Presse Information Nr. 34” 
(Kirchhof copy), September 25,1964, p. 3-4. 
9 BArch DY 6/2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates, Kommission für Agitation/Presse. “Presse Information Nr. 31. 





It was the National Front’s Central Committee in Berlin (or a more specialized temporary 
Anniversary Commission, if one had been created that year) that created and oversaw the 
anniversary activities. As we have seen, the SED Central Committee created anniversary theses 
with the intention that their central message be disseminated far and wide. However, they do not 
appear to have been particularly concerned with the practicalities of the implementation. Thus, 
the task of informing the populace of the central message of a particular anniversary’s theses 
inevitably fell to the Central Committee of the National Front in Berlin, which was responsible 
for informing all constituent National Front political parties, organizations, committees, and 
institutions how to develop a wide variety of educational activities such as lectures, publications 
and exhibitions.10 Although it did provide some guidance, the National Front ultimately expected 
the organizations themselves, such as the Society for the Preparation of Scientific Knowledge 
(Gesellschaft zur Vorbereitung wissenschaftlicher Kenntnisse), the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft), or the Cultural Alliance for the 
Democratic Renewal of Germany (Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneurung Deutschlands), to 
take responsibility for organizing their own activities on the ground. It was also completely up to 
the chairs of these national organizations to support their own lecturers (for example, by 
publishing their materials). In addition, the organizations were required to report all of these 
activities back to their umbrella organization, the National Front Berlin Central Committee.11 The 
Berlin National Front Central Committee was also the main organization to which all regional 
and smaller level National Front committees sent their own detailed reports for analysis. The 
                                               
10 BArch DY 6/564, “Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 3. 
11 BArch DY 6/564, “Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 3. 
 
 110 
Central Committee used this information to compile its own final reports on what methods and 
events were successful, which were not, and how to implement better practices in future.  
In addition to these myriad layers of national and regional committees, in at least two 
instances (the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957, and the 750th Anniversary of 
Berlin in 1987), there existed yet another extra layer of organizational bureaucracy. In both of 
these cases, the National Front’s Central Committee created special temporary commissions to 
oversee the anniversary events. Rather than the Central Committee of the National Front’s own 
secretariat sending the ideological directives and other materials to their regional committees, 
these tasks were undertaken by the National Front’s Commission for the 40th Anniversary of the 
Great October Revolution in 1957 and the Committee for the 750th Anniversary of the Founding 
of Berlin in 1987. As with the National Front Central Committee’s secretariat, these special 
commissions also determined whether the regional committees were carrying out the celebrations 
in a manner acceptable to the SED.12  
One example that provides insight into the intricate layers of accountability between 
different organizations and committees and how these worked together to create a year’s worth of 
cultural activities is that of the temporary 40th Anniversary Commission of the October 
Revolution in 1957.13  This Commission maintained a very close connection to the centres of 
power: the head of the Commission was Prof. Dr. Dr. Erich Correns, the President of the National 
Front’s Central Committee, while other important committee members included the Mayor of 
(East) Berlin Friedrich Ebert; President of the German Academy of Sciences Prof. Dr. Walter 
                                               
12 As a result of the existence of the Commission, there are many more specific details and meetings and notes that 
have survived in the archives for 1957. In other years, details on the progress of commemorations are often buried in 
meeting notes of other organizations as simply another point of the agenda.  
13 There is a richness to these documents from the top that is simply missing in other years: the directives that were 
sent out in 1957 provide reasoning and explanations for how the organizations were to do this and that, even details 
of what titles to use in lectures, etc.  
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Friedrich; Neues Deutschland Editor-in-Chief Hermann Axen; Culture Minister Dr. Johannes 
Becher; as well as the general secretaries of the National Front’s constituent political parties, such 
as General Secretary of the SED Central Committee Kurt Hager; the General Secretary of the 
CDU Gerald Götting; and General Secretary Manfred Gerlach of the LDPD.14 In June 1957, five 
months prior to the anniversary, Mayor Ebert commented that since it was becoming increasingly 
“impossible” for their Commission to continue to oversee all small organizational details of the 
anniversary, he suggested the Commission divide up their work into five smaller “task forces:” 
“Agitation, Press and Propaganda,” “Cultural Mass-work,” “Science and Technology,” “Art and 
Literature,” and “German-Soviet Relations.”15 To provide more assistance at the ground level, in 
July, the Commission issued a further directive ordering the regions to create their own 40th 
anniversary commissions, which would include not only representatives from the state apparatus, 
but also eminent personalities, such as representatives of all political parties and mass 
organizations, as well as individual scientists, engineers, artists, teachers, and farmers.16 The goal 
in doing so, according to this directive, was to mirror the national Commission and facilitate the 
growth of “a great political dialogue with all sectors of the populace.”17  
 Vital to the effectiveness of the whole system was that these regional commission 
members already had connections to other committees and mass organizations in the country in 
order to ensure the best possible collaboration across organizations. So for example, the National 
                                               
14 BArch DY 6/5641, “Abschrift: Mitglieder der Kommission ‘40 Jahrestag,’” Undated, p. 2.   
15 These five task force types were created at the suggestion of Berlin Mayor Ebert. BArch DY 6/ 5641, 
“Beschlussprotokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung der zentralen Kommission zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages 
der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” June 5, 1957, p .2. 
16 BArch DY 6/2569. Handout by the Nationalrat der National Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 
40. Jahrestag, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichungen des Planes der Kommission ‘40. Jahrestag der Großen 
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,’” undated, p. 2. 
17 BArch DY 6/2569. Handout by the Nationalrat der National Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 
40. Jahrestag, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichungen des Planes der Kommission ‘40. Jahrestag der Großen 
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,’” undated, p. 2. 
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Front explained that the chairpersons of the National Front’s standing regional committees 
(Bezirksausschüsse) also would have to chair the temporary 40th anniversary regional 
commissions.18  Due to the heavy emphasis of the 1957 anniversary theses on developing and 
maintaining the GDR’s connection to the Soviet Union, the chairs of the regional committees of 
the Society for German-Soviet Friendship were also to be the deputy chairs of each temporary 
40th anniversary regional commission.19 The functions of these commission members were not 
purely symbolic or ceremonial either: ordinary members of each regional commission were also 
expected to join in one of the “task forces” (Arbeitsgruppen) that would actually implement the 
work.20  
It is these kinds of intricate, interlacing features of committees that demonstrate not only 
the collaborative nature of the commemorations in the GDR (such as the strong connection 
between the National Front and the Society for German-Soviet Friendship for the 1957 
anniversary), but also the extensive layers of checks and balances between committees to ensure 
the events were carried out effectively. While some of these excess layers of temporary 
anniversary task forces and regional commissions did not exist in the case of smaller 
anniversaries, their main functions in organizing regional events were instead carried out as 
additional duties of the members of the standing regional National Front committees.  
 
                                               
18 BArch DY 6/2569. Handout by the Nationalrat der National Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 
40. Jahrestag, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichungen des Planes der Kommission ‘40. Jahrestag der Großen 
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,’” undated, p. 2. 
19 BArch DY 6/2569. Handout by the Nationalrat der National Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 
40. Jahrestag, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichungen des Planes der Kommission ‘40. Jahrestag der Großen 
Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,’” undated, p. 2. 
20 These five task force types were created at the suggestion of Berlin Mayor Ebert. BArch DY 6/ 5641, 
“Beschlussprotokoll der konstituierenden Sitzung der zentralen Kommission zur Vorbereitung des 40. Jahrestages 
der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” June 5, 1957, p. 2. 
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Popular Events and Activities  
 In October 1964, the Central Committee of the National Front in Berlin summed up the 
GDR’s 15th anniversary celebrations across the country as having created “a zest for life … with 
an array of political, cultural and sporting events in the city and countryside.”21 The usefulness of 
holding these smaller, localized events was that not only did they encourage communities to 
come together to celebrate a common purpose, but they also presented the anniversary theses –
which in 1964 focused on creating pride in the GDR’s economic success and closeness to the 
Soviet Union – through a locally-relevant lens. For example, in the city of Schwerin alone, about 
200 different events took place during their main “festivities week” from October 3 to 10, 1964.22 
Schwerin’s National Front secretariat described these Wohngebiet-level (residential) events as 
having been well organized overall, and most importantly, as having clearly shown how the 
area’s appearance had changed over the years through essays, pictures, and small exhibits.23 Such 
an activity was a way of confirming, the theses argued, that many localities had much to be proud 
of, something that was made possible not only through their own work, but also by the social 
advantages provided by their state. This was very typical of the way in which celebrations were 
organized: in every Kreis, Gemeinde, and village in the country, countless exhibitions were 
created to simultaneously entertain and educate the populace. Although main events were 
clustered more closely together in September and October 1964, activities were held throughout 
the year.  
 In September 1964, Berlin’s Stadtbezirke reported to the National Front that their 
secretariats were making great strides in collaborating with all social organizations, even 
                                               
21BArch DY 6/2397, Author unknown, “Auswertung der Bezirks-Informationen über die Vorbereitung des 15. 
Jahrestages der DDR,” October 1, 1964, p. 4.  
22BArch DY 6/2397, Author unknown, “Auswertung der Bezirks-Informationen über die Vorbereitung des 15. 
Jahrestages der DDR,” October 1, 1964, p. 4. 
23BArch DY 6/2397 Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß Schwerin. Report to 
Kirchhof, “Euer Fernschreiben vom 3.9.1964.” September 29, 1964, p. 6. 
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succeeding in involving people who had previously never been interested in any festivities. That 
year, the Berlin Stadtbezirk of Lichtenberg alone hosted 3 500 Hausgemeinschaft gatherings, 65 
lectures with accompanying discussions, and 28 large “cultural events,” involving 65 000 
attendees – numbers which did not even include attendance figures for the large “People’s 
festival of Eastern Berlin” (Volksfest des Berliner Ostens).”24 Bezirk Leipzig likewise reported 
that by October 1 (a week before the anniversary itself), it had already held 7400 gatherings 
attended by approximately 225 500 people, at which approximately 25 000 people had had a 
chance to speak their minds.25 This last statistic was important because the National Front wanted 
the people to be able to discuss any questions the theses raised for them– which is exactly what 
they were able to do in the lectures and forums that accompanied many festive events. In 
Dresden, the National Front Bezirk secretary commented with pride that he could see how well 
“some of our citizens understood to connect the content-related questions from the theses with 
their own development and the development of our republic.”26 This was of course entirely the 
point of the anniversary celebrations for the National Front, so for officials to sense that their 
message was being absorbed in this way was very significant indicator of success for them. 
 One way of ensuring the people were able to connect with the themes of the theses in such 
a meaningful way was by targeting certain groups with activities that addressed their concerns 
and interests. This was likely the chief reason why the National Front insisted localities and 
specific organizations ultimately create their own festivities on the ground, as it naturally ensured 
increased relevancy to that specific community. For example, Kreis Grimma in Bezirk Leipzig 
                                               
24 BArch DY 6/2397, Kirchhof, Ausschuss der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland der Hauptstadt 
Berlin, “Informationsbericht 4/64 zur Vorbereitung des 15. Jahrestages der DDR,” September 30, 1964, p. 1. 
25BArch DY 6/2397, Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuß Leipzig, “Information: 
Berichterstattung auf der Grundlage des Fs vom 3.9.1964,” October 13, 1964, p. 2. 
26 BArch DY 6/2397, Sekretariat of the Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuß Dresden, 
“Informationsbericht,” October 13, 1964, p. 2 
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organized popular exhibitions called “15 Years of the GDR” and “15 Years of the GDR: 15 Years 
of socialist development in Kreis Grimma.” These were not just simple overviews highlighting 
noteworthy events, but rather, content- and ideologically-dense exhibitions providing local proof 
of the GDR’s economic success in the 1960s by carefully spelling out the economic development 
of the state and region over the past 15 years.27 An exhibition in Kreis Riesa in Bezirk Rostock 
called “Flick’s block of shares: submarine parts, and seamless pipes” with accompanying lectures 
also proved very popular as it demonstrated the development of the GDR through the lens of the 
local steel works of Riesa. It ended up attracting 7 000 visitors from the area, a marked success.28  
 The National Front also aimed to create relevancy beyond that of geographic location: such 
as in Kreis Pirna in Bezirk Dresden, which put on an exhibition made by women for women on 
the theme “See how far we’ve come.” The Dresden National Front Secretariat described the 
purpose of such an exhibit as being useful “to, in particular, facilitate discussion amongst 
women.”29 There were also enterprise-focused exhibitions: in Kreis Erfurt-Stadt, residential 
districts (Wohngebiete) IV, VI and IX ran exhibitions that showcased the region’s production, 
workers, and cultural groups, while the VEB Labor-Chemicals in the near-by town of Apolda 
organized an open house attended by 700 people.30 Given the very localized relevance of such 
events, the National Front often turned to local cultural groups to help the regional National Front 
representatives create the exhibits and other activities. For example, in a town called Förderstedt, 
National Front representatives tasked the local “Village Club Photo Group” with creating an 
                                               
27 BArch DY 6/2397, Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuß Leipzig, “Information: 
Berichterstattung auf der Grundlage des Fs vom 3.9.1964,” October 13, 1964, (Version 2), p. 6.  
28 BArch DY 6/2397, Sekretariat of the Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuß Dresden, 
“Informationsbericht,” September 29, 1964, p. 3. 
29 BArch DY 6/2397, Sekretariat of the Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland Bezirksausschuß Dresden, 
“Informationsbericht,” September 29, 1964, p. 3. 
30 BArch DY 6/2397, Author unknown, “Auswertung der Bezirks-Informationen über die Vorbereitung des 15. 
Jahrestages der DDR,” October 1, 1964, p. 4. 
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exhibition showing the changes year by year in photographs, featuring the best and most active 
citizens in the area.31 
 In at least some instances, if the regional organizations did not design their activity 
programs with relevancy of both the community/audience (as well as that of the theses) in mind, 
there is evidence that their National Front superiors requested they redesign their anniversary 
programs. An example of this comes from Kreis Greifswald in Rostock, where the Kreis’s 
original festivities program was not approved by top officials (presumably at the Bezirk level), 
who required the Kreis representatives to create “better content.” Greifswald later came up with a 
revised program that included film showings and accompanying talks in the Haus-und 
Hofgemeinschaften (apartment-complex groups), as well as more youth-focused sport and 
cultural festivities.32 Greifswald also incorporated additional discussions about the development 
of the area over the past 15 years.33  
 
Messaging content of the Festivities: Creating Closeness to the Soviet Union in 1957 
 
Piquing local interest and creating relevance was even more important to the National 
Front when there were signs of disinterest in a particular anniversary thesis theme. An excellent 
example of how the National Front tried to get its message across in these cases can be observed 
in their approach to emphasizing the GDR’s connection with the Soviet Union for the 40th 
anniversary of the October Revolution, a core message of that year’s theses. As will be 
demonstrated in the next chapter on socialist competitions, the East German populace in 1957 
                                               
31 BArch DY 6/2397, Vorsitzender des Ortsauschusses der Nationalen Front & Vorsitzender des Rates der Gemeinde 
Focke “Program der politischen Massenarbeit der Gemeinde Förderstedt zur Vorbereitung des 15. Jahrestages der 
DDR, ” January 1, 1964, p. 8. 
32 BArch 6/2397, Bezirkssekretuar Klösel, National Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Infromationsbericht,” September 29, 1964, p. 6.  
33 BArch 6/2397, Bezirkssekretuar Klösel, National Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Infromationsbericht,” September 29, 1964, p. 6. 
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appears to have had neither very strong connections to, nor a strong awareness of, the Soviet 
Union. The National Front’s solution was to assign the regional German-Soviet Relations task 
forces (Arbeitsgruppen) with reinforcing the GDR populace’s current connections to the Soviet 
Union by rewriting the history of the German-Soviet relationship during the previous 40 years. 
For one, the task forces were expected to organize public lectures in which carefully selected 
speakers would talk at length about certain aspects of this “special” relationship. Possible lecture 
topics offered by the National Front were non-creative titles such as “Socialism is the future,” 
“The German-Soviet friendship,” “Socialism provides youth with glorious prospects,” “Realizing 
the directives of the Soviet Central Committee,” “Women’s political and economic equality,” 
“Soviet literature and art criticism,” and “scientific and technological critiques in the Soviet 
Union.”34 The German-Soviet Relations task forces were also to ensure GDR citizens heard about 
the German connection to Soviet Union sports movements; the “great relationship” between the 
German government and Russian revolutionaries in 1917; the German aid sent to those starving 
in the Volga in 1921; and German protests in solidarity with the Soviet Union between 1927-
29.35 Re-interpreting history like this of course overstated the power the communist movement 
held during these years, but it served to create a longer, more venerable connection between the 
two countries, one that preceded the Soviets’ arrival at the end of the Second World War.  
The National Front’s Central Committee was well aware that these general and possibly 
tedious history lessons would not necessarily seem relevant or interesting to the ordinary public, 
so they directed the German-Soviet Relations task forces and the Agitation, Press, and 
                                               
34 BArch DY 6/5641. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, 
“Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution.” Undated, p.11. 
35 Note: this is the history according to the Central Commission. BArch DY 6/5641, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front 
des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, “Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der 
Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” undated, p. 9.  
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Propaganda task forces to organize gatherings at the most basic of levels – that of the Haus and 
Hofgemeinschaften (apartment/neighbourhood complexes) – so that personal stories and 
experiences could be shared. The goal of these gatherings was to remind the East German people 
of local connections their communities may have to the Soviet Union. Stories of import included 
those of older GDR citizens who had visited the Soviet Union in its early years (especially the so-
called “worker veterans”—those who had taken part in the “brotherhood” at the Front in the First 
World War), as well as those who had belonged to early German communist groups such as the 
Society of Friends of the New Russia (Gesellschaft der Freunde des neuen Rußlands, founded in 
the early 1920s) or the Federation of Friends of the Soviet Union (Bundes der Freunde der 
Sowjetunion). The National Front believed bringing in such personal experiences could help 
ordinary people feel the Soviet Union was more relevant to their lives, especially for those who 
had never visited or had much contact with the Soviets previously.36 
In keeping with their strategy at maintaining relevance, the National Front Central 
Commission also made clear in their instructions to the regional task forces that they were to 
ensure any group discussions/events would be tailored to the specific social strata of particular 
subsets of the population.37  Thus, the task forces were to change the messaging they presented 
depending on whether the groups were made up of intelligentsia, housewives, youth, 
artisans/tradesmen, or merchants. One group the Central Commission wanted to reach in 
particular were more isolated rural populations, and they emphasized how important it was that 
                                               
36 BArch DY 6/5641, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, 
“Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution,” undated, p. 9. 
37 BArch DY 6/5641, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, 
“Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution,” undated, p. 3. 
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the regional task forces make concrete plans for those discussion groups.38  To help with carrying 
out these and other tasks, the Central Commission assured the regional committees and task 
forces that they would be provided with appropriate materials such as brochures, flyers, and 
pamphlets. More specifically, the National Front promised to send organizers five nation-wide 
posters that could be used in any regional displays.39  
The National Front also provided specific instructions to the local organizations on how 
best to produce their own materials. One suggestion was for regional committees to make 
exhibitions that showcased documents and photos showing the camaraderie between Russian and 
German soldiers beginning in the First World War and continuing to the present “building up” of 
socialism in the GDR.40  In order to reinforce that more personal, local, relevant connection, the 
Central Commission instructed the task forces to ask any locals who had been to the Soviet 
Union to contribute any photos, trip stories or experiences to the display windows of National 
Front Meeting Points (Treffpunkte der Nationalen Front), co-operatives, private shops, or any 
other display cases.41  The Central Commission also asked the task forces to collaborate with 
their fellow regional National Front organization chapters, such as the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship (Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft), to promote various film 
showings in local cultural centres, such as that of the film series called “Leningrad: the Cradle of 
the Revolution.”42 
                                               
38 BArch DY 6/5641, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, 
“Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution,” undated, p. 3. 
39 BArch DY 6/5641, Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Kommission 40. Jahrestag, 
“Hinweise für die Verwirklichung des Planes der Kommission ’40 Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution,” undated, p. 3. 
40 BArch DY 6/5641.“Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 4. 
41 BArch DY 6/5641.“Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 4. 
42 BArch DY 6/5641.“Plan der Kommission 40. Jahrestag der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” July 31, 
1957, p. 3. 
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Preparing for the Anniversary: Beautifying the Streets 
 
For ordinary East Germans, a major part of preparing for GDR anniversary celebrations 
was in readying the towns aesthetically to host these festivities. As evidenced by the surviving 
festivities program from the small city of Langewiesen in 1964, beautifying the city was 
something that the National Front took as seriously as the festivities themselves. Besides letting 
people know about the events taking place, the Langewiesen festivities program reminded the 
townsfolk to make a “worthy effort” in honour of the GDR’s birthday and 
Grab brush and paint and give house fronts and fences a colourful coat! 
Decorate houses, enterprises, streets, and squares with flags, garlands and green from 
Wednesday, September 30 to Wednesday, October 7! 
    Ensure the streets stay clean! 
    Visit our many events!43 
 
The purpose in people putting up such advertisements and decorations, as Secretary Klösel of 
Rostock explained, was so that the townsfolk would be made aware of the variety of festivities 
going on.44 Klösel argued that not only was there “never enough” decorations in his area, but that 
many East Germans, “instead of thinking about how they can make decorations using their own 
resources and creativity,” were going into stores looking for ready-made placards, materials and 
decorations to put up.45 The fact was that state officials preferred, above all else, that the 
populace be as hands-on as possible in any activities associated with the anniversaries, possibly 
believing that designing their own items would require a deeper concentration on the task and 
ideological messaging.  
                                               
43 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen, Veranstaltungen, p. 6. 
44 BArch 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel, National Front Bezirksausschuß Rostock, “Infromationsbericht,” 
September 29, 1964, p. 6.  
45 BArch 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel, National Front Bezirksausschuß Rostock, “Infromationsbericht,” 
September 29, 1964, p. 8. 
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Tellingly, however, in many instances in 1964, the National Front’s Bezirk representatives 
found that state-owned stores were the best-decorated buildings in any area of a city, with 
privately-owned stores less well-decorated, and private homes the most lacking of decorations 
overall. 46 This fact tells us about a certain lack of motivation from residents, likely resulting from 
either festivity-fatigue, simple disinterest, or even outright opposition to doing so. There were 
also late surges in interest, with residents only really getting into the festive spirit by decorating 
their houses with flags and garland in the last days before an anniversary.47 Although these late 
bursts of effort could have been due to simple procrastination, it is extremely likely that they 
were influenced, at least in part, by the National Front representatives’ monitoring of the 
decorating progress. For example, in Cottbus a week before the 15th anniversary, Bezirk 
Secretariat member Beccard explained to his superiors in Berlin that there was no reason to be 
alarmed at the lack of decorations in their streets because “the checks we carried out have told us 
that regional committees and enterprises have begun to make preparations for the decorating of 
the streets and buildings.”48 That Beccard was able to make this judgement makes clear the 
expectations the state apparatus had for participation in these festivities, including the decorating 
of private homes. While it is unclear what the penalty, if any, for willful non-compliance was, it is 
very likely that, just as the assessments of public reaction to the theses (as explained in the 
previous chapter), this monitoring of decorating progress enthusiasm was mostly used by the 
                                               
46 BArch DY 6/2397, Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß Schwerin. Report to 
Kirchhof, “Euer Fernschreiben vom 3.9.1964.” September 29, 1964, p. 7.  
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48 BArch DY 6/2397, Comrade Beccard of the Bezirkssekretariat, Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, 
Bezirksausschuß Cottbus, “Wöchentlichen Bericht” September 29, 1964, p. 3.  
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National Front as a gauge of how much their propaganda work would need to be intensified in 
that area in future celebrations.49   
Despite this occasional lack of interest, the National Front organizers did find other 
instances in which people in both state and privately-owned businesses made great efforts to 
decorate their windows in keeping with “the meaning” of the 15th anniversary. In some areas, city 
busses and street cars were covered in patriotic flags, posters, and even photographs that 
demonstrated how much the areas had recovered since the War.50 The decorating skill of a single 
drugstore in Kreis Borna in Leipzig completely satisfied all that the National Front committee 
was looking for in a decorated storefront, as this drugstore had adorned its main display window 
with sixteen close-up images showing the economic development of the locality in the last 15 
years.51    
                                               
49 The National Front does not seem to have kept detailed records about non-compliance or other aspects such as 
unruly or unacceptable public behaviour at the festivities, as it was more interested in receiving reports on the 
organizational abilities of its regional committees, as well as whether East Germans appeared to be engaging with the 
theses or not. Interest in public behaviour was something that would have been taken on by the Stasi, especially in 
later years. This aspect is, however, beyond the scope of the present work. For a look at the Stasi’s involvement in 
Perleberg’s 750th anniversary celebrations in 1989, for example, see Bruce, The Firm, p. 170-76. 
50 BArch DY 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Informationsbericht,” October 6, 1964, p. 5.  
51 BArch DY 6/2397, Author unknown. “Auswertung der Bezirks-Informationen über die Vorbereitung des 15. 




Figure 2. Scrapbook made by the Groß Glienicke in honour of the 20th anniversary of the GDR. These were the kinds 
of pictures of progress the National Front would have wanted to see as part of any well-done festive “decorations.” 
Here, this scrapbook page clearly shows the development of a much-needed sporting area (BArch DY 6/ vorl 6974, 




The “Week of Festivities” (Festwoche) in Micro-View: Programming in Bezirk Suhl 
 
At the ground level, the most important parts of an anniversary celebration were the 
festivities that ordinary people could attend along with their friends, family and neighbours, and 
in which they could relax and enjoy a day off work. This fits with what sociologist Amitai 
Etzioni has explained about how some festivities can be termed “tension-management holidays,” 
which reinforce particular ideologies indirectly through releasing any built-up tensions developed 
Figure 3. Advertisement asking people to participate in a talent competition on September 26, 1964 by showcasing 
whatever talents they possess, whether it is dancing, singing, in sports, or any other hobby. This advertisement is for 
the residents of a particular Wohngebiet (4) to join in the competition against the residents of a different Wohngebiet 
(5). (BArch DY 6/2397). 
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as a result of complying with a particular society’s ways and beliefs.”52 Furthermore, as pointed 
out in the beginning of the chapter, it was the grandeur and parades which caught ordinary East 
Germans’ attention and that they remembered long afterwards. Surviving event programs from 
the cities of Sonneberg and Langewiesen in Bezirk Suhl give us a glimpse into what these 
festivals looked like at the lowest levels and allow us to compare the offerings of larger and 
smaller urban centres.  
 In the city of Langewiesen, which had a population of several thousand people, activities 
for the 15th Anniversary of the GDR began September 26 and lasted until October 18, 1964. The 
IX. Internationaler Leichtathletik-Fernkampf of 1964 launched Langewiesen’s main festival week 
on Wednesday, September 30 at 2:30pm at the Kleinfeld-Sport arena. This was a youth-focused 
sporting event, in which Young Pioneers and children born between 1951 and 1953 competed 
against youth from other socialist countries.53 This competition was followed in the evening by a 
youth-focused film at the local cinema, titled “We are young just like our Republic!” and 
included a talk by “worker veteran” Fritz Barth.    
 Other events held over the next few days included an opportunity for the townspeople to 
attend a Friday-evening showing of colour photographs of Langewiesen in the picture window of 
the trade commission. This event promised residents they would learn something by attending, 
asking them “Do really know your city?” Meanwhile, the local People’s Solidarity (VS) chapter 
arranged a Saturday afternoon event for retirees that included a literary-musical program 
performed by a group from the local Oberschule. 54 At the same time, the city’s local DFD 
(Democratic Women’s League) chapter also arranged an evening for women. This event, called 
                                               
52Etzioni, “Toward a Theory of Public Ritual,” 48.  
53BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 2 
54BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 2. 
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“What do our local women think about our trade organizations?” was open to all women of 
Langewiesen, who were invited to gather and talk about trade politics whilst enjoying a sampling 
of various fish dishes, a fashion show, as well as other activities that were to remain a 
“surprise.”55   
 Langewiesen’s numerous main events opened to great fanfare on October 4, the Sunday 
prior the Day of the Republic (October 7). That morning, local football teams competed at the 
sport arena, while the Langewiesen Industry Exhibition opened its doors, and officials ran 
lectures at the local Gaststätte on the development of the socialist agricultural sector, as well as 
exhibits put on by pigeon breeders, hunters and fishermen of the Association of Gardeners, 
Settlers, and Animal Breeders (the VKSK, Verband der Kleingärtner, Siedler und 
Kleintierzüchter).56 Meanwhile, the neighbouring Oehrenstöck Orchestra performed in 
Langewiesen’s music pavilion; the philatelic club opened their exhibitions on stamps 
documenting the political, economic, and cultural development of the GDR; and elsewhere an 
exhibition called “How does Dr. Kurt Zimmermann view our Heimat?” put on a display of the 
paintings, watercolours, and drawings of the local artist Kurt Zimmermann. 57  
 More festivities occurred on the eve of October 7, including an open house at the 
Oberschule that allowed visitors to see lecture rooms, work projects, and an exhibition of essays 
and drawings for a 15th anniversary competition.58 Events for party functionaries also took place 
on the evening of October 6, including a dance for visiting dignitaries. Wednesday, October 7, the 
15th Anniversary of the Republic, was a day off work for the people of the GDR, with festivities 
beginning early, at 9:00am, with the grand opening of the Kleinfeld-Sportplatz to launch the 
                                               
55 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 2. 
56 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 3. 
57 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 2-3. 
58 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen Veranstaltungen, p. 2-3. 
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People’s Sports Festival, where, among other events, pioneers and children took part in the 1st 
Langewiesen Pioneer and Children’s Olympiad. All exhibitions were open for the entire day, as 
was the main music pavilion. In the afternoon, there was even more football, followed by a 
torchlit procession in the evening. Thursday, October 8, the day after the main events, meant the 
return to more ideologically-focused events, with a late afternoon trade union forum called “Do 
you know classical Langewiesen?” which included lectures, music, and even “freedom fighter” 
guests from West Germany.59 Langewiesen’s festival week came to a close on Saturday, October 
10 with a closing concert performance of classical “revolutionary” pieces. 60   
 The festival programs for the larger city of Sonneberg (approximately 30 000 people), also 
in Bezirk Suhl, make it clear that, as would be expected, they had more events on offer than the 
smaller Langewiesen, including large city-wide events, as well as events in individual city 
districts. Another difference was that the larger city was able to organize a much longer festival 
period of six weeks from September 12 to October 29, 1964. Sonneberg could even organize 
large-scale activities ranging from discussion forums with major economic figures and sports 
personalities, to larger sports festivities for all ages put on by the Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund, 
to grander talent and dance shows.61 Another significant difference is that Sonneberg festivities 
drew more top functionaries, as well as saw greater involvement by the National Front 
committees in comparison to Langewiesen, which while technically still arranged and organized 
by the National Front, appeared to have been largely organized by the local chapters of diverse 
mass organizations.  
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60 BArch DY 6/2397, Langewiesen, Veranstaltungen, p. 4. 




 In addition, Sonneberg organized a greater variety of activities, such as K-Wagen (small 
one-person kart) races, book readings, puppet theatre, and more events grand openings such as 
the opening of a new children’s playground by the National Front and the Mayor.62 The National 
Front committee for residential areas (Wohnbezirk) 6 and 7 in conjunction with the DSF 
organized events such as demonstrations of new electric household items.63  Sonneberg also 
offered more patriotic and ideologically-based exhibitions, demonstrating the achievements of the 
people under socialism, such as one called “Sonneberg, then and now.”64 On Wednesday, October 
7, the 15th Anniversary of the Republic, festivities began in Sonneberg at 9:00am in the Kreis 
cultural house with a gathering of SED and other local officials. Then, at 10:00am, the Deutscher 
Turn- und Sportbund held a marathon they called “Quer durch Sonneberg,” followed by a 
football game between local teams Motor Oberlind and Motor Sonneberg at 3:00pm.65 City-wide 
festivities in the days and weeks following comprised of a dance tournament, a wine festival, and 
a DFD-organized women’s forum called “How do I say that to my child?”66   
 Besides this multitude of city-wide activities, even more events were held in Sonneberg at 
the residential (Wohngebiet) level. National Front officials organized the lecture and seminar 
events at this level as well. This was likely for reasons of pedagogical effectiveness, because as 
noted by officials across the country year after year, they found the citizenry was more engaged 
in the content when they were in smaller groups and also more likely to voice their opinions, 
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which the National Front was very interested in hearing. Beginning in early September 1964, 
well before Sonneberg’s festivities began, many discussions took place in different places across 
the Wohngebiete, including in the club rooms of the National Front, the meeting rooms of the 
DSF, taverns, and local city offices. The forums that took place were on topics as varied as the 
theses: they included forums on raising children (Wohngebiet II) and the GDR-Soviet friendship 
treaty, as well as lectures on 500 years of festivities (Wohngebiet IV). The Wohngebiete of 
Sonneberg also held smaller week-long village festival games, grand openings of children’s 
playgrounds, family-themed festivals, bowling, table tennis and billiard competitions, as well as 
lantern lighting and torchlit processions.67 One forum in particular, held in Wohngebiet II on 
September 26, included a fashion show, exhibition, and music and singing put on by the local 
music school and the workers’ opera club. 68 Another in Wohngebiet IV was focused only on the 
elderly, titled “How do I say that to my child?” and “Because I’m not a child anymore” and 
included a film.69 
 Elsewhere across the country that year, regional National Front committees repeatedly 
reported back to Berlin how much East Germans enjoyed their own local festivities. Secretary 
Klösel of Rostock characterized his Bezirk’s 15th anniversary celebrations as having produced “a 
happy and festive atmosphere, particularly at the local festivities in all Kreisen, which were 
attended by representation from the city and Gemeinde.”70 In Rostock, on the day of the 
anniversary, thousands of locals attended a celebratory demonstration accompanied by a naval 
                                               
67 BArch DY 6/2397, Zentrale Veranstaltungen im Stadtgebiet Sonneberg zum 15. Jahrestag der Gründung der DDR, 
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review and fireworks display. According to National Front reports, there was also “significant 
public participation” at all the major events like the torchlit processions, beginning the night 
before the anniversary.71  In the small city of Klütz, 1000 people participated in a torchlit 
procession and demonstration, while in Gemeinde Selmsdorf, 400 people attended the same.72 In 
the city of Schönberg, an estimated 500-600 people took part in a torchlit procession despite 
pouring rain, while in the Kreisstadt Grimmen, 2000 people took part in a torchlit procession the 
day prior.73 Extremely high participation numbers were also reported in Leipzig, where officials 
estimated that while the cultural and sporting events held in the individual Wohngebieten were 
(mostly) well-attended, over 100 000 people came to visit the main Feststraße in Leipzig.74  
A final high point in local GDR anniversary festivities were the award ceremonies, in 
which East Germans received placards or prestigious awards for all their hard work, such as the 
“Badge of Honour of the National Front.”75 For example, Secretary Klösel of Rostock awarded 
24 functionaries and other “deserving” citizens with these awards in October 1964. 76 It is worth 
noting that many of the people who received these various awards were not competition winners, 
however, but rather, SED members, various functionaries for the party or city councils, National 
Front Kreis committee volunteers, or even low-level National Front functionaries; such as 
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volunteer members of the Wohnbezirksausschuß or DFD representatives. Many of these people 
had been working in these roles since the founding of the state.77 
What this great variety of festivities (designed for both people at large on the one hand, 
and specifically targeted groups on the other hand) in Langeswiesen and Sonneberg demonstrates 
is that while the themes of the anniversary theses were certainly important to the National Front, 
the organizers were pragmatic enough to know that ideology need not be the focal point at every 
step. While parades and fireworks are intrinsically appealing and draw crowds, organizers also 
made sure to serve the state’s purposes by, for example, arranging a military review 
accompanying a parade, thus still reinforcing the GDR’s legitimacy and distinctiveness from the 
West – major themes in the 1964 theses – while not detracting from the entertainment value of 
the spectacle.  In another example, while activities such as showing films to youths served as a 
generally appealing form of entertainment, the National Front reinforced the event with ideology 
by bringing in a worker veteran to give a talk that would presumably demonstrate the Soviet 
connection and pride in the GDR’s development. The fact that both cities had so many such 
participatory events (tailored to all ages and interests, from young to old), demonstrates how 
dedicated the National Front was to establishing and maintaining a sense of community. Indeed, 
in keeping with how Mona Ozouf defined other revolutionary festivals, the National Front was 
essentially attempting to “recast[ing] space and time” in order to develop “a new community 
based on new values.”78 
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Festivities in the Hauptstadt Berlin 
While all cities in the GDR were expected to prepare for the celebrations, there was a 
particular amount of pressure on Berlin as the GDR’s capital city. Not only would local and 
regional celebrations be taking place there, but national celebrations as well – which would be 
attended by GDR party functionaries, as well as dignitaries from all over the (communist) world. 
It was thus very important, the Berlin city National Front Committee pointed out, that the image 
the capital projected of the GDR be impressive. They went on: 
Since the capital of Berlin is in the foreground for the 15th anniversary, everything must 
be done to make the bond of our citizens with the German Democratic Republic and their 
achievements in building our state visible to the outside world. The focus here is on the 
involvement of all sections of the population in the preparation and promotion of good 
imaginative visual advertising, the cleanliness and friendly design of our city, and the 
dignified welcome of all guests. 79 
 
As in the periphery, residents of Berlin needed to clean and decorate the streets for the festivities. 
However, the difference for Berliners was the National Front’s expectation that this would all be 
well-underway and “visible in the streets” by September 15, a full three weeks before the 
anniversary. The National Front also expected all stores to design attractive shop windows 
featuring a particular product line, while stores and restaurants were to emphasize a variety of 
food options “in order to make a worthy impression of the capital on their visitors.”80 
 As was always the case, however, where there were anniversary events, there was 
ideological messaging to be found. This was particularly important given the number of visitors 
to Berlin, including people from elsewhere in the country, but also foreign guests from other 
Soviet Bloc countries, some guests from the West, and even some from West Germany. Berlin 
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80 BArch DY 6/2395 Ausschuß der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland der Hauptstadt Berlin, “Zur 
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City National Front Committee recognized the momentous task that lay before them: that of 
helping to develop a sense of a unique GDR identity. The Committee pointed out that: 
In preparation for the 15th anniversary of the GDR, the capital city of Berlin must pay 
even greater attention to ideological work, further expanding the role of the German 
Democratic Republic, and promoting the national consciousness (Staatsbewußtsein) of 
our citizens. The theses, the speech of Walter Ulbricht before the People’s Chamber, and 
the appeal of the People’s Chamber, must appear connected to the practical realities of 
each individual citizen.81  
 
 
Figure 4. “An unforgettable day of festivities.” Pictures from the Berliner Zeitung of the crowds and the military 
parade on October 7, 1964 (Berliner Zeitung, October  8, 1964, p. 1). 
 
 All of this diligent preparation resulted in what the newspapers described as “the greatest 
festival that the capital city has ever celebrated up to this point” with the “whole creatively-
decorated city on its feet from early morning until late in the evening. At all events, the working 
people expressed their joy at the great successes that have come of their 15 years of hard work.”82 
Festivities began at 9:00am sharp with the tolling of the bells from the Roten Rathaus. This 
signaled the commencement of the military parade followed by a demonstration in front of an 
                                               
81 BArch DY 6/2395, Ausschuß der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland der Hauptstadt Berlin, “Zur 
Sekretäriatssitzung: Information über die Vorbereitung des 15. Jahrestages in der Hauptstadt der DDR Berlin” 
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82 Karl-Heinz Gerstner, “350 000 demonstrierten in Berlin, Tausende Westdeutsche dabei, Leistungsschau der DDR-
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audience that the Berliner Zeitung claimed numbered 350 000 people. 83 Many different groups 
marched past Walter Ulbricht and Soviet Premier Brezhnev, who were seated in the grandstands, 
but it was one group in particular who caught widespread attention: that of the representatives 
from all the Bezirke, showcasing GDR economic strength in the form of new industry products.  
The Berliner Zeitung continued: “Again and again, the audience – especially the amazed guests 
from abroad – were carried away in enthusiastic applause.”84 Once these demonstrations and 
parades ended, the central People’s Festival in Karl-Marx-Allee began, totaling approximately 70 
different events put on by 2700 professional and amateur artists. Even Ulbricht himself took the 
time to make an appearance at the festival during the afternoon. The Day of the Republic finally 
came to a close later that evening with a grand fireworks display.85  
 
 
Figure 5. Example of an advertisement by the travel office of the GDR encouraging residents of Kreis Sonneberg 
(Bezirk Suhl) to take the trip to Berlin (BArch DY 6/2397) 
 
 Despite the great effort put into the local festivities elsewhere around the country, the 
National Front could not help but hold up these central festivities in Berlin as an example to the 
rest of the GDR (as well as to the West). Indeed, one of the National Front’s national initiatives 
for the 15th anniversary in 1964 called for “Everyone to experience the capital city once!” and 
involved partnering with GDR travel offices across the country to offer ordinary people the 
                                               
83 Karl-Heinz Gerstner, “350 000 demonstrierten in Berlin, Tausende Westdeutsche dabei, Leistungsschau der DDR-
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chance to participate in 3-day trips to Berlin to see the capital’s festivities.86 The National Front 
believed that viewing the celebrations in Berlin would be a memorable experience that would 
bring home the importance of the anniversary to ordinary citizens and more importantly, give 
them a sense of national pride. Their advertisements promised that “all participants will be deeply 
impressed by this trip and will return to their work with renewed vigor” as the visit “will clearly 
demonstrate for whom and for what our working people are undertaking their great efforts at 
work.” 87 So in all Kreisen, the National Front committees made serious efforts to get people to 
make the journey to Berlin. Secretary Klösel of Rostock described his own committee as making 
“increased efforts to ensure their scheduled special trains are booked full.”88 The fact was the 
advertisements were not just meant to appeal to single individuals, but also to groups, in 
particular workers’ brigades and cultural groups. Besides receiving a group discount, large 
enough groups could even arrange their own transportation: such as a group of 28 “gold building 
medal” winners from Rostock, who decided to celebrate by booking their own bus to Berlin.89  
 Although they could visit at any time, East Germans were encouraged to take these trips 
between September 15 and November 8, when the majority of the Berlin festival events would be 
taking place. Aside from the choice in dates, the itinerary of this trip was very strictly planned. 
On the first day, the group would depart Sonneberg at 5am and arrive at 1pm in Berlin. After 
lunch, the groups would get the whole afternoon to view an anniversary exhibition that, it was 
explained, provided “concrete evidence” (new products, perhaps?) that proved and “meaningfully 
                                               
86 BArch DY 6/2397, Reisebüro der Detuschen Demokratischen Republik Zweigstelle Sonneberg & Nationale Front 
des demokratischen Deutschland Kreissekretariat Sonneberg, Jeder einmal in die Hauptstadt Berlin! 
87 BArch DY 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Informationsbericht,” October 6, 1964, p. 4. 
88 BArch DY 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Informationsbericht,” October 6, 1964, p. 4. 
89 BArch DY 6/2397, Bezirkssekretär Klösel. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, Bezirksausschuß 
Rostock, “Informationsbericht,” October 6, 1964, p. 4. 
 
 136 
describe[d] the growth of our republic in all areas.”90 On the second day, following breakfast, the 
visitors would receive a city tour of the major attractions of Berlin such as the Brandenburger 
Tor, the newly-built state opera house, Karl-Marx-Allee, and the Treptow Memorial, with the 
highlight of the day being an afternoon boat trip down the Spree. Following this, the visitors 
would be granted a free evening to explore the city as they wished, however, the National Front 
highly recommended they attend a “cultural anniversary event.” On the third day, the group 
would begin their journey home via a short stop in Potsdam to see the palace and gardens at 
Sanssouci and the Cecilienhof. The total cost was 135 MDN per person including insurance, 
transportation, accommodations, tour guides, and activities. 91   
 Ultimately, some National Front committees were more successful at attracting participants 
than others, such as Rostock’s, where 5246 people applied for the trip.92 Others were less 
successful, as Kreis Wollgast only received 500 applications out of their original goal of 1000, 
while Dresden only managed to get 185 people to attend the celebrations in Berlin.93 Those from 
Dresden who had gone, however, reported back later that the trip had provided an important 
perspective about the development of the country, while they described the atmosphere at the 
festival, demonstration, and the large festival in Karl-Marx-Allee as all “unforgettable 
experiences.”94 The Dresden secretariat triumphantly declared that this reaction was exactly what 
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they had hoped, particularly in “convincingly dissipating … the lies spread by the West German 
press.”95  
 
Top-level celebratory activities and events  
 
 
Figure 6. Official Program for the reception in the Werner-Seelenbinder Haale on October 6, 1964 (BArch DY 
6/2398) 
 In his welcome address to the assembled dignitaries and guests that included Soviet 
Premier Brezhnev at the official reception on the evening prior the 15th anniversary of the GDR, 
National Front President Erich Correns thanked everyone, especially all “our wonderful friends 
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and foreign guests,” and those who “feel very strongly connected to the GDR” for having made 
the journey to the capital to celebrate the GDR.96 The experiences any domestic and foreign 
dignitaries would have of the anniversary, ranging from viewing the parades from the 
grandstands, to official receptions like this, were nothing like the festivities experienced by 
people on the streets. These high-level ceremonies instead involved passive entertainment and far 
fewer participatory options. This was in keeping with the goal of such events, which was to 
impress dignitaries with how far the GDR had come, and not to indoctrinate them on the content 
of that year’s anniversary theses (although demonstrations ideological of themes could still be 
found in even these events). For elites, festivities are always more about asserting their already-
established social status in society, such as by receiving special access to events. In this sense 
then, GDR festivities can be said to have followed suit in helping reinforce social dynamics.97 
For example, many events held in honour of the 15th Anniversary of the GDR required special 
invitations, and one lower-level official, a Comrade Woischwill, discovered that while he himself 
obtained an invitation to the official grand reception in the Werner-Seelenbinder-Halle on 
October 7, his relatively inferior status meant that he could not also secure an invitation for his 
wife.98  
The official top-level festivities began Saturday, October 3, 1964 at 9:30am with the 
opening of a visual art exhibition called “Our Contemporaries” in the National Gallery in Berlin, 
followed by an honours ceremony for the best competition efforts from all areas of the economy 
awarded by the Staatsrat (Council of State). On Sunday October 4, Staatsrat member Johannes 
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Dieckmann honoured high-achieving citizens with the fatherland’s service medals of silver and 
bronze as well as the title “Best People’s Scientist.” With the arrival of foreign delegations the 
following day, larger ceremonies began, including a more important honours ceremony where 
Ulbricht himself handed out Karl Marx Orders, Fatherland Service medals in gold, as well as 
“Banner der Arbeit” honours and the special title “Hero of Labour” (“Held der Arbeit”). A 
torchlit ceremony of the FDJ then brought the evening to a close. 99 
 
Figure 7. Official Program for the reception in the Werner-Seelenbinder Haale on October 6, 1964, hosted by the 
SED Central Committee, the Staatsrat, the Ministerrat, and the Central Committee of the National Front (BArch DY 
6/2398) 
                                               




The main official ceremonies began on the morning of Tuesday, October 6 with an 
invitation-only wreath-laying ceremony at the Memorial of the Socialists in Berlin-
Friedrichsfelde and also at the Soviet monument in Berlin-Treptow.100 President of the National 
Front, Erich Correns, officially opened the celebrations by welcoming the foreign dignitaries at 
the Werner-Seelenbinder-Halle later that afternoon, at 4:03pm to be precise, to the tune of an 
orchestra playing marching songs. This was followed by a 1.5 hour speech by Walter Ulbricht, a 
full 30-minute speech by the Soviet Union’s delegation, eight-minute speeches each by 
representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, with representatives of western communist parties 
in France, Italy, West Germany, Austria, and Denmark receiving a mere five minutes of time 
(each) for their speeches.101 Following the speeches, which, at over three hours, took up the 
majority of the reception, a shorter period of entertainment followed from 8 to 10pm.102 The 
entertainment included sixteen different musical performances including the music of Mozart and 
Verdi, a Moscow ballerina dancing to pieces from Tchaikovsky’s “Swan Lake,” opera pieces, 
speeches by ordinary prize winners, some acrobatics, and a performance called “Nobody had yet 
thought of that 15 years ago” from a Russian folk choir. The evening was brought to a close with 
the orchestra playing a variety of patriotic “GDR melodies.”103  
The Day of the Republic, October 7, began at 9am with a military parade on Marx-
Engels-Platz arranged by the SED Central Committee, the Ministerrat, and the National Front, 
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with officials viewing the parades and demonstrations from the grandstands.104 At the same time 
as the “People’s Festivals” were taking place in all the Stadtbezirke of Berlin and the main 
festivities were going on at Karl-Marx-Allee, officials once again had their own grand reception 
to attend that evening. At 8pm, Walter Ulbricht, Willi Stoph and Erich Correns hosted an event 
for 2000 people in the Werner-Seelenbinder-Halle, which included representatives of the SED 
Central Committee, the Staatsrat, and foreign delegations.105 Besides the obligatory speeches and 
congratulatory toasts by Ulbricht and Brezhnev, there was a banquet, performances by the NVA 
orchestra, and finally, a dance at 9pm in the foyer.106  
 
 
Evangelizing the Anniversary Message Abroad 
 
It was not just within the GDR’s borders that foreign delegations had the opportunity to 
celebrate the GDR, however, as the state wanted to spread the message of its theses to the Soviet 
Union as well. This is something that would have benefitted East Germans visiting the Soviet 
Union, as well as possibly creating interest in the GDR and its people among Soviet citizens, who 
perhaps might have joined a Soviet-GDR friendship organization and visited the GDR as result.  
In 1973, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party ordered detailed plans be made in 
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honour of the GDR’s 25th anniversary.107 In many ways, the GDR anniversary celebrations that 
took place on Soviet soil were a mirror of those held in the GDR itself. The communist central 
committees of all of the Soviet republics, including the city-level committees of Moscow, 
Leningrad, Volgograd, Irkutsk and others with existing friendship agreements with GDR cities 
and Bezirke, agreed to join forces in creating festivities, gatherings and exhibitions, concerts and 
film evenings in honour of the GDR’s 25th anniversary. Important partners in organizing these 
festivities included the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Connections with Foreign 
Countries, as well as local and enterprise-based union and Komsomol (Soviet youth organization) 
committees and the collective members of the Soviet Society for Friendship with the GDR 
(SGDDR). Also heavily involved were the Embassy and the General Consulate of the GDR. 108  
The methods used to spread the message abroad echoed the National Front’s method of 
spreading the message at home, as the party organs of the SED in the Soviet Union were 
responsible for distributing the anniversary message. A Comrade Goede led the task forces and 
provided other organizations with a framework from which to organize their own events. Other 
organizations were trained by GDR embassy staff, who oversaw the daily work and ensured they 
coordinated with other GDR groups.109 As in the GDR itself, there was also strict control from 
the top, with the fulfillment of the anniversary plan being “regularly monitored” at embassy 
meetings.110  
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That no less effort was put into these foreign celebrations is clear from the opinions of 
ordinary East Germans who attended these festivities in the Soviet Union. For example, a DSF 
member named Hildegard attended the GDR’s 25th anniversary in the Soviet Union in 1974 with 
fellow DSF members. She commented that on this trip, she “made memories that would stay with 
her forever.”111  Hildegard found the Soviets to be a wonderful people who were excited to have 
East German visitors, but she was completely surprised to observe that in celebrating the GDR’s 
25th anniversary, the Soviets were so enthusiastic that she thought they were celebrating their 
own anniversary. Hildegard judged their myriad anniversary cultural programs and banquets to 
have been extremely well done, something which was a pleasant surprise to her fellow DSF 
members.112 The fact that Hildegard and her group were so impressed shows how holding 
celebrations like these could be effective in creating bonds and maintaining the image of a close 
friendship existing between the East German and Soviet peoples.  
One of the main highlights of these foreign anniversary celebrations was the “GDR 
Culture Days” week of events held in Moscow, Leningrad, and some of the capitals of the union 
republics. Organized by the Soviet Union’s Ministry for Culture in partnership with the 
Ministerrat’s Committee for TV and Radio, the Ministerrat’s Committee for Films, as well as 
numerous other writer, theatre and other cultural groups, these events took place from October 1 
to 10, 1974. The main events included festivals, concerts, theatre pieces, and exhibitions designed 
to show the GDR connection to Soviet culture, as well as their common “humanist heritage of 
world culture and achievements.”113 Other events included a book exhibition arranged by the 
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Ministry Committee for Publishing and Book Stores in Moscow and Odessa; a photo exhibition 
of the GDR called “The GDR Today” created by a Soviet journalist society; scientific 
conferences, symposiums, and scholarly exchanges with the GDR arranged by the Soviet 
education ministry; and a “GDR Film Days” organized by the State Committee of the Ministerrat 
of the USSR and the Filmmaking Association of the USSR in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, and 
Minsk.114 Like in the GDR, the opening ceremonies of these anniversary celebrations included an 
official reception and grand opening in the Kremlin attended by numerous delegations and 
representatives. 
Also, as in the GDR, the Soviet press was tasked with closely reporting on the 
development of jubilee preparations – those taking place in the Soviet Union as well as in the 
GDR.115  TASS, the central editor for the newspapers worked with the Committee for TV and 
Radio, ensured that the anniversary events were widely publicized, including that bulletins for 
foreign and Soviet presses contained sufficient information honouring the GDR, like details 
about its quarter century of achievements. 116 Besides advertising, Soviet TV and radio also ran 
special programming such as an “Evening of GDR TV” and a “Day of GDR Radio” programs 
that highlighted the friendship and collaboration between the peoples of the GDR and the Soviet 
Union.117 There were even live broadcasts from Berlin, including of Brezhnev’s visit there, as 
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well as “an evening of GDR TV” with an interview by Honecker.118  Overall, there were 300 
films released and 12 “film weeks.”  
Similarly, Soviet authors wrote many featurettes, articles and reports in honour of the 
GDR’s anniversary. Using sources such as information from the 12th plenum, Kurt Hager’s 
speeches, the theses, and documents of the 10th DSF (German-Soviet Friendship Society) 
Congress, over 20 main newspapers and journals honoured the GDR with entire issues, special 
features or prize competitions.119 Some publications such as “Journalist” “Ogonjok” and 
“Friendship of the People” even held prize competitions about the GDR.120  
As in the GDR, it was important that the information presented at these events be relevant 
to their audience. The problem though was that much of the information the DSF and the GDR’s 
Panorama program provided to the Soviet Union and the Soviet Republics was not actually 
always relevant. So while the Kiev embassy remarked that they found some of Panorama’s 
documents in particular to be very helpful for their presentations, they also found that other 
information simply did not make sense in the Soviet context: such as several issues from the 
journal Aus erster Hand on “Conditions in the Socialist Economy” (Russian), “How do people 
live in the GDR?” (German), “One hundred questions – one hundred answers” (Russian), and 
“How does a VEB work?” Also, while the Kiev Embassy found that one film called “Our Land” 
provided the people of Kiev with a “positive experience,” others, such as one called “In Our Own 
Interest,” did not resonate at all with the intended audience.121  
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After the festivities had concluded, the GDR embassy in Moscow reported their efforts in 
the Soviet Union as having been a success. The Soviet citizens had been informed to “a great 
extent about the relations between the GDR and USSR and about the GDR itself” and the 
embassy thought their message had found “wide resonance” with the population.122 The Embassy 
in Moscow wrote:  
The celebration of the anniversary turned out to be a real highlight in the brotherly 
relationship of our parties, states and peoples. At all events and in all Soviet mass media 
in all Union Republics, the anniversary was highly valued as a mutual holiday, that, in 
particular, reflected the further development of our collaborative relationship.123  
 
The story was much the same in the Soviet republics, with the Embassy in Kiev reporting that all 
events and efforts that were popularized widely in the press and on the radio/TV received strong 
support from the general public. 124 The high point of the commemorations were the festive 
events (including a variety of “friendship gatherings” and exhibitions) in Kiev, Donesk, and 
Lvov, in which 5000 people took part. The official festivities in Kiev and Kischinjov had been 
led by the party secretaries and had included delegations from the Central Committee of the 
GDR, and included the usual topics such as the historical meaning of the founding and 
development of the GDR as a socialist state on German soil, the GDR’s success in building up 
socialism and improving societal life, the friendship between the Soviet Union and the GDR, the 
GDR’s “politics of peace,” and the close economic connection between the Soviet Union and the 
GDR in realizing the complex RGW economic program.125 One unexpected outcome for the 
organizers, however, was that through arranging these activities, the GDR embassy personnel 
                                               
122 BArch DY 30/ IV B 2/20/648. Botschaft Moskau, “Abschlußbericht über die Durchführung der Maßnahmen zum 
25. Jahrestag der DDR in der UdSSR,” October 10, 1974, p. 3, 7. 
123 BArch DY 30/ IV B 2/20/648. Botschaft Moskau, “Abschlußbericht über die Durchführung der Maßnahmen zum 
25. Jahrestag der DDR in der UdSSR,” October 10, 1974, p.  2.  
124 BArch DY 30/ IV B 2/20/648. “Bericht über den 25. Jahrestag der Gründung der DDR,” Kiev, Oct 15, 1974, p. 1. 




came to make important Soviet connections and developed good personal relationships with other 
organizations, such as with the SGDDR. 126 This was very helpful for their future work, as the 
25th Anniversary celebrations across the Soviet Union and the Union republics were viewed by 
officials as laying the groundwork for the 30th Anniversary of the Liberation of Fascism – a 
holiday equally important to all states within the Eastern Bloc –  in six months’ time.127   
 
Festivities Conclusion  
 
As explained in the previous chapter on the GDR’s anniversary theses, it was simply not 
realistic for the National Front to hand out dense information booklets filled with the state’s 
ideological goals, as this could not ensure that East Germans either read or understood them. 
Their solution was instead to hold events such as lectures and exhibitions that would be 
simultaneously entertaining (or at the very least, interesting) and “educational.” While there is no 
evidence that the National Front compelled people to attend any of the dry anniversary thesis 
lectures, there was actually no need for the National Front to do so in any case. Instead, they 
tapped into the pleasure-seeking desires of the populace and cleverly inserted their messaging 
right into popular celebratory events, which almost everyone was certain to attend of their own 
free will in some form. The sheer number of events tells us of the importance of these events for 
the state – clearly the SED and National Front believed in the important role they played in 
communicating ideology from the top down all the way to the lowest of levels.  
The usefulness of holding such smaller events was that they presented the anniversary 
theses through a locally-relevant lens. Thus, the National Front could encourage local cultural 
                                               
126 BArch DY 30/ IV B 2/20/648. Botschaft Moskau, “Abschlußbericht über die Durchführung der Maßnahmen zum 
25. Jahrestag der DDR in der UdSSR,” October 10, 1974, p. 12-13. 
127 BArch DY 30/ IV B 2/20/648. Botschaft Moskau, “Abschlußbericht über die Durchführung der Maßnahmen zum 
25. Jahrestag der DDR in der UdSSR,” October 10, 1974, p. 12-13. 
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groups to use their skills and creativity to help the regional National Front representatives carry 
out the activities. Event programs from the cities of Sonneberg and Langewiesen in Bezirk Suhl 
give us a glimpse into what these festivals looked like at the lowest levels and the differences and 
similarities in the offerings between larger and smaller urban centres. The example of Sonneberg 
shows how a larger centre could offer a higher number and greater variety of city-wide and 
individual district events over a longer time period than Langewiesen. Sonneberg could even 
count on higher attendance numbers from top functionaries as well as greater organizational 
involvement by the National Front committees in comparison to the events in Langewiesen, 
which appear to have been largely organized by the lowest of functionaries from local chapters of 
diverse mass organizations.  
Furthermore, the National Front also ensured the type and content of the anniversary 
events were interactive and carefully targeted to specific strata of society. Thus, a “holiday” to 
Berlin, while framed in terms of an enjoyable festive trip, was actually functioning as a way of 
reinforcing a sense of identity, national pride, and of underscoring the messages of that year’s 
anniversary theses. Most other events and activities were framed in this same way: people were 
drawn in by the chance to have fun and they were impressed by the grandeur and/or 
entertainment value, all the while subconsciously taking in the message as it was presented in a 
speech in one place, or infused into the choice of photographs on display in another place. 
Though they could ostensibly be merely looking at a photo exhibition displaying the economic 
progress of building up an area in the last 15 years, people visiting any of the festivities in 1964 
could actually have been taking in the message of hope for the future and thereby developing a 




Chapter Three: Socialist Competitions (Sozialistische Wettbewerbe) 
 
 
Figure 8. A workers’ brigade in a lightbulb factory working hard to meet their production target four days ahead of 
schedule in honour of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in August, 1957 (Neues Deutschland, August 
10, 1957, p. 11) 
 
As demonstrated by the image above of a group of GDR workers trying to meet their 
production targets at a lightbulb factory, commemorating GDR anniversaries was not just about 
enjoying a holiday and fireworks: rather, most of it involved a great deal of less-than-glamourous 
work. Indeed, this particular workers’ brigade’s goal of meeting their yearly production target 
four days earlier than planned shows how mundane the contribution could be. Nevertheless, the 
National Front appreciated every small economic effort, for put together, these unpaid workers’ 
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efforts helped stimulate economic growth in the GDR’s planned economy and reinforced the 
anniversary theses’ goal of encouraging workers to advance the GDR’s position in the world. 
These contributions were known as “socialist competitions” (sozialistische Wettbewerbe) and 
while their main function was indeed economic, they were also a means of reinforcing the 
anniversary themes to GDR citizens, especially through the more culturally-focused 
competitions. Widespread participation in these competitions in the lead-up to the anniversaries 
was thus vital to the National Front, as the sheer number of competitions (ranging from the 
factory down to the smallest Hausgemeinschaft) ensured East Germans were thoroughly exposed 
to the SED’s anniversary theses for that year.  
Despite this important ideological role, socialist competitions were most useful to the 
GDR leadership economically, for as a state with a planned economy, the GDR lacked the 
competitive aspects inherent in a capitalist economy. This was a problem that likewise affected 
other communist states across the Eastern Bloc. As Aappo Kähönen explains, from the 
perspective of other Eastern Bloc leaders, “[t]his was not considered a problem until the lack of 
competition was linked to poor quality output and low productivity.”1 Another common problem 
among such planned economies (and from which the GDR also suffered, especially as time went 
on) was that the centrally regulated prices, combined with limited access to information, often 
resulted in a lack of innovation.2  So the GDR (and other planned economies) needed ways to 
make up for these deficits by stimulating their economy. One way to do this was through holding 
periodic “socialist competitions” that pitted different organizations, individuals, or enterprises 
against one another in “friendly competitions” in order to increase economic output.  
                                               
1 Aappo Kähönen, “Optimal planning, optimal economy, optimal life? The Kosygin reforms, 1965-72,” in Katalin 
Miklóssy and Melanie Ilič, Competition in Socialist Society (London: Routledge, 2014), 23. 
2 Kähönen, “Optimal planning, optimal economy, optimal life? The Kosygin reforms, 1965-72,” 23. 
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Holding socialist competitions was an idea that had originated in 1917 with Lenin, who 
wrote that an important task for socialist governments was to “organize competition.”3 Lenin 
argued that in contrast to capitalist competition, which merely “crushe[s], suppresse[s], and 
strangle[s]” people, socialist competition would instead create an opportunity for most working 
people to develop and display their abilities in their own field of work, for  “there is a great deal 
of talent among the people. It is merely suppressed. It must be given an opportunity to display 
itself.”4 
In order to overcome these capitalist “parasites harmful to socialist society,” Lenin argued 
that socialist governments needed to first rouse the “organising talent” of every worker and 
peasant, which he explained as “organiz[ing] the accounting and control of the amount of work 
done and of production and distribution by the entire people.”5 As a result, Lenin thought 
competitions could be effectively organized on a national scale between communities and other 
worker associations. 6 He concluded that it was this rousing of suppressed talent, along with the 
support of the people, that would ultimately “save Russia and save the cause of socialism.”7  
Katalin Miklóssy and Melanie Ilič point out that by the 1950s, as a result of Cold War 
tensions, a new kind of “socialist competition” had begun to develop. In the aftermath of Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev’s reforms in the late 1950s and those following the XXII Communist 
Party Congress in 1961, the Communist Party developed the slogan of socialism “catching up 
without overtaking the West.”8 Miklóssy and Ilič write that “[i]n this hard-edged race with the 
                                               
3 V.I. Lenin, A Great Beginning; Heroism of the Workers in the Rear; Communist Subbotniks; How to Organize 
Competition (Moscow, Progress: 1971), 34. 
4 Lenin, A Great Beginning, 34; 39-40; 43. 
5 Lenin, A Great Beginning, 39-40. 
6 Lenin, A Great Beginning, 43. 
7 Lenin, A Great Beginning, 43. 
8 Katalin Miklóssy and Melanie Ilič, “Introduction: Competition in State Socialism” in Katalin Miklóssy and 
Melanie Ilič, Competition in Socialist Society (London: Routledge, 2014), 4.  
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West, the East started to learn from the enemy in order to ‘overtake’ it using its own means.”9 
Essentially, this meant more emphasis on consumer goods and results, in contrast to merely 
increasing production and distribution as before. In so doing, the East was tacitly admitting that 
socialism had fallen behind the West’s more robust economies and could not fulfill their people’s 
desire for non-necessities.  
In the GDR, these friendly competitions that would help the country “catch up and 
overtake the West” took place not only in anniversary years, but every year in one form or 
another, usually as a way of meeting pre-set production targets.10 During the 1950s and early 
1960s, GDR officials often referred to some of these competitions as “socialist obligations” – that 
is, extra duties (such as extra unpaid working hours in a factory or volunteering with the harvest) 
that people could do in order to help the GDR achieve its strategic economic plan faster and in a 
more efficient manner. Beginning in the late 1960s, and gaining increasing momentum in the 
1970s and 1980s, another type of socialist competition the National Front began organizing were, 
in essence, beautification campaigns, where townspeople were encouraged to fix up their streets, 
neighbourhoods, even individual dwellings, all for the “betterment” of their socialist state. These 
socialist competitions were held at the individual and apartment complex association 
(Hausgemeinschaft) level, and were popularized under the slogan of “Join in! Make our Cities 
and Communities more Beautiful!” (“Mach mit! Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden”).11 This 
unpaid labour was justified (and thus not “exploitative” like in capitalism) because it was framed 
                                               
9 Miklóssy and Ilič, “Introduction: Competition in State Socialism,” 4.  
10 For more on the SED’s concept of “Überholen ohne einzuholen,” see André Steiner, ed. Überholen ohne 
einzuholen: die DDR-Wirtschaft als Fussnote der deutschen Geschichte (Berlin: Links, 2006). For a more succinct 
discussion of the concept, including an anecdote of how it worked, see Michael Harms, “Überholen ohne 
einzuholen,” taz, November 9, 2004, p. 18.  
11A Hausgemeinschaft was an association of residents living in the same apartment building. The 
Hausgemeinschaften were normally headed by a Hausgemeinschaftsleitung, a committee made up of five 
representatives that would send reports up the chain to the National Front. The Hausgemeinschaften also received 
stipends from the National Front to organize their activities. See Rubin, Amnesiopolis, 107-08. 
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under catchy slogans as a way of contributing to the building of a sense of community and state 
socialism in the GDR, as well as of strengthening the socialist world system overall, such as by 
“catching up without overtaking the West.” By convincing the people to undertake this work 
themselves, the state saved a great deal of money and staved off some of the criticism associated 
with crumbling infrastructure, especially as the years wore on and the GDR fell increasingly into 
debt.  
During major anniversary years, such as every five-year increment of the so-called 
Liberation of Fascism in 1945 (“Befreiung vom Faschismus”) the anniversary of the end of the 
Second World War) or the Founding of the GDR in 1949, or even every ten-year increments of 
the Anniversary of the October Revolution, these economic competitions were merely one part of 
a broader group of initiatives or campaigns (Gemeinschaftsaktionen) initiated by the state. 
However, it was also important to the National Front in Berlin that the economic aspect of these 
activities not be its sole focus, as it hoped the year of activities would leave a deep ideological 
impression on the populace as well. Thus, the National Front also designed many cultural and 
educational initiatives to take place during anniversary years.  
Some of these cultural initiatives (Aktionen) were national in scope and were advertised in 
all major newspapers, while others were smaller campaigns devised by the top Berlin committee 
of the National Front or other mass organizations (such as the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship (DSF), the Democratic Women’s League (DFD), or the Free German Trade Union 
Federation (FDGB) and carried out on the ground by the local boards/committees of these mass 
organizations. In still other cases, local officials designed and carried out even smaller campaigns 
that could either stand alone or be held in tandem with national campaigns. Sometimes, as in the 
case of the initiative “Drushba Klub” (“Friendship Club”) in 1975, a radio contest where 
everyone was encouraged to submit personal stories about their own connections to Soviet 
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citizens, the campaign was organized as a joint effort, in this instance by Radio DDR, the Society 
for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) and the National Front. In cases such that of the “Drushba 
Klub,” which was technically a national campaign, it was local DSF and National Front 
committees that were actually responsible for drumming up popular support. In this particular 
1975 campaign, the local committees also judged peoples’ submissions, then forwarded the best 
examples on to Radio DDR to be broadcast on air. Unlike the economic competitions that were 
focused on increasing output and productivity, the main purpose of these cultural competitions 
was ideological and by taking part, the National Front hoped people would be thoroughly 
convinced of the underlying thesis in that competition – whether it was the necessity of the Soviet 
friendship or the GDR’s economic achievements.  
Key to the ultimate success of all socialist competitions, whether cultural or economic,  
was the way in which the Bezirk (state), Kreis (county) and local National Front and mass 
organization committees carried out the national campaigns at the regional level. Any 
miscommunication between local committees and Berlin usually resulted in delayed or less than 
desirable results in that area. In fact, ongoing tensions between centre and periphery were a major 
feature of the organizational process of the competitions: Berlin insisted on as much uniformity 
across regions as possible, leveling criticism at regional committees that seriously diverged from 
their admittedly often-vague instructions. In later years, the Berlin National Front Central 
Committee even occasionally sent out representatives from their cultural department to 
personally meet with representatives in regions to correct any problems as they arose.  
One common suggestion from Berlin in each anniversary year was for the Kreis or Bezirk 
committees to create specific task forces in order to carry out their work more smoothly. From 
Berlin’s perspective, the advantages of creating a task force were mostly to do with opening the 
lines of communication between regional and national organizing committees in order to 
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maintain better, centralized control of the messaging. Berlin thought that task forces made up of 
representatives from all the major organizing bodies, including the local presses, would thus be a 
better guarantee of the “success” of a specific competition (success meaning, of course, that 
participating in the campaigns resulted in public absorption of the SED ideology), than if the 
local National Front committees were carrying it out unaided. In practice, however, even the 
existence of a task force could not guarantee success if there were other organizational problems 
with the competition or even a lack of popular interest. The key here is that the National Front in 
Berlin could simply not compel cooperation from all local organizations, even if they were still 
technically part of the National Front. There are many instances of regional committees, such as 
those of the German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) committees, for example, contributing greatly to 
the organizing of an initiative in one region, such as Leipzig, while the same organizing work in 
Magdeburg was instead carried out by the regional People’s Solidarity (VS) committee as the 
local DSF committee was not interested in doing the work.  
Ultimately, however, Berlin was most concerned with a region’s ability to maintain the 
ideological integrity of its message and to inspire popular participation in the competitions, no 
matter how the region managed to achieve these results. For example, there were occurrences 
where local committees (such as that of Kreis Hainichen one year) completely reinterpreted a 
national campaign to Berlin’s initial annoyance, but upon achieving impressive participation 
numbers with ideologically-sound initiatives, won back Berlin’s approval in the end. There were 
also instances when Berlin was so unhappy with preliminary competition results in a region (such 
as in 1957 in Neubrandenburg) that the National Front interceded to find a way to ensure the 
initiative gained some resonance amongst the people and did not fail completely. Importantly, 
there were no examples of Berlin accepting defeat: the National Front always at least tried to 
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remedy an unsuccessful regional interpretation of a national campaign, for it was just too 




The Soviet Friendship and the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution  
 
As pointed out in the introduction to the dissertation, a powerful function of myths, 
especially founding myths, is their ability to appropriate and “change” the past by transforming a 
high point in a history into a “foundational myth” that becomes vital to a nation’s unity and 
stability. The stronger the myth is, the easier it then becomes to mobilize and unify people around 
a founding national idea.12 Its power lies in how it makes the past appears in contrast to the 
present: a founding moment can project unity, continuity and ultimately, identity.13 This is 
precisely how foundational myths help to stabilize a fragile time in a state’s history. Such a 
powerful founding myth was something that the fledgling GDR desperately needed during its 
first decade in existence.   
Aleida Assmann defines a myth as a “collectively remembered history” or more 
specifically, “an idea, an event, a person, a narrative that has acquired a symbolic value and is 
engraved and transmitted in memory.”14Along with the myth of antifascism, the GDR’s 
messaging in the first two decades of its existence was dominated by other important themes such 
as the connection between the East German and the Soviet peoples, as well as the East German 
state’s legitimacy vis-à-vis the West. It was through utilizing these narratives that the SED sought 
to rewrite the German past and provide more noble roots for their new state. Given that the 
National Front needed to first create a permanent positive opinion of the Soviets in the minds of 
East Germans – and make them forget their negative experiences of the brutal Soviet occupation 
– it is no coincidence that the first major anniversary commemoration and associated socialist 
competitions in GDR history was that of the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957. 
                                               
12 Anthony Smith, “The ‘Golden Age’ and National Renewal” in Hosking and Schöpflin, Myths and Nationhood, 39. 
13 John R. Gillis, “Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship” in Commemorations: The Politics of 
National Identity, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 9. 
14 Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” 68 
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This anniversary presented a golden opportunity for the National Front to re-educate the populace 
via thousands of local and national competitions on how the Soviet vanguards of the past had 
established a whole new world system. In addition, the SED drew on older working class 
traditions and tried to combine these with their newer discourses.15 Of course, this is part and 
parcel of creating a new state, for organizers of early Soviet festivals had had to also find a way 
to mark the new era and create and legitimize new revolutionary traditions. As James von 
Geldern points out, the Soviets had likewise sought by using a centred and focused narrative, to 
help establish the Revolution as inevitable and thus present their young regime as being the 
culmination of a long tradition. This creation of a new narrative allowed the Soviets to reframe 




Figure 9. “Competition to Honour the 40th Anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution – Who can write 
the best and most impactful experience of German-Soviet Friendship?” (BArch, DY6/5648) 
                                               
15 Olsen, Tailoring Truth,  45. 
16 Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 209-210.  
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“Wir schreiben das Buch der deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft!” (“We will write the Book 
of German-Soviet Friendship!”) (1957) 
 
In September 1957, the National Front appealed to the public to join in a national cultural 
competition in honour of the 40th Anniversary of the “Great Socialist October Revolution,” 
asking “Who can write the best and most impactful experience of German-Soviet Friendship?”17 
The appeal requested East Germans submit stories that detailed personal experiences or 
meaningful encounters that served to demonstrate the “warm and steadfast” friendship between 
the people of the GDR and of the USSR.18 People were to submit their stories to their district-
level (Bezirk) National Front committees for initial evaluation by a jury, who would then send 
their chosen finalists on to the central jury in Berlin. The Bezirk juries were made up of various 
local personalities such as journalists like Walter Bankel, cultural editor of local paper, Das Volk, 
in Erfurt; authors like Karl Otto of the Association for German Writers in Karl-Marx-Stadt; and 
cultural department officials such as a Herr Koschel in Cottbus.19 Likewise, the central jury in 
Berlin comprised of leading political officials from the National Front such as Herr Lewin from 
the SED Central Committee’s Department of Culture; Ernst Laboor from the SED Central 
Committee’s History Institute; Herr Schellenberger from the Writers’ Association of the GDR 
(DSV); Herr von Steuben from the German-Soviet Society for Friendship (DSF); and Herr 
Fühmannn, a representative of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD). It also 
included academics like Herr Grünberg from Berlin’s Education Department, Dr. Weise from the 
                                               
17 Note: The competition was first conceived in August, 1957, and the first public appeal in the national newspapers 
appears in the Berliner Zeitung on September 15, with the first appeal in paper newspaper Neues Deutschland 
appearing on September 24.  
18 BArch, DY 6/5648, “Wettbewerb zu Ehren des 40. Jahrestages der Grossen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution, 
1957,” p. 2.  
19 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,’” October 21, 1957, p. 2. 
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Potsdam-Babelsberg film school; and Herr G. Engel from Humboldt University’s Institute for 
German History.20  
In order to incentivize participation in this competition, the National Front offered 
substantial prizes for the top eighteen stories, with a further seventy-three submissions receiving 
smaller prizes.21 The first-place prize was an 18-day trip for two to the Soviet Union and included 
stops in Moscow and cities along the Black Sea such as Tbilisi, Sokhumi, Yalta, and Kiev; the 
second-place prize was a TV cabinet (it is unclear if a TV was included); the third-place winner 
would receive a 14-day trip for two to Moscow, Stalingrad, Rostov, and Kiev. The rest of the 
prizes awarded to the top 18 winners included TV sets, a Großsuper radio, a mo-ped, various 
cameras (including an AK 8, Contax, Praktika, and Werra), tape recorders, shorter trips for one 
person only (a 10-day stay in Leningrad and Moscow for 8th place; 7 days in Moscow for 10th 
place), watches and other items.22 Finally, the advertisement promised that the very best 
submissions would be compiled in book form and published at a later date.  
That the National Front provided such substantial prizes shows how serious the SED was 
about attracting public attention and generating participation in this socialist competition. 
Significantly, rather than doling out collective prizes that could perhaps improve a community 
(given the collective benefit these competitions supposedly brought), these prizes were very 
“westernized” and individualistic. The National Front thus offered the people what they really 
wanted, which were trips to foreign lands (even if they could only send people to the Soviet 
                                               
20 Likely written by Mallwitz, Secretary of Central Jury in Berlin. BArch, DY 6/5648, Section “Zusammensetzung 
der Jury – Organisation der Juryarbeit” in “Abschließender Bericht über den Wettbewerb ‚Wir schreiben das Buch 
der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,’ ausgeschrieben zu Ehren des 40. Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen 
Oktoberrevolution vom Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschlands,” p. 1.  
21 BArch, DY 6/5648, Secretary of Competition’s Central Jury in Berlin Mallwitz, “Protokoll der 4. Sitzung der 
zentralen Jury,” March 15, 1958, p. 2. 




Union) and consumer goods, both of which GDR citizens were sorely lacking in comparison to 
those enjoying West Germany’s “economic miracle.” It is important to recall that at this moment, 
the people of the GDR were suffering from even more shortages due to widespread strikes in 
Poland and the Hungarian Revolution of the year before. At this time, too, the border with West 
Germany was still open, and 1956 and 1957 marked the second and third highest number of GDR 
citizens departing for the West, with 279 189 people registering themselves as refugees in West 
Germany in 1956, and 261 622 in 1957, which amounted to a loss of 1.6% and 1.5% 
(respectively) of the total GDR population.23 It is thus entirely logical that the National Front at 
this point in time would have wanted to reinforce how the socialist system could compete with 
the West – to a degree at least.  
By mid-October 1957, a few weeks before the submission deadline, the Office of the 
President of the National Front started to become very concerned with the progress of the 
competition, commenting in a confidential memorandum that the competition had attracted 
insufficient attention in several Bezirke.24 Herr Neumann, a member of the regional commission 
in Neubrandenburg, had written to the National Front in Berlin describing the situation in his 
Bezirk as a complete failure (or, as he tactfully put it, “not yet successful”), with only two people 
having made submissions in the entire district.25 Upon personally investigating this situation in 
the region of Anklam (which included a city of 20 000 people), Neumann was only able to find 
                                               
23 Andre Steiner, The Plans that Failed: An Economic History of the GDR, trans. Ewald Osers (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010), 86 
24 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 1. 
25 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 1. 
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fourteen people who had either direct contact with Soviets, anything to do with the October 
Revolution, or who had even been to the Soviet Union.26  
The problem went deeper than merely Neubrandenburg residents’ lack of Soviet 
connections, however. As of October 17, the GDR’s fourteen Bezirke had only received a grand 
total of 229 submissions. For example, the Bezirk Leipzig had received a total of six submissions, 
while Bezirk Cottbus had received four. The highest totals came from Bezirk Suhl, with forty-five 
submissions, and Bezirk Karl Marx Stadt, with thirty-six submissions. The Bezirk of Halle had 
received twenty-one submissions, but the average total for most Bezirke was between nine and 
eighteen total submissions. 27 Furthermore, the quality of the submissions received was highly 
variable. In Bezirk Suhl, only twenty-five (out of forty-five) submissions were good enough to be 
sent on to the final jury in Berlin. In Bezirk Potsdam, only three out of seventeen were considered 
acceptable enough to be included in the book, while in Gera, a mere two out of six total 
submissions were considered good. Only in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt did the National Front 
believe the submissions’ quality ranged from good to excellent.28 Given that the first meeting of 
the Berlin jury was to take place in two days’ time, on October 21, the National Front President’s 
Office was naturally very dissatisfied with these interim results. Particularly in the disastrous 
example of Neubrandenburg, the President’s Office blamed this failure on the fact that numerous 
local competitions had very similar themes and thus took peoples’ attention away from the 
national one.29  
                                               
26 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 1. 
27 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 1. 
28 BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 1-2. 
29BArch, DY 6/5648, Büro des Präsidiums, Arbeitsgebiet 1. “Kurzinformation 07 zum Stand des Wettbewerbs ‘Wir 
schrieben das Buch der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft,” October 21, 1957, p. 2. 
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Another problem in the eyes of the President’s office was a lack of organization in certain 
Bezirke: although the first meeting of the central jury in Berlin was about to take place, Bezirke 
such as Halle, Magdeburg and Potsdam had not even managed to put their juries together yet.30 
As a result, Berlin extended the competition deadline by two weeks to November 15.31 The 
President’s Office recommended that in order to salvage the entire operation, the regional 
National Front committees make a concerted effort via the press and radio to attract more 
submissions.32 From Berlin’s perspective, the Bezirke were neither sufficiently advertising the 
competition nor making the competition’s meaning clear to the masses. 33  
While the competition was ultimately successful with a final total of 1750 submissions, 
from the perspective of the National Front in Berlin, this was due to its own actions at the last 
minute which made up for the inefficiencies and generally poor efforts in certain Bezirke.34 
Members of the National Council of the GDR and Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF), 
but particularly the members of the National Commission for the 40th Anniversary of the 
Revolution, had had to put in “a considerable amount of work” so that the campaign could still 
“achieve a good result” and did not fail outright.35 According to Mallwitz, the secretary to the 
central jury in Berlin, some regions remained disorganized until the end, delaying the conclusion 
to the competition and leaving the central jury in Berlin with much more work than they had 
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originally anticipated. For example, even though the competition deadline had been extended to 
November 15, some Bezirke forwarded their finalists to Berlin as late as the end of December, 
1957. 36 Other Bezirke like Potsdam, Gera, and Leipzig were so disorganized they only sent 
Berlin a few submissions at a time, which seriously impaired the amount of time and 
consideration the Central Jury could give to reviewing them. Mallwitz complained that: 
After repeated requests, the main brunt of the manuscripts arrived four to six weeks after 
the central jury’s last deadline. In addition to their usual year-end work, the publishers 
contributing to the manuscript will have to now work over Christmas and New Year in 
order to get the manuscripts organized thematically for an orderly transfer to the archive 
as well as to find substitute material to have close on hand to put into the book of 
German-Soviet friendship.37 
 
Mallwitz pointed out that the Bezirk juries’ selections would also need to be re-evaluated because 
their assessment standards varied so widely. Thus, the National Front’s 40th Anniversary 
Commission concluded that “not only should the Bezirk juries forward the best manuscripts 
[submissions] to the central jury, but [it should send] all manuscripts [submissions] in order to 
eliminate any inaccurate scores, which has happened in several cases.”38  
 Despite the good work that Berlin did in salvaging the competition, this did not solve the 
underlying problem of a general lack of willingness to participate in a competition that tried to 
forcibly create that which did not exist, which was a widespread sense of “connection” and 
friendship between the Soviet and German people. Although some people certainly had positive 
experiences to share about the Soviets (as we shall see more of in the section on the 30th 
Anniversary of the GDR in 1975), the reality was that lack of submissions in 1957 likely had 
more to do with the distrust with which much of the population viewed the Soviets, than with any 
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Bezirk’s inadequate advertising skills or clumsy organizational ability. Since much of the 
populace, especially many of the rape victims, would also have had very negative memories 
about the Soviets’ actions during the end and aftermath of the war, it is no wonder that many 
were not at all interested in participating in a competition celebrating their former enemies and 
occupiers.39 Seen in this light then, it seems obvious that the Bezirke would have struggled to 
command interest, no matter what prizes they had to offer.   
The topics of the eventual winning submissions featured stories from the First and Second 
World Wars, trips of worker delegations to the Soviet Union in 1920s, tours of the Soviet Union, 
the help of Soviet specialists in the reconstruction and rebuilding efforts following the Second 
World War, as well as daily encounters with Soviets in the early 1950s. Despite the historically 
fraught relationship between the countries and the harshness of the Soviet occupation of 
Germany, the winning stories only discussed positive interactions between Germans and Soviets, 
and those which conformed to the SED’s new ideological narrative and newly re-written history. 
First place in the competition was awarded to a woman named Martha who wrote about an 
incident during the Second World War that showed the solidarity of German and Soviet workers. 
Martha had befriended a female Soviet forced labourer while working together and she described 
an incident where they saved the life of a Soviet woman’s child. Ever since, the two women had 
kept in contact, sharing their experience and culture.40 Other submissions included stories of 
workers’ trips to the Soviet Union in the 1920s to attend conferences/events and the feeling of 
solidarity and warmth the Germans encountered with the Soviet workers there. In one such 
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example, a driver named Ernst wrote about a trip he made to Moscow in 1928 for the first All-
Russian Spartakiad (sporting event). Attending this great event further convinced him about the 
justness of the communist cause, and influenced him to later join the KPD. The central jury 
thought this submission demonstrated very well the “essence of the Soviet state in practice.”41 
Another particularly popular theme amongst the submissions was that of the tourist 
experience. The newspaper Neue Zeit published such an example from a man named Fritz. In a 
rather banal but very patriotic submission, Fritz wrote about a trip to the Soviet Union a few 
months prior. He wrote of how much Leningrad, “The Venice of the North,” had enchanted him. 
Particularly striking for Fritz was the friendliness and kindness of the Soviet people he met. For 
example, one day Fritz encountered a man and his daughter who spoke fluent German and who 
offered to take him on a boat ride on the river Neva. Later, his new friend and daughter came to 
his hotel to bid him farewell and to speak of the “peace and friendship,” between their countries, 
something which Fritz thought was wonderful and proper, showing what good communists they 
were. Fritz also wrote of another encounter with a woman working at a newspaper stand. Despite 
his lack of Russian, the woman was still very friendly towards him and they were nonetheless 
able to demonstrate their “communist” goodwill and friendship towards each other by gifting one 
other patriotic badges from their respective countries. Fritz therefore left the Soviet Union with a 
feeling of solidarity with the Soviet people.42 It was tales such as these, mundane as they were, 
that the National Front wished to popularize, for they served to underscore the official narrative 
that the Soviets were a kind people from whom East Germans could learn how to become “good 
communist citizens.” It is clear that the National Front wished the lasting positive impressions 
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reported by the authors of these stories to be disseminated amongst the populace at large and thus 
work towards achieving a main goal of the SED’s theses, which was to maintain a close 
“brotherly” connection with the Soviet Union (which was, of course, vital to maintaining the 
country’s continued existence, especially during the years before the GDR obtained its own 
legitimacy on the world stage).  
 
 
“A Good Deed for our Common Socialist Cause” (1957) 
In June 1957, the SED’s Central Committee described their plans for further initiatives 
following the “elections” of 1957. 43 These initiatives, the Central Committee wrote, would 
concern the implementation of the resolutions of the 30th plenary session of the SED. The slogan 
from the elections, “Eine gute Tat für den Sozialismus” (“A good deed for socialism”), was to be 
combined with a slogan from the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend, Free German Youth) concerning 
socialist workers’ brigades, “Eine gute Tat für unsere gute Sache” (“A good deed for our good 
cause”), to become “Eine gute Tat für unsere gemeinsame sozialistische Sache” (“A Good Deed 
for our Common Socialist Cause”).44 
While the “Book of German-Soviet Friendship” competition for the best story about 
German-Soviet relations served obvious ideological purposes for the 40th anniversary of the 
Revolution, the National Front designed “A Good Deed for our Common Socialist Cause” to 
encourage the populace to volunteer their time in certain sectors of the economy in order to help 
meet and even surpass the goals of the yearly economic plan. The SED Central Committee 
specifically wanted this competition to achieve a 10-day lead on the industry plan by the 40th 
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anniversary of the Revolution (November 7). The SED appeal called on all workers and farmers 
and even the intelligentsia to “do more good deeds for socialism,” while at the same time calling 
on all party members to do their “self-evident duty” by being “at the forefront of this 
movement.”45 The SED wanted every enterprise to increase their productivity: for example, 
workers were to overcome the shortfall in the energy (coal) and building/roadworks (NAW) 
sectors. The SED Central Committee cited as a good example of progress one organization in the 
building sector that had even created its own rhyming slogan “Spart Material, es wird sich lohnen 
— Ergebnis: schneller 100 000 Wohnungen” (“Save material, it will be worth it –  Result: it will 
be quicker to build 100 000 homes”). Also not to be forgotten was the agricultural sector, as the 
SED asked for greater efforts to be made bringing in the harvest with as little loss as possible, as 
well as for the people to work to form new permanent agriculture and livestock collectives.46  
 “A Good Deed for our Common Socialist Cause” began in earnest at the end of July 
1957, when the Agricultural Department in Berlin instructed the local-level National Front 
committees to discuss with their constituents how best to take part in this broad “production 
competition” initiative, including how best to get measurable results.47 The resulting 
achievements would be celebrated in a ceremony on the 40th Anniversary of the Revolution on 
November 7. Echoing the official line from the SED, the Agricultural Department reminded the 
local committees to inform the populace that their focus should be on bringing in the grain 
harvest with a minimum of losses; increasing livestock production (especially beef and milk); as 
well as on convincing any remaining independent farmers to form collective enterprises within 
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the VdgB (Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe, the Peasants Mutual Aid Association) and 
other state apparatuses.48 The National Front in Berlin agreed to provide additional workers to the 
localities to bring in the wheat, root crop and corn harvests. Berlin also told the regions it would 
help mobilize people from urban areas in order to get one million cubic metres of extra silo 
storage space.49 
 
Figure 10.  Newspaper article featuring collective farmers Robert Hauf and Otta Sodemann working to collect the 
grain harvest and doing their part to contribute to “A Good Deed for our Common Socialist Cause.”  
(“Eine gute Tat für unsere gemeinsame sozialistische Sache,” Neues Deutschland, July 16, 1957, p.1) 
 
The ways in which the populace contributed to this competition in their localities varied 
widely in size and scope. For example, in the town of Sargleben (Kreis Perleberg), three farmers 
and twelve farm workers agreed to build a 17-member Type-III LPG (agricultural collective) of 
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140 hectares. 50 In Rubow, an agricultural collective promised to raise the milk production by 120 
litres per cow and to get the hens to lay 130 instead of 100 eggs, while in the town of 
Schönermark, members of an agricultural collective promised to provide 4 000 litres more milk, 
1 200 dozen more seed potatoes, and through use of local reserves, aimed to save 25 percent on 
overall building costs.51 Meanwhile, members of the DBD (Demokratische Bauernpartei 
Deutschlands, Democratic Farmers’ Party) in Hettstedt promised to produce 50 000 more litres of 
milk, 14 000 kg more meat, 14 000 more eggs, 130 kg more wool, and 105 kg more poultry. 52 
The Department of Agriculture in Berlin advised the localities to obtain reserves from the 
agricultural collectives to help achieve these increases in livestock production.53 
Besides providing more food, East Germans also pledged to provide more hours of 
labour. For example, 700 future kindergarteners at a school in Schwerin agreed to work in the 
fields of 24 agricultural collectives in the surrounding area bringing in the harvest, while 1 100 
other school children in Schwerin agreed to volunteer for 14 days to help bring in the root 
vegetable crop harvest.54 In Kreis Haldensleben near Magdeburg, 142 administration and office 
workers said they would volunteer one day per week on an agricultural collective. 55 Although we 
cannot know for sure if these individual pledges were ever carried out, especially in the numbers 
listed above, the fact that these offers were made at all demonstrates that East Germans were well 
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aware of how much the National Front cared about the populace being involved in this 
volunteering work. For the National Front, it was both about the economic benefit, as well as the 
pedagogical usefulness in allowing ordinary people to feel connected to a bigger project beyond 
their own communities: that of “building up” the socialist state.  
It was not only the agricultural sector that desperately needed volunteers – the building 
and roadworks sectors did as well. The problem was that even twelve years after the end of the 
war, many areas still needed to be reconstructed or rebuilt. In the urban district Mitte in Berlin, 
the problem was particularly bad, with huge heaps of rubble remaining. In July 1957, the Berliner 
Zeitung published an appeal for volunteers to clear out large areas of Mitte so that additional 
apartment complexes could be built. The appeal further explained that the volunteer work would 
effectively help the NAW save 15 million DM on costs by November 7, as well as help their 
socialist state in general by enabling the building of extra housing units.56 Officials considered 
this building project “particularly urgent” and stressed saving on costs in every respect: 
This task of the economical use of materials will also apply to housing construction as 
this can help reduce steel consumption. According to the district management’s decree, 
more building materials should be obtained not only from the increase in building 
material production, but also from clearing rubble and from local reserves. Last but not 
least, the citizens of Berlin will be interested in the suggestion that a commission in every 
district of the city will gradually restore the living space to proper use.57 
It was not only areas of Berlin that still lay in rubble; building projects were very 
important elsewhere in the country as well. For example, residents of Woggersin in 
Neubrandenburg, along with some help from the army, planned to build a water pipeline so that 
the town could finally have running water. By using volunteer labour in combination with the 
town’s reserves, this group estimated they would save 90 000 DM on the project. Residents of 
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another village near Halle planned to build a street as their contribution to the competition, while 
in the region of Anklam, a group of twenty residents (mostly former construction workers) 
sought to create more housing in their town by building a four-family-house over the summer and 
fall of 1957.58  
Other villagers fulfilled their “socialist obligations” by undertaking smaller tasks in their 
communities. One group of six in the town of Dölau created several beautiful flower beds, which 
they said benefitted the community by acting as a peaceful space for townsfolk to congregate in 
and enjoy.59 In another instance, a FDJ painting group from Peene Shipyard in Wolgast agreed to 
hold special evening painting sessions for youth and to donate the revenue from this to the 
expansion project of the port in Rostock. 60 In the region of Suckrow, farmers came together and 
built a “cultural room” worth 20 000 DM for all of the area to enjoy.  In another example, SED 
members of the VdgB in the small city of Neustrelitz volunteered to get a minimum of 15 more 
subscribers to the party newspaper, Neues Deutschland.61 
GDR citizens also responded to appeals for volunteer work in the energy sector, 
something that was critically important given the recent shortages in raw materials, especially 
coal and steel, due to the unrest in the East.62 For example, the Art Union in Bezirk Halle ran a 
campaign called “Kunst hilft Kohle” (“Art helping coal”) that involved donating their artistic 
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talents to those working in coal mining. In this respect, members of the Elbe-Elster-Theater in 
Wittenberg, including 10 actors, eight members from the musical division, and 12 members of 
the orchestra, volunteered to build an artists’ group and to perform in coal mining areas. 
Meanwhile, the “Cultural Orchestra” of the town of Ballenstedt volunteered on the eve of the 40th 
Anniversary on November 7 to partner with the Volkskunstgruppe of the brown coal works in 
Bachterstedt, the elementary school in Aschersleben, as well as other neighbouring 
Volkskunstgruppen, to organize a festive program for everyone that included Soviet songs, poetry 
recitals, and dancing. In another example, the film collective group (KLB) and music school in 
Merseburg prepared several Soviet film festival days in the brown coal region of Geiseltal, while 
another film collective group from Saal offered to organize the showing of Soviet films during a 
festival week in their region, specifically in the nearby brown coal municipality of 
Teutschentha.63  
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What these economic and cultural competitions of 1957 show us is the ways in which the 
National Front sought to create effective socialist competitions that would achieve the SED’s 
economic and ideological goals. While the success of the cultural competitions, such as 
convincing the populace of the necessity of their Soviet connection, was difficult to judge in the 
short term and were thus repeated in anniversary after anniversary, the economic competitions’ 
Figure 11. An advertisement calling on coal miners in the town of Haselbach to participate in “A good deed for our 
common socialist cause,” in honour of  the 40th of the October Revolution and the eighth anniversary of the founding 
of the GDR.  The ad called on “all our mining comrades”to increase their output by 500 000 cubic meters, 
reminding them that “The entire district and Republic is awaiting coal from Haselbach!” There were 26 000 DM’s 




results were much more visible and measurable. Thus, the National Front considered a few hours 
of volunteering to bring in the harvest, working overtime to increase coal production in one mine, 
helping neighbours rebuild a town street, or even by simply arranging town flowerbeds, all to 
belong to the noble pursuit of “building up the socialist state.” Indeed, the state offered 
particularly dedicated villagers recognition for their strenuous efforts: One Frau Ingeburg Thiel 
from the city of Gera received a golden recognition badge for the 1250 volunteer hours she 
donated to building works in her neighbourhood.64  Even though these acts were overwhelmingly 
prosaic in nature, they also required a great deal of collaboration between coworkers, neighbours, 
and friends. Indeed, practical work such as beautifying public spaces, rebuilding war damage, or 
offering free art classes, on the one hand, actually benefitted their own communities far more 
than the state at large by improving the quality of life in the villages and cities. On the other 
hand, however, this collaborative work certainly benefited the state as the work completed was 
used by the National Front as evidence of claim popular approval not only of the competitions 
themselves, but also of the state’s leadership. Finally, all of this volunteer work also helped the 
state manage any economic shortfalls by helping them gain ground in “catching up without 
overtaking the West.”  
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Celebrating the GDR’s Success: Anniversaries of the Founding of the GDR in the 
1960s 
 
 The anniversary commemorations of the 1960s, much like those of the late 1950s, took 
the form of both economic and cultural competitions. The international and domestic contexts in 
which the 1960s anniversaries took place were significantly different, however. With the building 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the GDR had finally stopped the flow of people to the West. This 
made the task of running the state a much easier one, as there was no longer any real threat of 
people leaving in protest. The Wall’s existence also greatly aided the GDR theses’ claims of 
legitimacy as it symbolized the state’s permanency: while both East and West German officials 
continued to claim they sought German reunification, the reality was that the likelihood of this 
occurring in the foreseeable future was extremely unlikely.65 The result of this was that the 
competitions of the 1960s were focused on creating internal legitimacy by enabling people to 
gain a sense of being part of something greater -- a socialist German ideal. This was comparable 
to the way in which the Soviets employed activities, where “the party-state intended state-
sponsored popular culture to help build a socialist, alternative version of modernity.”66   
For the SED, this new version of modernity involved the leadership undertaking reforms that 
would ultimately lead to economic growth during this time period – something which the 
anniversary theses of 1964 repeatedly underscored.  
In April 1964, the SED Central Committee made resolutions that set in motion the 
preparations for the 15th anniversary of the founding of the GDR. Since the SED was finally able 
to strategize without fear of further population loss, the New Economic System (NES) of 1963/4 
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attempted to modernize the economy and increase productivity and quality, while still lowering 
costs. Essentially, the leadership was still trying to catch up and overtake the West, though 
without introducing market mechanisms, and to provide the populace with the consumer goods 
they had lacked for so long.67  
In honour of the anniversary, the SED asked industry workers “to do everything they can 
to implement the technical Revolution in the GDR, while achieving the highest quality and 
lowest costs possible, as well as meeting the deadlines of the 1964 economic plan.”68 Since the 
GDR was only just beginning to recover from its recent food shortages (caused in part by 
aggressive collectivization), the SED instructed agricultural workers to follow the resolutions of 
the eighth German Farmers’ Congress, which recommended workers strive to increase 
productivity by ensuring that the spring seeding and autumn harvesting achieved maximal 
results.69  
The 15th anniversary of the GDR in 1964 was a very important milestone for the state, as 
it was also the first anniversary celebrating the GDR itself that included a number of international 
delegations and numerous festivities. To accompany these festivities, the National Front 
organized a number of socialist competitions in 1964, including an economic competition entitled 
“Dem Volke zum Nutzen – der Republik zu Ehren” (“For the benefit of the People – Honouring 
the Republic”) and a cultural one entitled “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” (“Experienced and 
Recorded”). 
                                               
67 See, for example, Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: the Politics of Consumerism in East Germany 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005), 210-212.  
68 BArch, DY 6/2395, Vorlage 1 an das Sekretariat des Nationalrats, “Vorbereitung und Durchführtung des 15. 
Jahrestages der Detuschen Demokratischen Republik,” April 3, 1964, p. 2.  
69 BArch, DY 6/2395, Vorlage 1 an das Sekretariat des Nationalrats, “Vorbereitung und Durchführtung des 15. 
Jahrestages der Detuschen Demokratischen Republik,” April 3, 1964, p. 2. 
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“Dem Volke zum Nutzen – der Republik zu Ehren” was an urban economic competition 
that involved the industrial, construction, and transportation sectors.  Horst Brasch of the 
National Front claimed that the reason economic competitions like this were needed was because 
“the stronger the GDR is economically, the more certain lasting peace in Europe will be.”70 A 
synthetic fiber enterprise called “Friedrich Engels” had first begun this competition in Premnitz 
near Berlin by appealing to other workers to “help fulfill the 1964 economic plan.” This 
enterprise appealed to workers in other enterprises, asking them to focus on “accelerating 
scientific and technical progress, improving the quality of synthetic fibers and radically reducing 
total production costs.”71 Given that almost two-thirds of “Friedrich Engels’” costs were 
attributable to the consumption of raw materials, the workers aimed to use all basic materials and 
auxiliary materials, as well as all types of energy, as rationally as possible. They hoped to reduce 
costs by seven percent, while maintaining overall quality.72 These particular enterprise workers 
were very proud of what they had achieved over the past fifteen years, especially since they were 
anticipating their production for 1964 to be more than ten times more than that of 1949. They 
wrote in Neues Deutschland that achieving their goals would ultimately contribute towards their 
state gaining international recognition, explaining that: “We know that every success in material 
production, especially in science and technology, will support the struggle of our republic to 
secure peace and solve the German question, and further enhances the international reputation of 
our state.”73 Without minimizing the real pride these workers likely did feel in their work, it is 
                                               
70 BArch, DY 6/2395, “15 Jahre DDR – 15 Jahre Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht in Deutschland. Von Horst Brasch, 
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73 “Brief der Chemiefaserwerker an alle Werktätigen der DDR,” Neues Deutschland, March 31, 1964, p. 1-2. 
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highly unlikely in reality that they were thinking about larger issues like their state’s international 
reputation when working on improving their output (as Neues Deutschland would have the 
readers believe). But the larger issue is that, in context, each economic success helped improve 
the GDR’s standing at home and aboard. Successes like these also lent support to the GDR 
leadership’s plan to eventually overtake the West economically so they could, in the process, 
prove the superiority of the socialist world system. 
“Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” (1964) 
 
Building on the National Front’s 1957 cultural competition that asked the public to write 
about their personal experiences with the Soviets, “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” (“Experienced 
and Recorded”) asked GDR citizens to reflect on their experiences within their own country. The 
National Front encouraged the public to “help write the history book of our Republic!” by 
submitting any original songs, poems, pictures, photos, or drawings inspired by personal 
experiences to their local National Front committees. This national appeal aimed to make East 
Germans aware that even the smallest, most banal aspects of their normal lives were of interest to 
the state and thus eligible for submission to this competition. The appeal explained that: 
Each of us has witnessed and shaped a part of the history of the new Germany in the past 
15 years; it has been filled with joyful events, varied experiences and exciting conflicts. 
Each of us witnessed events and encounters that have become indelibly imprinted upon 
us. Often such times – but often only long afterwards – do we realize how our personal 
small stories are intertwined with the greater ones of the community.74 
 
The appeal went on to assure the public that although professional poets and writers had already 
written about the early years of the Republic “in an artistic way,” the National Front was now 
interested in the stories of ordinary people, asking “how many of our steps from yesterday to 
today, from the “I” to “we” are still shapeless and unknown?”75 This was a request for citizens to 
                                               
74 “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben,” Neues Deutschland, July 1, 1964, p. 1. 
75 “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben,” Neues Deutschland, July 1, 1964, p. 1. 
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reflect on the everyday details of their very ordinary lives and how these fit into the development 
of the country, an attempt at identity-creation. People were to make submissions to their local 
newspaper editors, who would then forward the submissions on to be judged by regional National 
Front committees. The best submissions would be made into a book and sold in bookshops.76  
Even though the local National Front committees were ultimately responsible for judging 
the winners of the competition, the National Front in Berlin chose to devolve a great deal of the 
organizing and promotion of “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” to the editorial boards of regional 
newspapers. As a result, during the summer of 1964, members of the National Front in Berlin 
kept daily watch on approximately seventy different regional newspapers to discern how well 
they were promoting the competition.  
The National Front had high expectations of the regional newspaper editors and expected 
the editors to keep as close as possible to their original advertisement. Supporting this 
competition, Berlin told the editors, would not only help top officials further develop their 
“political-ideological work,” but also assist in creating an atmosphere of excitement surrounding 
the 15th anniversary.77 More bluntly, the National Front said that:  
no Kreis newspaper editors are allowed to wait idly by until some testimonials arrive on 
their desks. The task is to work imaginatively and in a variety of ways with this appeal 
[advertisement] together with the National Front Kreis secretariat, to encourage many 
people to write down their experiences so that they can be published immediately. No 
issue of a Kreis newspaper should appear that does not contain well-placed contributions 
to this competition. Both urban and rural citizens are encouraged to think back on their 
lives over the last 15 years and write down the most interesting parts of them.78  
 
                                               
76 BArch, DY 6/2396, “15 Jahre Deutsche Demokratische Republik, ‘Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben’” approx. July 
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The National Front left the decision about providing prizes for the top submissions up to the 
individual newspapers. For example, the SED-run regional newspapers offered their readers 
prizes, money, and trips worth anywhere between 1 000 MDN or 10 000 MDN,79 depending on 
what the individual publication was able to afford. 80 Across the country, the National Front 
estimated that, on average, individual newspapers were able to offer their top submission either a 
trip to the Soviet Union or a prize worth approximately 300 MDN.81  
The Berlin National Front’s Secretariat for the Commission for Agitation/Press informed 
the regional newspapers that they were expected to publish the national appeal (designed and 
written by the National Front) in its original form. In order to keep interest high, Berlin also 
advised the editors to make sure the competition was continuously advertised from July 1 through 
to October 7, the day of the 15th anniversary.82 However, only a few papers reacted immediately 
to Berlin’s orders. Those who strictly obeyed and published the original advertisement were 
almost all the editors of SED-run regional papers, which advertised the competition for the first 
time as early as July 1 or 2. A handful of other papers, such as the Magdeburg Volksstimme, 
diverged slightly from the instructions and published long summaries of the advertisement, while 
papers like the Ostsee Zeitung and the Sächsische Zeitung published brief summaries of the 
campaign.83  
The regional Brand-Erbisdorfer-Zeitung from Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt made an 
exceptional effort to pique the interest of their readers. As early as July 10 and on page 1, the 
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80 BArch, DY 6/ 2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates Kommission für Agitation/Presse, “‘Miterlebt und 
Aufgeschrieben’ in der Kreis und Bezirkspresse,” October 27, 1964, p. 4.  
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paper published its own advertisement for the competition, featuring a child holding a pen with 
the captions “What is Gudrun writing?” answering its own question with “On the occasion of the 
GDR's 15th anniversary, she is writing down the most meaningful experiences that made her 
aware that the GDR is her fatherland.” 84 Over the following ten issues, the Brand-Erbisdorfer-
Zeitung published a selection of eight different submissions received from their readers. The 
National Front in Berlin was also impressed with the efforts of Freies Wort in Suhl, which had 
worked very hard to get their readers invested in the competition. Freies Wort invented a cartoon 
character for the readers to follow and also published the anecdotes, poems, and pictures people 
submitted as soon as they arrived. What the National Front thought was particularly effective 
about Freies Wort and Brand-Erbisdorfer-Zeitung’s approach was that they made the 
competition more accessible and appealing to their local readership. For example, Freies Wort’s 
goal was for their cartoon character to prompt participation in the competition by, other things, 
posing questions like: “In the last year, which changes in your residential area or workplace made 
you really happy?” or “In your region, do you remember who the first to drive a combine was?” 
and inviting people to submit answers.85 Asking simple, yet explicit questions like these made an 
otherwise very dry and ideological exercise more accessible to the average member of the public. 
After observing these good examples and the public’s positive reaction to them, the National 
Front in Berlin soon began to advise all newspapers to develop their own characters or fun ideas 
to promote the competition, something Berlin assured the editors would “deepen the friendship” 
                                               
84 BArch, DY 6/ 2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates Kommission für Agitation/Presse, “‘Miterlebt und 
Aufgeschrieben’ in der Kreis und Bezirkspresse,” October 27, 1964, p. 1-2. 
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between the newspaper and their readership, as well as help the people “develop connections” 
with their socialist state.86 
 
 
                                               
86 BArch, DY 6/2396, “15 Jahre Deutsche Demokratische Republik, ‘Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben’” approx. July 
1964. Likely written by the Nationalrat and sent to the Kreiszeitungen, p. 4.  
Figure 12. The Berliner Zeitung chose to advertise the competition in a very 
accessible manner. As can be seen here, there are cartoon characters prompting 
people to make their own submissions by giving examples of what these characters 
are writing about: for example, about new appliances the family has, what new 
machines are available at work, or just to tell about the history of the collective 




While many papers embraced the exercise, the delayed and even disinterested approach of 
some other newspapers gave the National Front cause for concern. Examples like these came 
from the official regional party papers of other block parties87 such as the CDU (Christian 
Democrats) and LDPD (Liberal Democratic Party), for example, which the National Front found 
were often either slow to advertise the competition, or simply failed to mention the competition at 
all. Many other regional newspapers also did not publish the original advertisement at the 
beginning of July as the National Front had instructed. Instead, these newspapers only began 
advertising the competition at the end of July or beginning of August. In Berlin’s opinion, this 
late start resulted in quite a few editors scrambling to even publish the original advertisement, 
leaving them no time to develop their editorial “take” on the competition, which was an 
important part of striking the right tone with diverse groups of readers. Berlin thought that this 
“limited the effectiveness of the appeal (advertisement) because the readers did not feel like they 
were being personally spoken to.”88 Since Berlin viewed this lack of connection as negatively 
impacting popular interest in the competition, Berlin’s National Front Agitation Commission 
decided to intervene by once again providing the regional editors with specific directions on how 
to go about publishing their advertisements. This time, the National Front admonished the editors 
for their tardiness, telling them that their delays had resulted in much “valuable time being lost” 
which they needed to “make up as fast as possible.”89  
The National Front was also annoyed with the ways in which many newspapers published 
their advertisements. In one instance, Berlin criticized a newspaper for only publishing their 
                                               
87 The other, smaller political parties that were a part of the National Front were referred to as “block parties.” 
88 BArch, DY 6/ 2396. Sekretariat des Nationalrates Kommission für Agitation/Presse, “‘Miterlebt und 
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advertisement on page 5 rather than the front page, which made the competition less visible.90 
Another problem the National Front had was that many newspapers altered the title “Experienced 
and Recorded” (“Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben”) to other titles, such as “The Republic and Me,” 
“Encounters with People of our Region,” “Thoughts between Yesterday and Today,” and “What 
were you doing in 1949?”91  
Major deviations such as this only reaffirmed how disorganized the competition could be 
at the lower levels and that many Kreis committees and newspaper editors did not understand 
Berlin’s instructions, which clearly stated it was to be made clear to the populace these initiatives 
were all part of a centralized national campaign.92 A specific example comes from the Gebirge 
Echow of Kreis Annaberg (in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt), which angered the National Front because 
its advertisement on July 9 for “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” conflated two different 
competitions: that of a local Kreis competition, “Für Dich – für mich – für die Republik,” (For 
you – for me – for the Republic), with the national “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” competition. 
The National Front anticipated that the Gebirge Echo’s use of two sentences from the national 
competition in advertising their local competition would not only confuse the populace, but 
would also dilute and change the message of Berlin’s original advertisement.93 Further problems 
with the Annaberg advertisement included that it was “much too narrow” and focused on 
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“Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben,’” approx. July 1964. Likely written by the Nationalrat and sent to the 
Kreiszeitungen, p. 2.  
 
 186 
“recognizing only the best deeds” of the people of the Kreis, as opposed to appealing for stories 
about even the most ordinary life.94  
These annoyances were bad enough, but the National Front was infuriated with the 44 out 
of 77 regional editors who completely disregarded Berlin’s repeated direct orders to publish 
submissions as soon they came in – that is, months in advance of the 15th anniversary. Instead, 
the National Front found that the majority of newspapers only began to publish their readers’ 
submissions only about four weeks prior to the anniversary celebrations (in early September). A 
further problem was that the quality of these submissions was often poor. While Bezirk Halle 
received a total of 160 submissions from the papers in their region, many of them were not of 
high enough quality to be published in a newspaper.95 In other instances, quite a few submissions 
came from elderly citizens describing their current lives in contrast to their lives prior the GDR 
and arriving at a balanced picture of the present and past. This was not the kind of story the 
National Front wanted to hear, noting that such stories left “the developments of the last 15 years 
… colourless and too general.”96 In other regions, editors disregarded popular submissions 
altogether and instead wrote their own reports on the lives of individual people. The National 
Front was not impressed with this approach and insisted this was not in the spirit of their 
competition – they wanted East Germans to write their own stories.97  
Even more so than with certain newspaper editors, the National Front was often 
disappointed with their regional counterparts – the National Front Kreis secretariats. In Berlin’s 
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opinion, the Kreis secretariats “did not make enough of an effort to make these appeals 
[advertisements] a part of the political mass work and breathe life into them.” 98 Berlin believed 
that part of the problem was that the National Front Kreis secretariats often had far too little 
contact with and thus influence on, the editors of the papers.99 The National Front in Berlin was 
deeply disappointed in their regional committees’ “aimless approach,” especially as this proved 





In 1964, the National Front organized its first major anniversary commemoration in 
honour of the GDR’s founding, seeking to underscore the GDR’s growing international 
legitimacy and economic prowess. One of the major challenges facing the National Front in 
Berlin in organizing these socialist competitions, however, was in implementing the competitions 
on the regional and local levels. While, in theory, the National Front Kreis committees were 
supposed to coordinate with and support the regional newspaper editors, in practice, the 
committees remained rather aloof from the process. This left the major burden of responsibility to 
the regional newspaper editors, who were not always able – or even willing – to implement what 
Berlin wanted for their national competition.  
In their efforts to ensure “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” was successful, the National 
Front in Berlin kept close watch on how all 70 regional newspapers were promoting the 
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competition. If Berlin saw any newspapers not following their strict instructions, such as not 
publishing the advertisements on front pages continuously from July 1 through to October 7, 
altering the name of the competition, or even by promoting the competition in a less-than creative 
way, they would directly inform the offending editors. However, many editors did not heed these 
repeated complaints. From the perspective of Berlin, the lesson learned was that this competition 
was most successful and had the most popular participation in the areas where the “the spirit of 
the National Front’s original appeal from July 1 had been continuously supported” meaning, of 
course, those newspapers that had most strictly followed Berlin’s mandate.101   
The close eye the Berlin National Front kept on its regional committees and newspaper 
editorial staff for this competition did set a pattern for future initiatives, however.  For one, the 
committees had to learn to work closely with their regional newspaper editors in order to earn 
approval from Berlin. Another element that began to change as the years went on, however, was 
the fact that Berlin became more and more tolerant of regional divergences: although in 1964 
they were very unhappy that some Kreise essentially “watered down” their orders, in 
competitions in later years Berlin grew to accept that complete uniformity was impossible and 
that the best way to garner participation from the population was to let the regions have some 
autonomy in their competitions.   
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Figure 13. “We’ll join in, we’ll take part!” (BArch DY 6/ vorl. 3155b) 
 
 
Throughout the 1960s, despite real economic growth in the East, the economic gap 
between East and West Germany was widening.102 Given events like Prague Spring in 
neighbouring Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union’s harsh crushing of all reform, and the SED’s 
flirtation with economic reform coming to an end, meant that the GDR would never catch up and 
overtake the West as they had hoped. Instead, there were consumer goods shortages and rising 
inflation in 1970, and a year later, the SED reintroduced central planning.103 The leadership thus 
had to focus on achieving greatness for the country in other respects, such as developing a 
respectable standing on the international stage through normalizing relations with West Germany. 
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They also sought to continue their task of creating a unique East German identity, distinct from 
the West.  
It was in this context that, in January 1969, the National Front undertook a very ambitious 
project for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the GDR, the ultimate success of which 
required remarkable coordination from the National Front’s constituent organizations. The 
difficulty with this project was that it lacked a central focus on one anniversary theme, unlike 
previous competitions. In this competition, “Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” “We’ll join in, 
we’ll take part!” and its 10 different constituent initiatives, the National Front instead wanted 
multiple ideological threads to be on display, including the German-Soviet friendship, GDR 
friendship with and support of fellow communist countries’ struggles against the “imperialists,” 
community pride, GDR legitimacy, the (literal) building up of the GDR over the past 20 years, 
and GDR national identity. In addition, these threads were marketed to a very wide selection of 
the populace, including children, the elderly, individual communities, cultural groups, and artists, 
to name but a few. 
The National Front introduced the public to this competition in the form of a special issue 
of Der Volkshelfer, the illustrated journal of the People’s Solidarity (Volkssolidarität (VS)) mass 
organization. The purpose of this competition’s myriad constituent initiatives, the journal 
explained rather unrealistically, was that “many individual deeds will together create a vivid 
mosaic of our citizens’ creative work that shows the colourful diversity of life in our socialist 
state.”104 In reality, creating these ten individual initiatives, referred to as “mosaic stones” in the 
journal, was the National Front’s ambitious attempt to attract participation from nearly the 
entirety of the population. Organizers hoped that, with so many different options, there would be 
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at least one that every individual or group could join. The initiatives, or “mosaic stones,” 
included the following:  
Mosaic Stone 1: Soviet greeting cards 
Mosaic Stone 2: “Hello, young people!” (“Hallo, junge Leute!”) 
Mosaic Stone 3: “The house in which we live” (“Das Haus, in dem wir wohnen”) 
Mosaic Stone 4: “Solidarity with the Vietnamese people” (“Solidarität mit dem heldenhaft  
kämpfenden vietnamesischen Volk”) 
Mosaic Stone 5: “The Book of Good Deeds” (“Buch der guten Taten”) 
Mosaic Stone 6: A film project documenting participation in the Join In! initiative, “Make 
our cities and localities more beautiful! (“Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – mach 
mit!”) 
Mosaic Stone 7: The creative children’s project, “The GDR: Our Beautiful Socialist  
Homeland!” (“Die DDR – unsere schöne sozialistische Heimat”)  
Mosaic Stone 8: East Germans taking pictures and videos of people in the present enjoying  
their Heimat, called “A Mensch – how good that sounds!” (“Ein Mensch – wie stolz das 
klingt!”)  
Mosaic Stone 9: “Our children deserve all our love” (“Unseren Kindern gehört unsere ganze  
Liebe”) 
Mosaic Stone 10: “Searching for young and old talent:” a “complete the sketch” project  
where one would create an original drawing using these few pre-designed lines. 
 
This variety was a major departure from the National Front’s approach a mere five years 
previously in the 1964 competition “Miterlebt und Aufgeschrieben” – which had been a much 
more narrowly defined and monolithic competition. In order to carry out such a massive project, 
Berlin had advised their Bezirk and Kreis counterparts to create regional commissions. Berlin 
expected these commission members to include regional secretariat members, representatives 
from other National Front organizations such as the Society for German-Soviet Friendship 
(DSF), the People’s Solidarity (VS), the Cultural Association (DKB), the Free German Youth 
(FDJ), as well as others such as teachers, representatives from the Department of Education and 
Culture, and members of the press.105  
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Although all mosaic stones followed themes the National Front had used in previous 
anniversaries, this time, it was up to individual East Germans to pick which theme they would 
explore. For example, participating in Mosaic Stone 1 meant paying tribute to the Soviet-German 
connection by creating greeting cards to be sent to the Soviet Union detailing everyday life and 
activities in the GDR. Each Bezirk would then forward their 10 best greeting cards (to be 
determined by their political content and form) to Berlin to accompany a GDR delegation 
travelling to Moscow in October, 1969.106  Mosaic Stone 8, “A Mensch –  how good that 
sounds!”  was meant to showcase the ways in which social life had positively developed in the 
GDR during the previous twenty years, with the National Front encouraging East Germans to 
submit their best photos featuring their community members studying or working, friends 
enjoying their free time at a club, or even photos of children playing.107 Mosaic Stone 3 (fig. 14, 
below), “The house, in which we live,” encouraged individual Hausgemeinschaften or other 
groups to come together to create an original and colourful wall newspaper (Hauswandzeitung) 
that depicted the development of their group or their area.108   
                                               
106 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, National Front der DDR, Kreisausschuß Hoyerswerda, Sekretär Haugk, “Wir machen 
mit – Wir sind dabei,” memo to Orts and Wohnbezirksausschusse, February 25, 1969, p. 3. 
107 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 5. 
108 Wall newspapers were usually newspapers pinned to bulletin boards. They were a popular option in the GDR and 




Figure 14. School children at the Oberschule Schönborn making a wall newspaper for their school (BArch DY 6/ 
vorl. 3155b, Freie Presse, “Fotoaustellung und Wandzeitungen,” 17 March 1969). 
 
One obvious benefit of these initiatives was that they underscored the thriving daily life 
that existed in the GDR: anyone looking through old photos would be nostalgically reminded of 
the past, while anyone viewing them from outside would be forced to conclude that GDR citizens 
were leading happy, normal lives in thriving communities.109 For example, Mosaic Stone 6, the 
film project, asked anyone who possessed a small film camera to film community members 
working on any of the local beautification campaigns with the purpose of creating small skits.110 
The intention was for this project to capture the sense of comradery and community that existed 
in many neighbourhoods across the GDR, while at the same time extolling the value of 
volunteering one’s time for the benefit of the nation (i.e. saving the state money on building 
                                               
109 For more on this argument, see Mary Fulbrook, The People’s State, 10. 
110 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 3. 
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repairs). Mosaic Stone 5 (fig. 15, below) the “Book of Good Deeds,” asked the public to submit 
letters describing particularly hard-working community members who “make our lives richer, 
more beautiful and more pleasing.”111 As can be predicted, the purpose of these letters was to 
acknowledge hard-working individuals –  in other words, ideal pillars of the socialist community 
– and reward them for their efforts and encourage others to follow in their footsteps.  
 
 
Figure 15. Original National Front advertisement example for Mosaic Stone 5 (BArch, DY 6/ vorl. 3155b). 
 
Through Mosaic Stone 9 (fig. 16, below), the National Front demonstrated its desire to 
educate the young on its ideology by asking East Germans to create a “pedagogically 
meaningful” toy for a small child.112 The National Front envisioned this as a project for the 
elderly, veterans, or those belonging to handwork collectives within People’s Solidarity (VS) 
                                               
111 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 3. 
112 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 9. 
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clubs, or for anyone who had the “love, talent experience and desire” to create a children’s toy. 113 
The National Front Kreis committees confirmed they would accept the toy submissions for three 
months until June 1, and would present them to children on the 20th anniversary of the GDR in 
October. Not wanting the pedagogical intent behind this project to seem too obvious (that of 
moulding impressionable young minds), the National Front commented that since young children 
had been contributing in small measures to the ongoing town beautification campaigns in honour 
of this anniversary, that they deserved to be “rewarded” for their efforts by receiving a toy. Berlin 
also suggested that, if unable to create a toy, people could instead volunteer to help beautify (that 
is, decorate or renovate) childcare facilities in honour of the 20th anniversary.114   
 
Figure 16. Advertisement for Mosaic Stone 9 “Unseren Kindern gehört unsere ganze Liebe” “Our children deserve 
all our love.” The advertisement asks: “Do you have an idea?” about how to create a “pedagogically meaningful” 
(i.e. ideologically-oriented) toy for a small child. Example shown in this picture is of two children adoringly playing 
with blocks built into the shape of a Soviet spaceship with a cosmonaut inside (BArch, DY 6/ vorl. 3155b). 
 
 
                                               
113 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 9. 
114 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 3.  
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Other Mosaic Stones designed to appeal to youth included Mosaic Stone 7, “The GDR – 
our beautiful socialist Heimat,” that asked children and youth to send in a drawing depicting 
themselves singing, laughing or playing, or even just “enjoying their beautiful homeland.” The 
National Front encouraged every youth, from kindergarteners to 18-year-olds, to participate in 
this Mosaic Stone using any technology they desired, as the National Front wanted them to 
simply recognize how wonderful their homeland was (and possibly diminish any desires to travel 
elsewhere). Taking into account that young people would not necessarily be reading this 
magazine, the advertisement addressed their older readers, asking them to tell the children around 
them about this particular initiative.115 A related initiative, Mosaic Stone 2, “Hallo, junge Leute” 
(“Hello, young people!”), encouraged anyone turning 20 years old in 1969 (“along with their 
country”) to submit an account about growing up in the GDR and how their state helped them 
“discover their own personal happiness.”116 Anticipating possible apathy on the part of the youth, 
the National Front appealed once more to the elderly to encourage their grandchildren or their 
nieces/nephews to make submissions. Since youths had neither experienced the war nor lived 
anywhere else, the advertisement encouraged their elders to explain to the children what they 
themselves had dealt with in the past and how life had become so much better in the last 20 years. 
If these stories from long ago still failed to pique youth interest, the advertisement went on, older 
people were invited to simply write in their own impressions about the past 20 years.117   
 
                                               
115 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 5. 
116 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 2.  
117 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 2. 
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Participating in Mosaic Stone 4 (fig. 17, below) required the populace to show solidarity 
with the people of war-torn Vietnam by sending a personal gift, such as a drawing, photo, or 
craft, to a Vietnamese child.118 The National Front reminded GDR citizens that having 
themselves lived through one (perhaps even two) wars in their lifetime, they were well-placed to 
empathize with those enduring war.119 This was not only about creating a feeling of solidarity 
with another communist country, but given American involvement in the war, it was also a potent 
reminder of the state’s long-standing dismissal of the “imperialist” West being nothing but 
“warmongers.”   
 
Figure 17. Homemade signed postcard to be sent to Vietnam. Caption: “Solidarity with Vietnam - Greetings from 
the GDR!” (BArch, DY 6/ vorl. 3155b). 
                                               
118 For details about the GDR’s other acts of “solidarity” towards Vietnam during this time period, see Quinn 
Slobodian (ed), Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World (New York Oxford: Berghahn, 2015). 
119 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 3.  
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Finally, in Mosaic Stone 10, “Searching for young and old talent” (figs. 18-21, below) the 
National Front asked the populace to use their “talent and imagination” to create a “funny and 
colourful original drawing” from a sketch fragment and to submit these to the newspapers.120  
Although most submissions overwhelmingly sought to strike a positive note, such as the 
submission (fig. 19) that depicts the growth of Berlin over the past 20 years, one submission in 
particular (fig. 20), appears to be a protest against the recent Warsaw Pact invasion and resulting 
occupation of Czechoslovakia.121 This drawing shows the author is clearly opposed to the 
crushing of the Prague Spring reforms, and it seeks to turn official rhetoric on its head by 
showing one of the Soviet Union’s proud sons, Soviet Cosmonaut Aleksei Yeliseyev, 
commanding a tank emblazoned by a swastika inside a communist five-pointed red star. This 
replacing of the usual hammer and sickle with a swastika not only shows the absence of 
proletarian solidarity (and therefore the support of the common people), but is also symbolically 
linking the present-day Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia to that of the Nazis in 1939. The 
illustrator is seeking to demonstrate how the Warsaw Pact invaders, much like the Nazis, caused 
much suffering – something made clear by the tears streaming down the cheeks of the drawing’s 
central figure, the martyr Jan Palach, who is shown here having been set ablaze (which depicts 
his real life act of self-immolation). The drawing also simultaneously shows the aftermath of the 
invasion: black ribbons of mourning on the tattered Czech flag and Palach’s tombstone with a 
wreath in front of it, on which the words “Wir verstehen Dich [“we understand”] —Smrkovski 
[sic.]” are written, symbolizing the solidarity of the rest of the protest movement with Palach, 
including popular reformer politician Josef Smrkovsky.  
                                               
120 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!” Der Volkshelfer, February, 1969, 
no. 2, p. 5.  









Figure 19. Submission for “Searching for young and old talent” by Herbert Unglaube. Drawing depicting 
development of Berlin over the past 20 years, highlighting the rebuilding of homes, construction of the Fernsehturm, 
and growing industrial capacity. Caption reads “20 Years of the GDR: Wow, Berlin, how you have changed in 20 
Years!” This is exactly the kind of sketch that the National Front was looking for as it was patriotic and reflective of 







Figure 20. Submission by unknown author for “Searching for young and old talent” protesting the ending of reforms 





Figure 21. Another submission for “Searching for young and old talent” by Rolf Xago. This submission depicts GDR 
acrobats performing a show in honour of the 20th anniversary and the caption thanks them for their great 
determination and effort in doing so. (BArch, DY 6/ Vorl. 3155b). 
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Figure 22. Characters part of an advertisement for the competition in the regional Thüringer Neueste Nachrichten 
(February 7, 1969). Note: As is common with regional interpretations, this is a generic advertisement asking for 
participation in the entire competition and does not mention which “Mosaic Stone” competition these particular 
characters are associated with (BArch DY 6/vorl. 3155b). 
 
From the perspective of the National Front in Berlin, the purpose of the competitions was 
both economic and “intellectual-cultural,” meaning the goal of the training of minds was as 
important as the economic gains the state made from people volunteering their time.122 Herr 
Seewald, a National Front Kreis secretary, wrote that he believed it was not even worth having 
beautiful cities (i.e. achieved through the continuous beautification competitions) if the citizens 
created them without an awareness of the ideological underpinnings.123 This kind of ideological 
dedication was something that Berlin hoped would drive all regions to create effective and 
popular competitions.   
                                               
122 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a. “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 2. 
123 Seewald quoted in ibid., p. 3.  
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Of course, it was not so simple in reality: struggles in popularizing, organizing, and 
creating an understanding of the ideological underpinnings of the magazine initiatives were to be 
found across the GDR. By May 1969, with the submission deadlines for the initiatives looming, 
the National Front concluded that while a few initiatives and individual Kreise had been 
successful, such as those of the Bezirk of Karl-Marx-Stadt as well as the popular complete-the-
sketch initiative (Mosaic Stone 10) in general, Berlin had to admit that “the work with the 
magazine has had a very difficult start.”124 Upon visiting the regions, Berlin-based National Front 
representatives saw that many top-level suggestions were not being followed in many localities. 
Regional secretariats had not managed their extra workload very well, as many viewed their role 
as merely a passive one, even though Berlin had envisioned the Bezirke and Kreise taking a very 
active role in generating interest in the initiatives. In Berlin’s opinion, the Bezirk secretariats were 
just not sufficiently emphasizing these initiatives.125 Compounding this difficulty were the 
regional presses, which Berlin believed were not properly explaining to their readers how the 
varied initiatives were all part of the same project.126  
For their part, many Kreise protested that many of these problems were beyond their 
control. For example, that Berlin had not sent them enough magazines to distribute; that the 
magazine was just being used as a wall newspaper; that “the central press is not informing us all 
well enough;” that the prizes they were supposed to hand out were too expensive; and that the 
magazine was just “not popular enough.127 Another very common complaint was that the Bezirk 
                                               
124 DY 6/vorl. 3155a, likely written by a representative of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der 
DDR, Berlin, “Analyse der Bezirksberichte ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei,” May 22, 1969, p. 1. 
125 DY 6/vorl. 3155a, likely written by a representative of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der 
DDR, Berlin, “Analyse der Bezirksberichte ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei,” May 22, 1969, p. 3. 
126 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, likely written by a representative of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen 
Front der DDR, Berlin, “Analyse der Bezirksberichte ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei,” May 22, 1969, p. 3.  
127 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, likely written by a representative of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen 
Front der DDR, Berlin, “Analyse der Bezirksberichte ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei,” May 22, 1969, p. 3. 
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and Kreis secretaries were being bypassed altogether because many people submitted their work 
directly to Berlin or directly to other smaller organizations.128  
For example, in May, Bezirk Leipzig reported that its goal of making the magazine 
initiatives part of their “political mass-work” by winning over great sections of the populace had 
not been achieved, which they partly attributed to their own lack of oversight over their Kreise.129 
For one, the local committees found it very difficult to popularize all of the initiatives at once in 
the regional newspapers in a way that made this very complex magazine initiative clear and 
appealing to the populace. The Bezirk thought a lack of continuous advertising had caused 
popular interest to lag over time.130 Another part of the problem was the magazine itself: although 
the populace had liked and read it with interest, afterwards it was often simply set it aside or 
mounted as a wall newspaper. Although local National Front committees and organizations also 
held a multitude of events to inform the public about joining in the competition, Bezirk Leipzig 
concluded that these committee efforts were just not enough: the public was just generally not 
interested in making their own submissions to this competition.  
The nature of the mosaic stone submissions posed another challenge. Many East 
Germans, unsure of where to send their submissions, sent them to obscure, small associations or 
even directly to Berlin, instead of sending them to their Bezirk or even Kreis secretariats. This 
then left the Bezirk and Kreis National Front committees without direct oversight over the local 
                                               
128 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, likely written by a representative of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen 
Front der DDR, Berlin, “Analyse der Bezirksberichte ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei,” May 22, 1969, p. 3. 
129 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Bezirksausschuß Leipzig secretariat member A. Jacob, “Die Illustrierter ‘Wir machen 
mit – wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, 
May 12, 1969, p. 1-2.  
130 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Bezirksausschuß Leipzig secretariat member A. Jacob, “Die Illustrierter ‘Wir machen 
mit – wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, 
May 12, 1969, p. 2-3. 
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results due to a lack of communication between these smaller local committees.131 In an effort to 
combat this problem, the Leipzig Bezirk secretariat made an arrangement with the Leipzig Bezirk 
Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) committee regarding the Soviet greeting card 
initiative, whereby the DSF would take over full responsibility for this initiative, including the 
printing and distribution of more advertisements. In order to centralize organization and ensure 
proper oversight, any further submissions were to be sent to the DSF to be judged.132 
The results of the magazine initiative in Frankfurt (an der Oder) were similarly varied. 
The Frankfurt Bezirk and Kreis secretariats, as well as members of their agitation commissions, 
all sent out multiple flyers and other information to the Hausgemeinschaften and schools about 
the important political message behind these initiatives, as well as examples of how to carry out 
the initiative. However, the Bezirk secretariat concluded that it had not been enough.133  Bezirk 
Frankfurt admitted that while they had begun advertising the Soviet greeting card initiative 
(Mosaic Stone 1) too late, their main problem, like with the other Bezirke, was that the populace 
was submitting other entries to a variety of sources unconnected to the Bezirk secretariat. 
Specifically, submissions for the “Hello, young people!” (Mosaic Stone 2) initiative were not 
being sent in to the FDJ or the Bezirk secretariat, but rather, to a youth magazine,  while the 
completed sketches of the “Searching for young and old talent” (Mosaic Stone 10) initiative were 
being sent directly to the National Front in Berlin. 134 In the latter case, the Frankfurt secretariat 
                                               
131 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Bezirksausschuß Leipzig secretariat member A. Jacob, “Die Illustrierter ‘Wir machen 
mit – wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, 
May 12, 1969, p. 1-2. 
132 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Bezirksausschuß Leipzig secretariat member A. Jacob, “Die Illustrierter ‘Wir machen 
mit – wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, 
May 12, 1969, p. 3.  
133 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Merk of the Bezirksausschuß Frankfurt (Oder), “Wir machen mit – 
wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, May 19, 
1969, p. 2. 
134 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Merk of the Bezirksausschuß Frankfurt (Oder), “Wir machen mit – 
wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, May 19, 
1969, p. 1-2. 
 
 205 
was annoyed they were missing out on judging their own regional submissions, given that they 
personally knew of many art teachers who had put a great deal of effort into creating good 
drawings.135 In an effort to correct these coordination problems, the Bezirk Frankfurt secretariat 
met with all their Kreis secretariats in mid-May, 1969 to make a concerted effort in tandem with 
the regional presses to not only remind the public to participate in the initiatives, but to also make 
clear the political ideological importance underpinning them, as well as to send the submissions 
to the Bezirk.136  
Bezirk Halle also reported similar problems. As was the case elsewhere, the submissions 
for the “Hello, young people!” (Mosaic Stone 2) initiative were being sent to the youth magazine 
Neues Leben, while their region’s “Searching for young and old talent” (Mosaic Stone 10) 
submissions were going directly to Berlin.137 Secondly, while their Bezirk had worked hard to 
make sure that the magazine project became a main talking point in the Hausgemeinschaften, a 
major stumbling block to spreading the word was that Halle had only received 7900 copies of the 
magazine from Berlin to distribute in total, which worked out to only two copies per 100 
households.138   
Bezirk Halle attempted to work through its coordination problems by asking its Kreis 
secretariats to narrow their focus to promoting just a selection (rather than all ten) of the 
magazine initiatives: for example, the Soviet greeting cards, the town beautification projects, the 
                                               
135 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Merk of the Bezirksausschuß Frankfurt (Oder), “Wir machen mit – 
wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, May 19, 
1969, p. 2. 
136 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Merk of the Bezirksausschuß Frankfurt (Oder), “Wir machen mit – 
wir sind dabei!’” Memo addressed to Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, Berlin, May 19, 
1969, p. 2.  
137 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Secretariat of the Bezirkausschuß Halle, “Einschätzung und Schlußfolgerungen über 
die Führung der Aktion ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!’” April 22, 1969, p. 2.  
138 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Secretariat of the Bezirkausschuß Halle, “Einschätzung und Schlußfolgerungen über 
die Führung der Aktion ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!’” April 22, 1969, p. 1. 
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wall newspaper project, and the Vietnam solidarity letters.139 In addition, the Halle secretariat 
suggested an even more targeted approach: that the Kreis secretariats make descriptive 
advertisements of each of these four initiatives and leave copies in places where the groups most 
likely to participate could see them, such as leaving advertisements for town beautification 
projects and wall newspaper projects for Hausgemeinschaften, giving advertisements for the 
Soviet greeting cards and Vietnam solidarity letters to retirement homes, and providing worker 
collectives with advertisements for beautification projects.140  
A major reason for such difficulties in the regions was due to Berlin’s decentralized 
approach towards this very complex group of initiatives, which was problematic because a 
competition of this scope had never taken place before.141 Despite the regions’ clear need for 
guidance, the Berlin was insistent that the regional National Front committees find ways to make 
it work on their own since implementation on the ground was ultimately the responsibility of 
these lower-level committees. The flaw in such a plan was that the local committees did not 
always have sufficient time, resources, or information with which to successfully carry out the 
initiatives in the uniform way that Berlin envisioned. For example, although there were many 
different local initiatives already underway in 1969, the National Front in Berlin did not think this 
was a good enough reason for local officials to put any less effort into the massive national 
campaign. Instead, the Berlin secretariat flippantly commented that the regional committees were 
to simply find any way possible in which to participate, telling them to inventively make use of 
                                               
139 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Secretariat of the Bezirkausschuß Halle, “Einschätzung und Schlußfolgerungen über 
die Führung der Aktion ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!’” April 22, 1969, p. 3-4. 
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141 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, draft of “Erfahrungen in der Arbeit mit der Ilustrierten ‘Wir machen mit – Wir sind 
dabei!’” approx. mid-March 1969, p. 1. Likely written for the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, 
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the whole “palette of possibilities” that their region possessed.142 In doing so, Berlin explained to 
the regions that “there was no need [for the regions] to replace their already-existing initiatives 
with those of the magazine or to add new ones to them ... the various competitions advertised in 
the magazine should be meaningfully incorporated into existing initiatives.”143 For example, 
Berlin pointed out that it would be easy enough for Hausgemeinschaften to make wall 
newspapers and put them up in their buildings in order to fulfil Mosaic Stone 3, “The house in 
which we live.” Berlin also reminded the regions that any old photos could be used to fulfill a 
variety of the initiatives. If that was not possible, the regions could simply put up some children’s 
drawings around town.144  
However, organizing even the simplest of initiatives proved not as straightforward as 
Berlin made it sound. For one, Berlin’s instructions on combining events signalled a complete 
reversal of its previous approach. As explained in the previous sections on the socialist 
competitions of 1957 and 1964, Berlin heavily criticized the localities for doing the very thing 
they were now advocating: combining local and national campaigns and thereby “confusing” 
people. By this time in 1969, however, Berlin was less concerned with the presence of too many 
competing initiatives existing across the regions, and more focused on ensuring that their massive 
national magazine initiative worked as “a broad-based action within the framework of the 
National Front” which was “supported by all social forces.”145 In other words, Berlin’s main 
                                               
142 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 4-5. 
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concern was that all mass organizations and regions could come together to create a unified and 
cohesive campaign across the country.  
One instance that caused concern for Berlin was when, after five months of popularizing 
the initiatives, the Bezirks of Suhl and Potsdam had received absolutely no submissions of Soviet 
greeting cards (Mosaic Stone 1).146 Although not dissimilar from other competitions where 
organizers found it difficult to pique popular interest in the Soviet Union, Berlin preferred to 
ascribe such disinterest to a general lack of oversight and control on the Bezirk and Kreis levels, 
for it seemed to Berlin that schools and FDJ groups were simply organizing their own 
competitions with similar themes without any oversight at all.147 The result, so Berlin thought, 
was due to the fact that people were too fatigued to participate in the national greeting card 
initiative. A similar issue occurred in Kreis Bernau (in Bezirk Frankfurt), where Berlin blamed 
the problem on the local and residential district committees not only beginning their preparations 
far too late, but also on the fact that the Kreis also lacked a concrete plan for the implementation 
and control of its planned initiatives.148  
Given its oftentimes overly critical opinion of the Bezirk and Kreis committees, in an 
attempt to find out how the work was actually taking shape on the ground, Berlin, in at least one 
case, bypassed the Bezirk committees altogether and sent out inquiries directly to town clubs and 
other small-level organizations. One response they received was from Erhard Walther, a 
representative of his Hausgemeinschaft in Pirna-Copitz (in Bezirk Dresden). Walther wrote to 
Berlin that his Hausgemeinschaft had been particularly inspired by the ideas they had read about 
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148 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, draft of “Erfahrungen in der Arbeit mit der Ilustrierten ‘Wir machen mit – Wir sind 
dabei!’” approx. mid-March 1969, p. 3-4. Likely written for the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, 
Berlin.   
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in the magazine. Their group decided to first take on the Soviet greeting card option, which they 
thought would be a good opportunity to connect with old friends in the Soviet Union. Walther 
proudly reported that their involvement in this initiative encouraged the remaining six people of 
their group to become members of the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF). The next 
initiative they planned to join in was in submitting photos of the goings-on in their area, and their 
group was also planning to create a wall newspaper.149 An example such as this, showing one of 
the smallest-level groupings of citizens excitedly carrying out the magazine project, was proof 
enough to Berlin that their ideas for this project were good ones and implementation was feasible, 
even if the Kreis and Bezirk secretariats did not always agree.  
 
Regional Comparison in Microview: Bezirk Cottbus vs. Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt 
 
Bezirk Cottbus 
  While from Berlin’s perspective it was mainly Bezirke that were not fulfilling their 
obligations, from the perspective of Bezirke like Cottbus, it was the Kreise that were not carrying 
out their “political mass-work” as they should have been.150 Kreis Forst, for example, had 
explained to Bezirk Cottbus that the reason for their slow start was because they had received too 
few copies of the magazine to distribute. However, Frau Neumann of the Bezirk Cottbus’s 
National Front secretariat disputed this, and argued that it was nothing more than a poor excuse. 
The fact that Forst dared to blame Cottbus for their own failings, showed, in Neumann’s eyes, 
that Kreis Forst “did not really understand that every copy requires intensive [ideological] work 
                                               
149 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 2-3. 
150 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 2.  
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with the people, which has nothing to do with the number of copies of the magazine received.”151 
Thus, Neumann concluded that it was Forst’s own lack of ingenuity in popularizing the initiatives 
and making the project relatable to ordinary people that resulted in their initial loss of 
momentum. She pointed out that upon asking Forst representatives how involved they were 
personally with the preparations, they replied that they were not – thus proving her point that they 
were doing “gleich Null” or “essentially nothing.”152 
Herr Döring, also a part of Bezirk Cottbus’s National Front secretariat, suggested the 
Bezirk respond to the problems their Kreise were having by creating a special commission to 
oversee the project. The commission would be responsible for assessing progress, while at the 
same time ensuring all social organizations would feel equally responsible for the magazine 
project.153 Döring argued it was necessary because even their most successful Kreis, Calau 
(Berlin’s poster-child for excellent organization), was still reporting that few people were 
attending the events (such as lectures and meetings) being held to ensure the public understood 
the ideological underpinnings of these competitions. Döring further underscored that the Bezirk 
needed to find out the reasons why this was the case by examining the managing role of the Kreis 
committees and how much of an effort they were making to encourage participation by 
differentiating their message or events. Ultimately, Döring thought “the [Kreis] committees must 
become even more aware that the main task of the National Front is political-ideological 
work.”154 Ironically, there is no suggestion that the Bezirk secretariat ever thought to enquire of 
                                               
151 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 2. 
152 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 2. 
153 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 3. 
154 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 3. 
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East Germans themselves as to why they would not be interested in attending these kinds of 
ideologically-focused events. This failure to consider popular opinion was mostly likely due to 
the fact that the GDR was not really a “participatory dictatorship” since, as discussed earlier, the 
purpose of the National Front inquiring of ordinary peoples’ opinions was not to incorporate 
them into official policy, but rather, to get useful information with which they could better defend 
their original position -- the unalterable theses narrative created by the SED Politburo’s 
propaganda wing.  
Ultimately, the Cottbus secretariat decided it would be best to create a commission for the 
specific task of controlling and leading this magazine competition. They tasked the commission 
with critically assessing the situation and reporting back to the secretariat about what was going 
on at the lower levels of the Bezirk, and proposing possible solutions.155 As a result, many Kreis 
secretariats followed Cottbus’s lead and created their own commissions to help carry out the 
work, while Berlin even began to help by contacting the representatives of these commissions 
(even city mayors) to underscore the importance of these initiatives and the political meaning 
behind them. For its part, the Cottbus Bezirk secretariat decided to communicate directly with its 
press affiliates to try to get more coverage of the competition.156 All the different local versions 
of the Lausitzer Rundschau, for example, began to publish more articles in an effort to drum up 
popular interest.157 
 One of Cottbus’s Kreise that was singled out for praise by the National Front Central 
Committee’s secretariat in Berlin and was held up as an example of what could be accomplished 
                                               
155 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 4.  
156 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, representative of the Bezirksausschuß Cotttbus, “Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung vom 
21. April 1969,” April 24, 1969, p. 4. 




was that of Kreis Calau. Herr Zimmermann, a representative from the Calau city secretariat, 
commented that, “We have had lots of fun and joy working on this magazine project, but it has 
also required lots of effort.” Zimmerman went on to say that it was all worth it, however, 
especially because “ohne Fleiß, kein Preis” (no pain, no gain).158  Zimmermann pointed out that 
one of these “gains” was that these weeks and months of organizing had enabled the secretariat to 
make quite a few new contacts they would not have made otherwise, and that through organizing 
varied activities, the secretariat came to understand the populace better, especially in getting a 
sense of what their interests were.159    
 According to Berlin, the key to Calau’s success was that their organizers understood 
how to combine the magazine initiatives with the social and political events already going on in 
their own region. This was partially due to the fact that Herr Zimmermann, Calau’s National 
Front Kreis secretary, was particularly enthusiastic and personally involved in the preparations 
and was able to contribute many good ideas. Zimmermann’s approach in integrating the 
promotional and organization work of the competition with the other political and societal work 
of Kreis secretariat ensured that Calau was much more organized than the average Kreis. The fact 
that Calau’s secretariat was able to coordinate various events and initiatives with many different 
organizations allowed them to gain a good overview of all that was going on in the Kreis, and the 
reports sent back to them were especially informative.160 According to the National Front, this 
“goal-oriented approach and emphasis on individual deadlines and work” was an important factor 
                                               
158 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 3-4. 
159 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 3-4. 
160 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 1.  
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in Calau’s success, something not many other Kreise replicated.161 A good example of Calau’s 
outstanding efforts in carrying out the magazine initiative was the Kreis secretariat’s partnering 
with the local police service to drum up interest in the “Hello, young people!” (Mosaic Stone 2) 
initiative. Calau’s secretariat, using information provided by the police service, was able to target 
an advertisement for the initiative to all 800 people born in the year 1949 and who were 
celebrating their twentieth birthdays in 1969.162   
 It was efforts like these that allowed Calau to prove again and again it was able to 
cleverly harness its own activities and resources for Berlin’s national projects. In another 
instance, Calau planned its own festival week for October 1969, and included a raffle draw in the 
festivities.163 The importance of this was that everyone in the Kreis who had made a submission 
for any of the magazine initiatives (Mosaic Stones) was automatically entered into a draw to win 
prizes during the festival week. Calau then built up popular anticipation and excitement for 
months beforehand by arranging for stores in the region to display the prizes.164 This strategy of 
tying the possibility of winning a great prize for participating in Berlin’s magazine initiatives to a 
local celebration resulted in surprisingly high participation numbers. 
  Beyond its obvious enthusiasm, Calau’s organizational prowess was second-to-none. 
The secretariat even used several large spreadsheets to keep track of which Gemeinden 
(localities) were participating in which initiatives– thus making it clear to the Kreis which areas 
                                               
161 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Zur Arbeit mit der Illustrierten ‘Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!’” undated, approx. 
May, 1969. 
162 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a. “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 3; BArch, DY 6/vorl. 
3155a, “Notizen über die Kontrolle der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten in den Kreisen Calau, Spremberg (Cottbus) und 
Niesky (Dresden) sowie im Bezirkssekretariat in Dresden – 22/23 Mai,” May 27, 1969, p. 2. 
163 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a. “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 2.  
164 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a. “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 2.  
 
 214 
were lacking and which were not.165 The National Front in Berlin saw these methods as clear 
signs that the Kreis officials were making a concerted effort to succeed.166 As expected, Calau 
also did well advertising the initiatives in local newspapers, having a very good working 
relationship with their regional newspaper, the Lausitzer Rundschau, which continuously 
published advertisements to keep its readership updated on the progress of the competition.167 
The Lausitzer Rundschau even published a weekend special from the Kreis secretariat, including 
text examples, pictures, and drawings that introduced local participants with their submissions. 168 
 
 Figure 23. Featurette of a Weißwasser (Bezirk Cottbus) resident’s submission of various Soviet Greeting Cards 
(BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155b, Lausitzer Rundschau, July 5, 1969).  
 
 
                                               
165 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Notizen über die Kontrolle der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten in den Kreisen Calau, 
Spremberg (Cottbus) und Niesky (Dresden) sowie im Bezirkssekretariat in Dresden – 22/23 Mai,” May 27, 1969, p. 
2. 
166 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” copy of Irene Weismann, 
member of the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front, undated, p. 2. 
167 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 3.  
168 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Die Aktion in ‘Aktion’: Wir machen mit – wir sind dabei!” (Version 1), undated. 
Likely drawn up by the Secretariat of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 3.  
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Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt  
Much like Bezirk Cottbus, Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt also struggled with its own 
implementation and oversight problems. Unlike Bezirk Cottbus, however, Bezirk Karl-Marx-
Stadt and many of its Kreis secretariats had immediately created their own Bezirk and Kreis-level 
commissions for the magazine project. However, by May 1969, Karl-Marx-Stadt had to conclude 
that they had not really been successful in achieving their political-ideological goals.169  Kreise 
such as that of Gleichau, despite the existence of commissions, had proven unable to coordinate 
their efforts, eventually requiring the Bezirk to send their own representatives to Gleichau work 
out a solution.170 The Kreis secretariats complained to Karl-Marx-Stadt that there were a variety 
of reasons for their difficulties, including that the magazine was not well-enough known, there 
was not enough assistance from the top, and that populace could not understand the ideological 
core of this Aktion – which was of course the main point, from Berlin’s perspective.171  
Despite these problems, there were elements of real success in the magazine competition 
for Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt. The secretariat commented that they had been successful in places 
where “content [i.e. the ideology as presented in the anniversary theses] was the starting point of 
the work and where the National Front component organizations made a concrete contribution to 
the success of our project.”172 In Kreis Aue, for example, many of the Kreis-level organizations 
had worked quite well together: the Pioneers and FDJ were working with the Department of 
Education and with schools to design extra-curricular activities related to the competitions, while 
those belonging to the Kreis “cultural house” had partnered with residential committees 
                                               
169 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Karl Marx Stadt Bezirk secretary Oehme and Bezirksausschuß member Süßmann, 
“Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten des Nationalrates,” May 9, 1969, p. 1.  
170 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Karl Marx Stadt Bezirk secretary Oehme and Bezirksausschuß member Süßmann, 
“Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten des Nationalrates,” May 9, 1969, p. 2-3. 
171 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Karl Marx Stadt Bezirk secretary Oehme and Bezirksausschuß member Süßmann, 
“Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten des Nationalrates,” May 9, 1969, p. 1. 
172 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Karl Marx Stadt Bezirk secretary Oehme and Bezirksausschuß member Süßmann, 
“Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten des Nationalrates,” May 9, 1969, p. 1. 
 
 216 
(Wohnbezirksausschüsse) to design their own drawing competition.173 Similar cooperation was 
visible in Kreis Hainichen, which, while initially suffering from many problems with 
organization, was still able to find a creative solution to their problems without requiring 
intervention from Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt.174  
Kreis Hainichen was a less-straightforward example of success, as the Kreis did not 
follow Berlin’s direct guidelines yet still achieved good results. Despite serious initial problems 
with coordination, Kreis Hainichen managed to integrate the national magazine initiatives within 
their own Kreis initiative, “Roses for the Republic.” Although precise details about the intricacies 
of “Rosen” are lacking, it appears that it took place in installments, with the Kreis issuing 
directions for new activities over time. In May 1969, the Wohnbezirke in Hainichen were in the 
midst of preparing for the sixth installment of “Roses for the Republic,” in which participants 
were to 1) create a wall newspaper that answered the question “who is the most beautiful in the 
whole area?” and 2) demonstrate through various activities “our love for the elderly.”175 Even 
though combining these activities with the national magazine activities resulted in the 
Wohnbezirke creating well-made wall newspapers and greeting cards to be sent to the Soviet 
Union,176 it was, nevertheless, a marked deviation from Berlin’s plan.  
                                               
173 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Oehme and Süßmann, “Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit,” p. 2. 
174 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Oehme and Süßmann, “Informationsbericht über den Stand der Arbeit,” p. 2-3. 
175 What exactly these entailed is unclear. Based on other activities through the years involving the elderly, it is likely 
the initiative involved donating time to help an elderly person with everyday tasks, such as gardening, cleaning or 
running errands. BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß 
Hainichen, May 6, 1969, letter addressed to Herr Bürger of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 
2. 




Figure 24. A preliminary sketch of an advertisement from Kreis Hainichen asking FDJ members to make 
submissions of postcards for Soviet citizens. The intended audience of this advertisement was much narrower than 
Berlin had envisioned. As was common in other regional appeals, this advertisement did not mention that this was 
merely one part (Mosaic Stone 1) of a much larger project. Indeed, the only reference to the larger project was in its 
identical title, “Wir machen mit, wir sind dabei!” (We’ll join in, we’ll take part!) (BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a). 
  
 The Berlin National Front, upon discovering Hainichen had not carried out its original 
magazine directive, immediately contacted the Hainichen Kreis secretariat directly, demanding 
an explanation. Secretariat member Schönfeld replied point blank that the reason was because “it 
was clear to us that we could hardly expect success” if they had followed Berlin’s guidelines.177 
Rather, the only way the secretariat thought they could carry out their “political-mass work” (that 
is, the ideological component of the competition) was by incorporating the content from the 
                                               
177 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß Hainichen, 
May 6, 1969, letter addressed to Herr Bürger of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 1-2. 
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magazine initiative into their own projects planned in honour of the 20th anniversary. Believing 
they could not possibly get the populace to participate in all 10 magazine initiatives, Schönfeld 
told Berlin that the Kreis chose instead to focus on creating local wall newspapers, photos, 
drawings, and Soviet greeting cards to go abroad. Schönfeld boasted that the Kreis had decided to 
even create “a substantial small exhibition” at the end of the competition so the populace could 
view all the submissions.178   
 Although proud of what Hainichen had achieved, Schönfeld was very frank with Berlin 
about the Kreis’s past and current challenges. He explained that Hainichen’s smaller level 
committees did not wish to forward their best local submissions onwards to national 
organizational branches or even to the Berlin National Front itself, as was expected. Instead, after 
judging the submissions, Schönfeld explained, these organizers wanted to keep them to be reused 
in exhibitions, projects and events throughout the Kreis!179 Of course, reusing instead of 
remaking such material would have defeated the pedagogical purpose behind the material’s 
original creation. Despite the enthusiasm from the Kreis organizers, Schönfeld complained of a 
lack of support from other National Front organizations. He wrote that: 
Another problem with this magazine was that the ‘co-responsible’ did not feel 
‘responsible’ at all. Neither the FDJ Kreis leadership, nor the People’s Solidarity, let 
alone the Kulturbund, showed any initiative … concerning this magazine. With regard to 
the commencement of the [Soviet] postcard initiative, “Greetings to the country of our 
friends,” even the DSF provided no support. That is just a fact. Now that we have 
something to show with our series of events, people are starting to regret their disinterest. 
There is a conclusion that has come out of this, however. [We discovered that] the good 
ideas and requests of this type of magazine will be successful if closely linked to the 
political mass-work objectives in their respective [geographic] areas. This will be a real 
help in interesting many people in completing the initiatives through creative self-
affirmation.180  
                                               
178 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß Hainichen, 
May 6, 1969, letter addressed to Herr Bürger of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 1-2. 
179 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß Hainichen, 
May 6, 1969, letter addressed to Herr Bürger of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 2. 
180 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß Hainichen, 
May 6, 1969, letter addressed to Herr Bürger of the Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Berlin, p. 2. 
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 Schönfeld was clearly very proud of the Kreis secretariat for what it had accomplished 
in spite of a lack of support from other committees, explaining to Berlin that the submissions they 
had received, although small in number, were of a very high quality, done in “good form” and 
with “good taste (for example, 27 apartment wall newspapers among other items).”181 Schönfeld 
further assured Berlin that the goal for the Kreis by the time of the actual anniversary in October 
was to carry out perhaps even twice or three times as many activities as they had done so far.  
 Overall, this example of a small region defying Berlin’s direct orders demonstrates the 
limits of Berlin’s control over its lower-level committees, as well as the limits of the usefulness 
of centralized uniform directives. Ironically, Hainichen defied Berlin so as to be able to better 
achieve Berlin’s own goal –  that of involving the population in a competition that had 
pedagogical meaning by reinforcing the themes of the anniversary theses. One can be reasonably 
sure that Hainichen would have fallen afoul of Berlin even if it had promoted the initiative with 
its original 10 options, however, for if it had then failed to achieve sufficient interest and 
participation, Berlin would not have admitted to any flaws in its own plan, but instead blamed 
Hainichen for a lack of proper organization and effort.  
                                               
181 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, Sekretariat member Schönfeld, National Front der DDR, Kreissausschuß Hainichen, 




Figure 25. One of Kreis Hainichen’s own initiatives for the anniversary, called “Aktion F 169.” The original 
magazine title “Wir machen mit, wir sind dabei!” (“We’ll join in, we’ll take part!”) appears here as well, although 
this particular activity was not actually part of the national magazine project (BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a). 
 
Conclusions and Lessons for Berlin: 
 
 What is obvious from this competition’s organizational problems is that having so many 
themes under the large umbrella initiative, “Wir machen mit, wir sind dabei!” meant that the 
competition ultimately lacked a focal point – like simply underscoring Soviet friendship as in 
previous years—and was thus impossible to carry out very easily. Since we do not have the final 
numbers or reports for this competition, it is diffcult to assess the ultimate outcome. However, the 
fact that this complex form was not repeated in later years suggests that the National Front 
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decided to return to its original model of having one focused theme per anniversary competition. 
What we can say for certain from the interim reports is that despite the success of Kreise such as 
Calau and Hainichen, this massive undertaking of ten different initiatives overwhelmed most 
regions, proving it was simply too ambitious a project to carry out. Berlin National Front 
representatives eventually realized that many regional committees were able to neither 
completely understand, nor follow, Berlin’s detailed plans.182 While Berlin recommended that the 
Bezirke and Kreise create individual commissions in order to ensure the successful coordination 
of this massive competition, as the example of Calau shows, this centralized control was not vital 
to success.183 Indeed, the fact that many Kreise were still not able to coordinate the initiatives, 
despite the existence of a specifically dedicated commission, indicates that the project, while in 
principle a highly centralized one, in its execution resulted in the regions taking a very 
decentralized approach. 
 Ultimately, the responsibility for much of this disorganization did not lie with the 
regions alone, but was due to the decision-making process at the very top. It was the Berlin 
National Front, for example, that decided the submissions for the “Hello, young people!” (Mosaic 
Stone 2) initiative would be sent to the youth magazine, Neues Leben, instead of to the regional 
committees themselves.184 As the Bezirk and Kreis secretariats pointed out time and again, it was 
precisely decisions like these that made their oversight attempts such an impossible task. 
Diverting the workload to other organizations did not always increase participation, but rather, 
                                               
182 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Notizen über die Kontrolle der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten in den Kreisen Calau, 
Spremberg (Cottbus) und Niesky (Dresden) sowie im Bezirkssekretariat in Dresden – 22/23 Mai,” May 27, 1969, p. 
2.  
183 The recommendation to create these commissions can be seen in the following memo: BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, 
National Front der DDR, Kreisausschuß Hoyerswerda, Sekretär Haugk, “Wir machen mit – Wir sind dabei,” memo 
to Orts and Wohnbezirksausschusse, February 25, 1969, p. 2. 
184 BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, National Front der DDR, Kreisausschuß Hoyerswerda, Sekretär Haugk, “Wir machen 
mit – Wir sind dabei,” memo to Orts and Wohnbezirksausschusse, February 25, 1969, p. 3. 
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seriously hampered the Bezirk and Kreis-level National Front committees’ plans, for example, by 
not being able to view the final results (submissions). This is an important takeaway because it 
shows how seriously Berlin overestimated the ability of its constituent mass organizations (as 
well as regional counterparts) to communicate and collaborate on competitions.185 In conclusion, 
Berlin badly misjudged the scope of this project: although its sprawling variety of initiatives and 
themes had the potential to invite a far greater variety of submissions, this very wide net actually 
proved its downfall, as it became far too complicated to coordinate and carry out on the ground.  
  
                                               
185 Organs of the state apparatus like the “Kreiskabinette für Kulturarbeit” were disinterested elsewhere as well. See 
BArch, DY 6/vorl. 3155a, “Notizen über die Kontrolle der Arbeit mit der Illustrierten in den Kreisen Calau, 




The Soviet “Friendship:” the 30th Anniversary of the Liberation from Fascism  
 
  
The first (and only) East German President Wilhelm Pieck once wrote that the continued success 
of the GDR lay in “making the friendship with the Soviet Union close to our peoples’ hearts” in 
their everyday lives.186 Although the GDR had been admitted as a full member of the UN in 
1974, and had normalized relations with West Germany through the Basic Treaty of 1972, the 
National Front nevertheless still felt it necessary to use Pieck’s quote as inspiration to maintain 
their close-knit ties to the Soviet Union, especially for the 30th anniversary of the so-called 
“Liberation from Fascism” (the end of World War II) on May 8, 1975. The significance of this 
                                               
186 BArch DY 6/ vorl. 6676, Abteilung Kultur, “Großkonzeption: Erarbeitung einer Dokumentation zum 30. 
Jahrestag der Befreiung als Geschenk des Nationalrats,” November 5, 1974, p.1  
Figure 26."Friendship with the Soviet Union: The beating heart of our lives." Drawing by Gerhard Vontra. Used 
by the National Front in honour of the 30th Anniversary of the Liberation of Fascism (BArch DY 6/ vorl. 6676) 
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anniversary was that, together with the 25th Anniversary of the GDR, it was the first major 
anniversary to occur following the establishment of the GDR’s legitimacy on the world stage at 
the height of the country’s “golden years.” Going forward, celebrations would now take place in 
an entirely different context than those that had come before, as the GDR could exude a 
confidence it had previously lacked. The GDR attempted to underscore legitimacy internally as 
well, for in 1968, the SED created a new constitution that finally defined the GDR as its own 
distinct state. According to Joanna McKay, theorists finally made a distinction between the 
nation, nationality and citizenship, replacing “socialist nation” with “German socialist nation.” 
People in the GDR were now to be first “citizens of the GDR” but also possess a German 
“nationality.”187  
Given this turn of events, the National Front’s goal for the 30th anniversary was to 
strengthen the reach of socialism in the world, maintain the connections and friendship of the 
GDR and the Soviet Union, and ensure the GDR’s continued integration into the socialist 
economic system.188 As was the case in previous anniversaries, the GDR leadership saw success 
as contingent on the regional and local committees’ ability to carry out a variety of celebrations 
in the months and weeks leading up to May 8. Examples of “cultural highpoints” that were 
celebrated included February 23, the day honouring the Soviet Army; the week of German-Soviet 
Friendship in the GDR at the beginning of May; and the third “Festival of Friendship” between 
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GDR and Soviet youth from May 14-19 in Halle.189  The purpose here, as the National Front 
pointed out, was to continuously maintain the SED-prescribed “educational work” – that is, the 
spreading of the anniversary theses’ messages of the GDR’s economic prosperity and the 
continued need for closeness to the Soviet Union to the people, especially the youth. For this 
anniversary, the leadership had deemed it particularly useful for the regions to organize events 
that celebrated those GDR citizens who had had personal experiences of the Soviet Union, such 
as attending university or receiving other training there.190 One very specific suggestion that the 
leadership gave to the regional committees was to hold events where workers in VEBs 
(Volkseigenerbetriebe, state-owned enterprises) could reflect on their particular enterprise’s 
history and how “unselfish” help in the beginning from the Soviet Union contributed to its 
present success.191  
In keeping with its usual approach to the festivities, the kinds of events the National Front 
suggested to workers’ clubs, town clubs, houses of German-Soviet friendship, and other cultural 
residential organizations included Soviet film and theatre performances including lectures, book 
readings, and exhibitions showcasing Soviet works of art and literature. The secretariats of the 
National Front and Society for German-Soviet Friendship also asked their 17 000 and 36 000 
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respective committee members to organize forums, lectures, visits to memorial sites, and 
Hausgemeinschaft gatherings. They also arranged viewings of the film “Friendship: A matter 
close to the heart” (“Freundschaft—Drushba — Herzenssache”) about Brezhnev’s visit for the 
25th Anniversary of the GDR. 192 Finally, the National Front reminded their local counterparts of 
the importance of organizing festivities for the evening of May 7 (the day before the anniversary) 
that involved music, cabarets, or singing groups.193   
While these sorts of reminders from the National Front about the kinds of different 
cultural activities the regions were to organize were similar in tone to those of previous 
anniversaries, there was a noticeable increase in the apparent confidence that the Berlin National 
Front had in its regional committees. In contrast to the detailed directives they sent out in 1957 
for the 40th Anniversary of the October Revolution, the Berlin National Front in 1975 left many 
decisions to the regional committees themselves, and merely recommended associations to which 
local organizations could turn if they required extra resource materials. What is significant is that 
the tone of language Berlin used made reaching out for these centrally-produced resources seem 
optional, in contrast to the anniversaries 20 years before, where the mass-produced materials 
were routinely sent directly to the regions, whether requested or not.194 
In addition to these festivities and cultural events, 1975 once again saw the National Front 
organize major socialist competitions in honour of the anniversary. One competition from the 
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industry, building, and commerce sector was entitled, “To get greater efficiency from every 
Mark, use every working hour, every gram of material!” (“Aus jeder Mark, jeder Stunde 
Arbeitszeit, jedem Gramm Material einen grösseren Nutzeffekt”), while another city 
beautification plan was called “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!,” which 
aimed to contribute to the economic plan in 1975 and make working and living conditions 
better.195 The Society for German-Soviet Friendship also undertook several different initiatives 
under the motto of “Friendship Group” (“Aufgebot der Freundschaft”).196 One of the largest 
competitions that took place that year was called “Drushba-Klub” and was the joint effort of three 
different organizations, taking place from February 17 to May 4, 1975.197  
 
“Drushba-Klub”/“Troika der Freundschaft” (1975) 
 
In an attempt to underscore the benefits the Soviet connection had brought GDR citizens 
over the previous 30 years, Radio DDR, the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF), and 
the National Front joined forces to create one of the largest cultural socialist competitions of the 
year, requesting ordinary citizens submit personal stories to a radio program called “Troika der 
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Freundschaft” / “Drushba-Klub.”198 The radio series aired on Radio DDR from February 17 to 
May 4, 1975 with radio show hosts reading out the personal stories. The competition aimed to 
demonstrate, in the words of the National Front, how “deep, positive and diverse GDR citizens’ 
connections with Soviets had become,” regardless of their socio-economic status and profession, 
whether “they were scientists, artists, youths, officers, or labourers.”199 For their connection with 
the Soviet Union had been, and continued to be, “vital to their success in building a socialist 
state.”200     
Addressing everyone from individual citizens, to regional and local committees of the 
National Front, as well as members of Hausgemeinschaften, the three organizations requested 
East Germans submit stories about “important people, encounters, or experiences” so as to give 
listeners an overall sense of what good people the Soviets were. Organizers were not only 
interested in people recounting momentous events, but also the smaller everyday experiences that 
would usually not be considered noteworthy. The advertisement told participants to keep in mind 
that “even the smallest stone is a fundamental building block that today guarantees the present 
and future of our socialist lives in the Land of Lenin.”201 Participants were encouraged to use the 
blank reverse side of the advertisement to write their story, and to add a choice of music at the 
bottom of the page to be played. After making their submissions directly to the Berlin National 
Front Department of Culture by March 31, 1975, the advertisement read, East Germans were to 
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tune into Radio DDR on weekends from mid-February 1975 onwards to see if their story made it 
on the air.202 
The submissions for this “Drushba-Klub” competition were many and varied.203 Many of 
the stories submitted were about personal experiences, although some attested to how specific 
people in the community had dedicated themselves to maintaining relations with German-Soviet 
organizations over the years– which in some cases dated back to the 1920s. Another important 
facet to this competition was that all of the stories recounted positive experiences with the 
Soviets: whether in their role as occupiers immediately after World War II, or later as “friends” 
or travelling companions of GDR citizens. Although there is no evidence of any negative 
experiences, and many stories indeed cast the Soviets in a very admirable – even heroic – light, 
there were still hints of popular resentment in the stories, especially when the writers, recounting 
a particularly good experience, indicated that they treasured their Soviet interaction despite their 
previous views or the misgivings of others around them. While there is no reason to doubt the 
truth of these personal stories, they certainly do not reflect the truly awful experiences many 
Germans had with the Soviets, especially during the occupation following the war. 
 
Connections in the past: tales of humanity and teaching in the post-war period 
 
In a particularly glaring contradiction with the lived experience of many East Germans, 
many submissions portrayed life under the Soviet Military Administration as a positive 
experience. In reality, the Germans, including millions of refugees from the East, faced a myriad 
of difficulties during these years.  Since the Soviet Union wanted to be compensated financially 
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for their losses suffered during the war, it took any “wealth” that still existed in its zone by 
seizing factories and looting.204 Norman Naimark describes this time period as a Soviet “feeding 
frenzy.”205 Soviet dismantling of German factories seriously impaired the GDR’s ability to 
recover from the war to the point that even German communists were angry about it.206 Workers 
were forced to dismantle and ship off factory parts without pay alongside Soviets who were 
completely careless in their dismantling and packing of factory parts.207 Compounding the 
challenges around recovery was the issue of land reform. Immediately after the war, the Soviet 
plan had been to expropriate any land belonging to Nazis and large landowners (Junkers), and 
while many new smaller farmers were happy to receive land initially, this changed once they 
were confronted with serious economic hardship, such as a lack of horses and carts, stalls, seed, 
livestock, fertilizer, and machinery (which had been sent to the Soviet Union).208 Without seed, 
they could not plant crops, and without horses and carts, they could not bring in the harvest. 
Abuses by local commandants were rife and included high quotas being set for an entire region 
with little regard for the disadvantages this posed the new smaller farms that had been carved out 
of the old larger landholdings.209 This contributed an already precarious food situation in which 
Germans suffered widespread disease and malnourishment, especially due to their lack of fats, 
fresh fruits, and vegetables.210  
The widespread rape of German women by Soviet soldiers also caused deep resentment of 
the Soviet occupiers. Anne Applebaum refers to the wave of rapes as Soviet “political rage” 
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against the Germans,211 while Norman Naimark explains that some Soviet soldiers saw raping 
German women as another way of conquering the enemy, especially as many of the rapes took 
place in front of family members, including husbands and fathers.212 Many of the women caught 
sexually transmitted diseases, became pregnant, or suffered dangerous abortions. Some husbands 
abandoned their wives as a result, while still other women succumbed to the injuries they 
sustained. No woman was safe, as the Soviets would rape both young girls and elderly women. 
Indeed, anyone who attempted to help risked being beaten or killed themselves, so some villages 
even resorted to hiding their women in attics.213 While some Soviet officials did make attempts to 
stop this –even as many others simply looked the other way— in the end, stopping it often proved 
difficult since the Soviet soldiers were steeped in anti-German propaganda and well-versed in the 
worst of the Nazis’ crimes and were, quite simply, out for revenge.214  
The suffering the Germans endured by the end of the Soviet occupation had been 
immense: already enduring great hardship as a result of the war, the occupation made their lives 
even worse. The rapes, looting, the “wanton destruction” of the Eastern zone, and the violence in 
general215 resulted in the Germans’ experience of the occupation being one of, as Naimark puts it, 
“hunger and want, misery and despair.”216 Even though the Soviets officially denied this had 
taken place, and Ulbricht would neither admit nor discuss it, memories of this terrible time lived 
on in the population’s memory. 217  The result was the German population developed a deep 
mistrust, fear, and a generally unfavourable image of the Soviets.218  Mary Fulbrook comments 
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that while many East Germans would later claim with pride they helped build up the state during 
these years, those who truly experienced joy in doing so were few: rather, “the large majority 
simply made the best of a bad job, grumbling and complaining and hoping somehow simply to be 
able to survive, with little thought for either past or future.”219 
In stark contrast to this horrible reality, submissions to the radio competition recounting 
this time period instead recalled a benevolent, almost father-like Soviet military administration 
that was intent on helping Germans re-develop their industries and help “build up” the first 
socialist state on German soil. Again and again, these accounts tell of kindly Soviet officers and 
officials who, despite having (as the writers frequently phrased it) “personally suffered so much 
at the hands of the Germans” during the invasion of the Soviet Union, were able to put that 
behind them in order to help Germans rise above their Nazi past. These accounts posed the Soviet 
occupiers as providing educational instruction to a people who desperately needed guidance. 
From the writers’ perspective, their purpose in sharing these stories was about far more than 
simply reminiscing about an era they had experienced differently than the majority of Germans: 
Ernst Eutin, a former “propagandist” and mayor of Bergen in the immediate post-war years, 
pointed out how memories such as his could play a particularly important role in educating the 
younger generation, who had never experienced the aftermath of the war. Eutin pointed out that it 
would be useful for these Pioneers and FDJ members to know how much the Soviets helped the 
GDR “build up” socialism and recover from the destruction of the war.220 Of course, another 
unspoken effect was to give credence to this competing narrative of the Soviets as kind and fair 
occupiers.  
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Another favourite topic of the writers was how personable the Soviet people seemed to be 
in general. There were countless stories of writers describing how taken aback they were at 
discovering their initial distrust of the Soviets to have been unfounded by simply interacting with 
them. These accounts therefore attest to the genuine warmth of the Soviet people. In one such 
account, Hildegard, from a town on the island of Rügen on the Baltic, bluntly described the 
Soviets as having provided vital support during the immediate aftermath of the war: “Without the 
help of our Soviet friends, we would not have survived the difficult time between May and 
November 1945.”221 Hildegard’s account painted a desperate picture: upon returning to her 
hometown of Swinemünde on the Polish border in 1945, she had no way to get food for herself or 
her three children. At the time, she worked clearing rubble in the town, so one day she went to a 
Soviet soup kitchen looking for food for her family. Not only did she receive the food, but to her 
pleasant surprise, the Soviets even gave her children extra milk. Her takeaway from this 
interaction was that the Soviets loved children and that their welfare was “a matter close to their 
hearts.” The Soviets also assisted her older parents by paying them in food and provisions in 
exchange for their work for the town commanders. Overall, Hildegard described the Soviets’ 
consideration towards her family as “an example of proletarian internationalism.”222 These 
experiences left Hildegard with such a positive impression of the Soviets that years later inspired 
her to join the DFD (the Democratic Women’s League of Germany, Demokratische Frauenbund 
Deutschlands), which led her to make even more contacts with Soviet women through organizing 
many collaborative events.223  
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In an account that compared their American and Soviet occupiers, an elderly workers’ 
movement “veteran” named Albert from the city of Plauen also recalled the life-saving assistance 
the Soviets provided in those first years after the war.224 Since bombs had destroyed Plauen’s 
piping networks, there was no gas, power or water. As a simple metalworker, Albert did not 
know how to begin to help the people who were struggling, as most workers in the city, including 
the engineers, had fled. Albert described how, during their seven weeks of occupation under the 
Americans, each person only received one ration card, with nothing additional provided for those 
who conducted physical labour. Albert commented that this changed immediately upon the 
Soviets’ arrival. While he admitted that their Soviet occupiers also provided only a small number 
of rations, Albert felt their allocation was fairer as it was based on work type, which meant larger 
rations for those doing physical labour. Albert thought this change motivated workers who had 
previously left the city to return to help clear the rubble. Despite this extra help and food, Albert 
acknowledged that the rebuilding work was nevertheless very difficult and required much 
sacrifice. Albert spoke of a motto he and his fellow workers had during this time, which was 
“first work more, then eat more!,” although keeping to this was extremely hard because of how 
hungry and exhausted they were. Years later, when people asked how they had had the strength 
and courage to get through those days, Albert answered that they had derived the strength from 
the belief that the early struggle was worth being able to later live in a state where the working 
class was in control. In July 1945, in recognition for all his efforts (and likely his ideological 
beliefs as well), Albert was chosen as his workplace representative for his local KPD group.225  
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In a second submission to the competition, Albert provided an even more human account 
of individual Soviets. Albert wrote of his experience of coming into direct contact with some 
Soviet POWS while celebrating the end of the war on the evening of May 8, 1945.226 Here, 
Albert callously claimed that the Soviets were able to distinguish between “two different kinds of 
Germans:” people like himself who welcomed the defeat of fascism, and those around him who 
did not.227 As he belonged to the former group, that night a group of former Soviet POWS invited 
him to sit and share their borscht with them. This act of kindness touched Albert deeply, for he 
knew they were also suffering and had not had anything to eat. To his astonishment, they even 
insisted he eat his fill first. Albert remarked that he still remembered, 30 years later, how good 
that food and drink tasted and how the whole evening felt like a large family party.228 As a result, 
maintaining contact with the Soviets became a matter close to his heart, and led him to become a 
member of his district board of the DSF. 229   
  In another submission to the contest, a man named Rudolf from the small village of 
Tirschendorf near the Polish border wrote that his philosophy for enduring those difficult post-
war years was, “First work more, then live better” (“Erst mehr arbeiten, dann besser leben”).230 
While Rudolf acknowledged that not everyone shared his point of view and that he had observed 
many of his coworkers grumbling about their work, he nevertheless attempted to negate their 
experiences by declaring that “worthy sacrifices” were simply part of creating a socialist state.  
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Rudolf righteously concluded that he had seen these nay-sayers ultimately proven wrong, for 
“time has since shown that our party was on the right path.” 231 For Rudolf, the proof lay in the 
fact that he had not observed anyone in his community suffering social plights such as 
unemployment since their socialist state came into existence (in comparison to how widespread it 
was before).232 Thus, he firmly believed that their sacrifices during those hard times 30 years 
before had “laid the foundations for the march forward of socialism,” resulting in “the country’s 
current stability and the thirty-year peace in Europe.”233 
 Rudolf was not alone in this belief in sacrifice: Georg, the chairman of a residential 
district (Wohnbezirk) near Zwickau, believed that the only way forward for humanity was by 
joining in the fight against “exploitation and oppression,” “Ausbeutung und Unterdrückung.”234 
A long-time communist, having joined the KPD in 1931, Georg had served a three-year prison 
sentence during the Nazi era, something he felt was worth it because “our fight was the right one 
and would eventually be victorious.” In 1945, Georg was overjoyed at the arrival of the Soviet 
army because, as he saw it, their presence would enable them to rebuild a better Germany where 
the workers would hold power. Like the others, Georg thought Soviet assistance had been the key 
factor that had alleviated widespread hunger in 1945. According to Georg, it had been very 
important to the Soviets that the German people had enough to eat, even if that meant using up 
their own food supplies to feed them. Georg saw the Soviets as exemplary individuals who cared 
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deeply about others, which he felt was entirely logical, for “if one wishes to create a humane 
social order, then one has to love people.”235  
 Beyond their general benevolence, Georg also described the Soviet occupiers’ assistance 
with education and training. In 1945, Georg had worked inspecting enterprises, and the Soviet 
economic officials and local commander who helped him with his work taught him a great deal, 
“gifting us their great wealth of experience.”236 Despite having been a lifelong communist, there 
was so much information Georg did not know, but which he said he was able to learn in those 
years working with the Soviets. He commented: “One could sense in their advice a real human 
warmth” towards others. For example, the Soviets helped him swiftly handle any bad situations 
that came up in the enterprises, such as the “hoarding” of goods.237 Looking back, Georg wrote 
that he was “firmly convinced that without the help of these Soviet comrades, we would not have 
achieved our goals.” For, as Georg saw it, it was having the Soviet “trailblazers” at their side that 
enabled the GDR to go down the right path to socialism and communism, especially given that 
the Soviets had already laid the foundation for “a better order.”238 
Unlike Albert, Rudolf, and Georg, who were long-time communists, Paul from Bezirk 
Cottbus formed his positive views on the Soviets based on personal experience alone. Paul wrote 
about how he had arrived back in Germany in September 1945 after having been a prisoner of 
war in Soviet hands..239 Although he said he had wanted nothing to do with a uniform ever again, 
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especially given the political uncertainty at the time, the town mayor requested Paul join the local 
police force, the “Schutzpolizei” (soon to be Volkspolizei). During this time period, the police 
service was, as a whole, untrained and unprepared for their duties. 240 But what impressed Paul 
the most during this difficult time were the “patient” Soviet officers who trained them all. Despite 
the language barrier, the Soviet and German officers became very close to one another. It was 
these “excellent” officers who taught Paul (and indeed everyone else) how to, as Paul termed it, 
“think well.” Paul recalled asking the Soviet officers one day, why as Germans, they were 
required to learn the history of the Soviet Union instead of their own. Although he never received 
a satisfactory answer at the time, he later realized that the answer was that “lernen heißt siegen 
lernen” (“learning means to learn to be victorious”). Paul also pointed out to the present-day 
listeners that now that the working class had achieved victory, they should focus on doing all 
they could to keep and protect their power, especially given what they “owed” the Soviet 
Union.241 
Former Mayor Walter Voigt of the small city of Glauchau likewise described the many 
selfless acts of the Soviets immediately following the war. For one, the Soviets themselves 
helped rebuild the streets of the towns, volunteering many hours of their time, something which 
Voigt said they “did not have to do” for the Germans.242 He recalled how one day a bulldozer, 
attempting to clear up a large amount of rubble in the city, sunk into the dirt and could not be 
extracted. Mayor Voigt felt he had no other choice but to ask the Soviet garrison commander for 
help, who immediately arranged for a larger vehicle to arrive, which also became stuck. The 
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commander then arranged for an even larger tractor to help, but while waiting for it to arrive, 
some Soviet soldiers and officers came to the rescue and “with much humour and cheerful 
words,” assisted in extracting both vehicles.243  
 Another former mayor, Ernst Eutin of the city of Bergen on the island of Rügen in the 
Baltic Sea, recounted how important the Soviet administration had been to Bergen’s recovery 
after the war. Although Bergen was fortunate enough to have escaped serious damage, there were 
still serious problems to be solved in those early years, as city officials had to ensure order was 
restored and that the townsfolk had sufficient food and accommodations. Eutin was certain that, 
without the “outstanding and full support of the island’s commanders and staff,” it would not 
have been possible to have successfully rebuilt in the same way.244 He described receiving daily 
“brotherly” advice from the Soviet commanders about how best to proceed. Indeed, he even 
remembered one person reminding him that the Soviets were not just “excellent soldiers” 
responsible for the defeat of fascism, but were also “good specialists” in administration, 
agriculture, industry, and education and thus could be turned to for help. For example, according 
to Eutin, the Soviet command helped alleviate widespread hunger in Bergen by ordering the 
confiscation of stocks of potatoes, grains and other foodstuffs that were being held by large 
landowners and other “fascists.”245 In another instance, when typhoid broke out in Bergen, the 
Soviet medical services assisted with treatment, ensuring the hundreds of people who fell ill 
recovered.246 
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 Eutin further described how the Soviets helped organize other, less tangible, aspects of 
Bergen’s recovery, such as its first post-war religious service. Eutin explained that in order for 
the town to fully recover, it could not just be the work of the German and Soviet officials, but 
that they needed the help of everyone in the city. Even though he was the mayor, Eutin at this 
time was not sure how best to get people to gather together for a townhall meeting. It was here 
that one of the Soviet commanders stepped in to assist: he reminded Eutin that since the 
following day was a Sunday, many people would already be assembled at the church, so he 
recommended Eutin request the priest ask his congregation (who would in turn tell their friends) 
to gather in the town square afterwards.247 The significance of this suggestion for Eutin, besides 
being a helpful idea that solved his organizational problem, was the realization that the Soviets 
were prepared to allow religious services under the occupation. The officials standing beside 
Eutin who overheard this conversation were astounded that this would be allowed, but a Soviet 
superintendent told them that the idea that religion would be outlawed was nothing more than 
untrue anti-Soviet propaganda. Instead, he said the people would certainly be allowed to hold 
their religious services provided “anti-Soviet fascist propaganda” was not preached.248 This 
successful first religious service, according to Eutin, marked the beginning of a collaborative 
relationship.  Eutin also remembered that the first dance evening in Bergen occurred as early as 
the end of May 1945 – again, on the recommendation of the Soviet commander.249 Eutin’s final 
overall reflection of these years was that: 
Despite many privations and difficulties, all the activists of those early years fulfilled their 
tasks with much joy, great zeal and confidence. Our path was the right one, because it was 
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the path to happiness, peace and socialism. On this path we always had our faithful 
friends and helpers beside us.250 
 
 
Acts of Kindness  
 
Besides helping with recovery efforts, many competition participants also recalled simple 
acts of kindness shown to them by Soviet citizens in the past, sometimes in life or death 
scenarios. One example came from Frau Klotz, who was nominated for recognition by the Kreis 
secretariat in Zwickau for her tireless work for the National Front. Frau Klotz explained that her 
love for the Soviet people began one day in 1945, after she and her child had fled their home and 
had been walking for days. At one point she could not walk any longer and was approached on 
the side of the road by a Soviet soldier, who offered her a ride. As a German and “knowing what 
her people had done to the Soviets,” she felt apprehensive. However, she was exhausted and 
decided to accept the ride. To her surprise, the soldier was kind to her and spoke of Lenin and of 
his home. Hearing the many stories the soldier told her during this journey, she came away 
feeling his love for his country and for his people. Frau Klotz remembered, “His parents and 
siblings had been killed, he had nothing left, all his loved ones were dead. I was dying, I felt 
ashamed. It was my own people who had done this to him.” Despite this, he bore her no ill-will. 
She went on: “For him, I was only human, a mother who needed help. It was clear to me from 
that point on that I would work day and night to prevent such suffering from happening again.” 
Frau Klotz did keep her promise and thereafter dedicated herself to the Soviet cause, pointing out 
how much she owed to that man: “I am indebted to the Soviet soldier for being a sincere comrade 
today. Through his human greatness, he gave me confidence in myself. I owed it to him to 
become a different person. I will never forget him.” She also made sure that no one else did 
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either, for she explained that she took every opportunity she could to tell other East Germans how 
wonderful the Soviets were.251 
Stories of Soviet selflessness were also recounted by Irene, who remembered how in July 
1945, she was a migrant staying at an estate in Mecklenburg with many other women, children, 
and elderly. One day, Irene saw that a young mother standing beside her had a very sick and 
malnourished infant, but had no food or medicine to give it. Suddenly, a Soviet soldier walked by 
their group and saw the infant. He looked at the mother and asked if the child was sick. Irene, the 
only Russian speaker in the group, communicated that this was the case. A while later, the same 
soldier, who turned out to be a doctor, returned with a bottle of liquid and told the mother it was 
“medicine for the child.” Hesitantly, the woman gave her child the medicine. The next day, a 
different soldier approached Irene and gave her a package, telling her to give it to the sick child. 
Upon opening it, she saw that it was bread and butter. Irene was overwhelmed as she soon 
realized that “the Soviet soldier had given a sick German child his bread ration!” Reflecting on 
all the harm the Germans had brought to the Soviets, Irene was astonished that it was “from these 
people that we received help!” She vowed that she would never forget this meeting with these 
“friends” or how “after years of inhumanity in the time of fascism,” she finally encountered “true 
people.”252 
A SED party veteran named Paul in the Bezirk of Karl-Marx-Stadt similarly recounted his 
own experience of Soviet humanity. On a cold wet day in May 1945, in a small village near 
Chemnitz (as it was then known) that had been destroyed by bombs, a group of women with 
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babies and some elderly people were standing stranded in the cold rain. Paul was at work in an 
office building nearby when a Soviet soldier came in to get him to help this group of people. The 
soldier said he would get bread and tea for them, but instructed Paul to make some space in the 
office so that the group could come in out of the rain. After convincing the owner of the building 
that the people should be allowed in (as the owner was certain the people would bring in lice and 
dirt), Paul and the soldier eventually were able to get the people out of the rain. Paul found this 
soldiers’ act of concern for others’ welfare to be extremely kind-hearted, especially as he later 
found out that the German army had burned the soldier’s hometown in Soviet Union to the 
ground. Paul was so impressed that he was determined to share this story on the radio show all 
these years later so that others could hear about it. “There are still countless more examples," he 
continued, “where the long-suffering Soviet people did not give tit for tat. They have proven this 
over and over again in the past 30 years.” In contrast, Paul pointed out that he did not remember 
their American occupiers ever having concerned themselves with questions such as these (as the 
area was briefly under American occupation). Instead, Paul recalled an anecdote at the time of the 
Americans “dumping gasoline on foodstuffs while hungry children watched.”253  
Other accounts of the selflessness of Soviet soldiers include one story from a man named 
Rudi, who recounted how a neighbour’s house caught fire during the summer of 1953. The first 
to respond to the burning house were Soviet soldiers. Rudi wrote that the neighbours’ houses and 
barns would have been destroyed too if not for their quick thinking. One soldier even went 
beyond fighting the fire: he ran into the burning house to save a child’s train set and brought it 
back to the overjoyed child.254 In a similar story, a woman named Helene recalled a catastrophic 
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flood in Zwickau in 1954, resulting in hundreds of people needing to be evacuated. Many Soviets 
(and others) came to offer what help they could. One Soviet even died in the process of helping 
rescue residents. Helene commented that it was instances like these that made her fond of the 
Soviets, a feeling that persisted until the present day.255 
Despite the impression that selfless acts such as those described above left on East 
Germans, everyday interactions were in some ways equally as important because they showed 
that regular day-to-day interactions alone could result in some ordinary Germans developing a 
favourable opinion of the Soviet people: it was not vital that they witness extraordinary acts such 
as rescuing people from floods or children’s toys from fires, or saving a sick child. For example, 
Erna from Olbernhau in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt came to appreciate the Soviets through a simple 
exchange trip where she once received a group of visitors from Irkutsk, Siberia. Later, Erna 
herself travelled to Siberia, and while there, a young teacher from the group who had visited 
Germany contacted her and invited her to a “friendship meeting” with the local chapter of the 
Society for the German Soviet Friendship (DSF), an event Erna enjoyed immensely.256 In another 
instance, an anonymous Hausgemeinschaft representative described the importance of 
connections with Soviet people for the young people of their area. Their children, belonging to 
the Pioneers or FDJ, were pen pals with children in the Soviet Union, while at least one young 
person from their group was studying in the Soviet Union. The members of the 
Hausgemeinschaft also counted many Soviets as personal friends of theirs, who would 
occasionally attend their residential street festivals.257 
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A single serendipitous encounter with a Soviet was also enough to affect Germans’ 
opinions of the Soviets for a lifetime. For example, someone named Reinhard described how a 
chance encounter as a youth with Soviet officers in 1949 changed his whole opinion on the 
Soviet Union. One day, while getting a drink in a restaurant after missing a meeting point with 
his friends, a small group of Soviet soldiers saw him and invited him to sit at their table and share 
lemonade and bread with them. As Reinhard pointed out, he had had no previous contact with the 
Soviets, and had indeed only heard negative stories about them. But, after speaking with these 
men for several hours about their children, families, and about how all they wanted to do was 
help “build up” the country, the young man formed a much different picture of them. This 
encounter had such an effect on Reinhard that it encouraged him to make more Soviet contacts, 
beginning with Soviets in the GDR, and then progressing to making his own visits to the Soviet 
Union. He remarked that this one occurrence had led him on a lifelong path where he was 
learning more about the Soviets all the time.258 
In a very similar account, Ehrenhard from Bezirk Schwerin recalled how his early 
impressions of the Soviets had been tainted from the books he read in the Nazi school system, 
which had naturally painted the Soviets in a bad light.259 However, his views changed shortly 
after the war, when one day his family needed horses to work their field, but had none. In 
response to this, the Soviet commander of the town ensured they obtained a horse. As a result of 
this kindness, Ehrenhard and his whole family from that point onwards sought to develop 
relationships with Soviet citizens: even thirty years later, they still received postcards, letters and 
souvenirs from Moscow, Tallin, Riga, and even from Alma-Ata [now Almaty], Kazakhstan. He 
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and his family became close to these people, telling them about their joys and sorrows, while at 
the same time learning about these foreign lands.260 
 What this group of stories tells us in general was that there were many individual 
instances of humanity and kindness to be found during a very difficult period in time. While 
heroic instances like the ones described above were most likely the exception rather than the rule, 
a simple “normal” chance encounter with a kind Soviet could apparently also change an 
individual’s perspective. Of course, the fact that that perspective changed at all confirms that 
those people had already formed a negative opinion of the Soviets, proving the existence of 
widespread mistrust of the Soviet Union. It was certainly feelings such as these that this radio 
competition sought to counteract. For once again, the National Front was seeking to make its 
message as palatable as possible to the masses: listening to the personal stories of ordinary people 
would be far more likely to convince East Germans to give Soviet friendship a chance than would 
a dry lecture or another long article in the newspaper.   
 
Maintaining current connections to the Soviet Union 
 
The most ubiquitous topic of all in the submissions for this radio competition was of the 
benefits reaped as a result of maintaining personal ties to the Soviet Union and their citizens. 
Many people wrote of trips of a lifetime to the Soviet Union, with Moscow and Leningrad being 
favoured destinations. Given that they were experiencing a new culture and country for the first 
time, these people were understandably astounded at the beauty of the cities, the friendliness of 
the people, and the good lives people apparently led there. One young plastic factory worker from 
the town of Spremberg in Bezirk Cottbus described a trip to Moscow and Leningrad where “we 
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were received everywhere as friends, almost as relatives.” He went on to report that, although 
“the Soviet Union is vast and hard to compare with our country, I felt at home, amongst 
friends.”261 Other accounts echoed this sentiment, describing what good hosts the Soviets were 
and how many would often take their German guests to see important landmarks. As with the 
accounts of Soviet kindness after the war, a very important theme is the shame that many East 
Germans felt because of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. Many recount arriving in the 
Soviet Union, expecting the Soviets to resent them. However, to their great surprise, they were 
very well-received.  
The purpose these trips served was multifaceted: on the one hand, they enabled East 
Germans the chance to experience life outside the GDR’s borders. As Patrick Major has said, 
young people by the 1970s would rather have been allowed travel, mostly to the West, over and 
above even possessing intellectual freedoms. These trips were thus designed to (somewhat) 
satisfy that thirst for travel in spite of the shadow of the Wall.262 The other purpose these trips 
served was to make East Germans more familiar with Soviet culture and people. As was clearly 
demonstrated by the socialist competitions in 1957, many East Germans claimed to have had 
very little contact at all with Soviet people. By visiting the country for themselves, the Soviet 
people would become at once more familiar, but also relatable, which would make the National 
Front’s task of reinforcing the East German-Soviet bond (as set out by the theses) much easier 
every anniversary. 
Horst, a worker from the VEB Mansfeld Kombinat in Bezirk Karl-Mar-Stadt recalled one 
such illuminating four-week multi-city trip to the Soviet Union in 1961. He described how he and 
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his tour group thoroughly enjoyed themselves whilst taking in the wonderful landscapes, the 
“interesting” lock system in the Volga, as well as the wonderful cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, 
and Donetsk. Despite his enjoyment, Horst, like so many others, spoke of the guilt he carried “as 
a German” and how this initially affected him on his trip. He was apprehensive about meeting 
Soviet people as he thought they would certainly be angry at him by association: “I was not 
directly involved because I was too young, but I still could not get rid of this feeling.” However, 
to his pleasant surprise, Horst was warmly received by the Soviet people – even though, as he 
pointed out, they had lost so much during the war because of the Germans. Horst soon learned 
that the Soviets were able to distinguish between the Germans “from then” and “those of the 
GDR today,” who were “honestly trying to find a better way.” A lasting effect of this trip for 
Horst was that his feeling of guilt as a German dissipated permanently after interacting with the 
“kind Soviet people.”263 
Luise, a well-travelled woman from the Bezirk of Karl-Marx-Stadt, told a similar story. 
She described making many trips to the Soviet Union and consistently finding that the Soviet 
people greeted her in a warm and friendly manner. In reference to the ideological underpinnings 
of this radio contest, Luise also wrote that the Soviets’ friendliness was a testament to the deep 
bond between the GDR and Soviet peoples. She described how on one trip, her group’s tour 
guide took them to the Piskaryovskoye cemetery outside of Leningrad. Luise’s group was 
overwhelmed hearing their guide describe the 900 day siege of Leningrad (1941 – 1944) and 
about the 600 000 people who died there. It was clear to Luise that their guide loved her 
homeland, especially when she talked about the heroic fighting of the city’s inhabitants. Yet, 
despite her description of such a difficult chapter in history, Luise’s guide spoke without 
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levelling any judgement against the Germans, something the group found astounding. Upon 
being asked if this was not extremely difficult to do, he replied that “it is fascism we hate – we 
love the German people.”264  
Other East Germans were impressed with their trips to the Soviet Union not just because 
of the kind people they encountered, but also because they seemed to have been overawed from 
an almost religious-like perspective: these GDR tourists described their “pilgrimage” to the 
“Land of Lenin” and the honour they felt from visiting such important sites of memory (which of 
course helped reinforce official narratives of Soviet sacrifice). Visiting the siege site outside of 
Leningrad was very popular amongst GDR tour groups, and many described being completely 
overcome when hearing about sacrifice made by the “Soviet heroes” in their struggle against 
fascism. Gertraute from Freiberg described her trip to the Soviet Union as having been mainly to 
celebrate the anniversary of the October Revolution, but upon arriving she found herself less 
concerned with the festivities and more overcome when seeing and experiencing the war 
memorials.265 Similarly, Heinz and Herta from Hormersdorf greatly enjoyed their visit to 
“Heldenstadt” (city of heroes) Leningrad, particularly their visit to the Piskaryovskoye Memorial. 
They described the indelible impression this left on them, especially of all the suffering they 
realized those “heroes” had endured. Heinz and Herta wrote that they made sure to stand in 
silence to remember the fallen. This experience, combined with their warm welcome by the 
Soviet people, the couple said, allowed them for the first time to “fully understand what real 
friendship meant.”266  
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Despite the clear advantages of travelling themselves, receiving visitors from the Soviet 
Union in the GDR also had an impact on those East Germans who met them. One example of this 
came from a group of 25 VEB colleagues at the Stralsund shipyard, who signed a “friendship 
treaty” with the crew of the Soviet ship the Atlantik 7220 “Geroi Adzhimuskaya.” According to 
the organizers, for their VEB, “friendship with the Soviet Union [was] a matter of the heart.”267 
So the group explained that they hoped talking about their own interactions with the Soviets 
would help “dispel and disprove many false opinions and reservations” others had of them. 268 
Further proving that these opinions commonly abounded, the group said they were very proud of 
their ability to “get all of our colleagues to joyfully participate in this friendship treaty.”269 Part of 
the “treaty” involved the VEB members inviting the crew ashore so they could learn about one 
another. The group took their visitors to museums, toured the city with them, and organized an 
evening of bowling, dances, films, and even sporting events and a youth gathering.270 For their 
efforts, the Society for German-Soviet Friendship had even awarded the VEB the silver badge of 
honour. Ultimately, the group wrote, they hoped that sharing their experiences on the radio would 
inspire more people to join the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) and make their own 
“friendship treaties.”271 
                                               
267 BArch DY 6/1028, Materialbedarfsermittlung Abteilung des VEB Volkswerft Stralsund, Submission for 
Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the National Front, March 21, 1975, p. 1. 
268 BArch DY 6/1028, Materialbedarfsermittlung Abteilung des VEB Volkswerft Stralsund, Submission for 
Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the National Front, March 21, 1975, p. 3. This language formulation is 
interesting as these constant references to “falsche Meinungen” and desire to show willing participation in GDR 
relations with the Soviets must mean that there was widespread dislike/distrust of them.  
269 BArch DY 6/1028. Materialbedarfsermittlung Abteilung des VEB Volkswerft Stralsund, Submission for 
Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the National Front, March 21, 1975, p. 3.  
270 BArch DY 6/1028, “Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen der Besatzung des Schiffes Atlantik 7220 ‘Geroi 
Adzhimuskaya’ und dem Kollektiv der Abteilung Materialbedarfsermittlung und Materialverbrauchsnormung des 
VEB Volkswerft Stralsund,” Submission for Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the National Front, March 21, 
1975, p. 2-3. 
271 BArch DY 6/1028, Materialbedarfsermittlung Abteilung des VEB Volkswerft Stralsund, Submission for 
Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the National Front, March 21, 1975, p. 2-3. 
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It was not only adults who claimed to have benefitted from Soviet connection, as children 
also were able to create and maintain friendship ties. For example, the teacher of a kindergarten 
class in the city of Plauen wrote in to the competition describing the many interactions her 
students had had with Soviet citizens in the area, especially celebrating local festivals with Soviet 
children. The teacher also commented that the children were always particularly excited to meet 
with Soviet soldiers. These contacts were made possible through a worker in the Kreis committee 
of the National Front of Plauen, who helped organize these cultural highlights. As the teacher 
explained, their main goal in doing all of this was to “deepen the love of our children for the 
Soviet Union and especially for other Soviet children.”272 Of course, educating the young in this 
way was something that the SED and National Front always encouraged – for developing these 
                                               
272 BArch DY 6/1028, Waltraut Georgi of the Kindergarten “Der Socialismus siegt,” Submitted to National Front 
Kreisausschuß Plauen im Vogtland, February 8, 1975. The teacher directly sent in submissions from the children to 
the radio station as part of the attempt of their entire collective (the Kollektiv der DSF des Kindergartens “der 
Socialismus siegt” in Plauen im Vogtland) to get the silver honour badge of the DSF. 
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positive connections early on would help prevent the next generation from carrying the same 
dislike for the Soviets the older one did.  
 
Figure 27. Picture submitted by a child at a kindergarten in Plauen for the competition (BArch DY 6/1028) 
 
 
Another educator named Angelika at a children's home in Guben in Bezirk Cottbus also 
described how important she thought it was for her children to develop connections to the Soviet 
Union. She described how her group of children had maintained contact with a Moscow 
kindergarten for the preceding three years, while she herself had gone to the Soviet Union the 
year before to visit the kindergarten and its teachers. Although these Soviets educators were 
virtual strangers to her, they had absorbed the costs of Angelika’s stay, and one even used his 
vacation time to act as her translator and to escort her and her group on a tour of Moscow. 
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Overall, Angelika enjoyed her visit immensely and took away many ideas that she hoped to 
implement in her own children's home.273    
In other instances, children were able to experience the Soviet Union for themselves. One 
educator at another children’s home in Bezirk Rostock recalled a trip during the summer 1971, 
when a group of Pioneers, FDJ and DSF members of the children’s home went to the Soviet 
Union. They had a great time in Moscow and then in Odessa, and made “deep” and “meaningful 
connections” with the people who showed them around, especially their volunteer tour guide who 
told them about the ordinary life of the Soviet people.  The group was able to spend time with 
groups of Komsomol (Soviet youth group) members from an enterprise in Odessa and even visit 
a Pioneer camp there too, where they made “friendship treaties” with a school near Odessa.274 In 
another submission to the contest, two FDJ members, children named Kerstin and Eva, described 
a similar scene in their class trip to the Ukraine. They had been pen pals with children in a small 
Ukrainian village and had been invited to go to their pioneer camp, where the FDJ learned about 
the area’s history and even laid a wreath at the town monument in honour of the 170 of 385 
people in the town who had lost their lives “fighting fascism.” In another moment of bonding, 
they then later sang the Weltjugendlied (an international communist youth song) in German and 
Russian with their hosts.275 
The usefulness in promoting such stories from children lay in their potential to train 
young minds to see the connection to the Soviets as something natural. The SED leadership 
clearly hoped the children would thus avoid the negative opinion held by the older generation. 
                                               
273 BArch DY 6/1028, Angelika Nicklisch. Submission for Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub” to the Abteilung 
Kultur, National Front der DDR (Berlin). March 5, 1975, p. 1-2. 
274 BArch DY 6/1028, Wolfgang Maier, Head of the Children’s Home “Juri Gagarin” in Schönberg, Submission 
“Wir waren Gäste im Lande Lenins” for Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub,” March 12, 1975, p. 1-2. 
275 BArch DY 6/1028, Kerstin Dudek and Eva Titze, Submission “Kranz niederlegung in Olchow Rog,” for 
Gemeinschaftsaktion “Drushba-Klub,” 1975.   
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Even so, as evidenced by the stories of trips to the Soviet Union and other interactions, it appears 
as though some mistrust amongst even some older East Germans could be overcome through 
trips to the Soviet Union. Yet, it was not only the splendor and historical meaning that existed in 
certain places that convinced East Germans of what an important guiding role the Soviet Union 
had played in their country; rather, some East German visitors were also positively influenced by 
simply experiencing Soviet culture and people for themselves. Despite the existence of such 
stories, it is likely that such reversals of opinion were not representative of the norm – for if the 
Soviets were indeed very popular amongst East Germans, why would the National Front keep 
reiterating this theme in its competitions year after year? The National Front must have suspected 
the message was not truly being absorbed. 
 
Recognition of deserving individuals  
 
In addition to accepting personal stories, the “Troika der Freundschaft” competition also 
encouraged people to submit stories about certain individuals worthy of recognition – those who 
had served their community well or contributed in a major way to the “build up” of the socialist 
state. Most individuals who were nominated belonged to a mass organization, such as the Society 
for German-Soviet Friendship (DSF) or the Democratic Women’s League (DFD), and usually 
played some kind of leadership role in it – even if it was on a small scale by advocating for their 
individual Hausgemeinschaft as part of their regional National Front committees.  
One such example came from a local National Front committee in the Bezirk of Karl-
Marx-Stadt, which nominated a National Front committee chairwoman named Erna from 
Annaberg-Bucholz, who had spent years mediating conflicts in eight residential districts, 
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successfully concluding an average of 30 conflicts per year.276 Another woman named Gerda 
Köbernick was nominated by the National Front’s Kreis Committee of Zwickau-Land. Gerda ran 
a kindergarten and belonged to her local National Front Kreis committee. She was also a 
representative for her very socially active and successful Hausgemeinschaft, which maintained a 
friendly relationship with another Hausgemeinschaft near Leningrad. For the 30th anniversary of 
the Liberation from Fascism, her Hausgemeinschaft decided to create its own competition, which 
they called the “Eternal friendship with the Soviet Union, strengthening the brotherhood with the 
land of Lenin – the heartbeat of our lives.”277 It was for this that Gerda won a trip to the Soviet 
Union so that she could finally meet her Soviet contacts. 
  
Figure 28. Gerda Köbernick showing off the gifts her Haugemeinschaft received from a Hausgemeinschaft in 
Leningrad (BArch DY 6/1028, National Front's Kreisausschuss Zwickau-Land nomination of Gerda Köbernick, 
March 27, 1975) 
Besides nominations for very active community members such as Gerda, there were many 
nominations of “worker veterans” – that is, people who had joined the KPD in its early years in 
the 1920s and often had endured imprisonment or other hardships at the hands of the Nazis. 
                                               
276 BArch DY 6/1028, National Front Stadtausschuß Annaberg-Buchholz, nomination of Erna Engelhardt, March 17, 
1975. 




These “veterans” continued to work for the socialist cause later on by joining mass organizations 
in the GDR and often played a community leadership role well into old age.  For example, the 
“Veteran Commission” of the SED Kreis leadership of Werdau nominated Ida, an early “worker 
veteran” in her 80s. Ida had joined the KPD in 1920 and from 1933-36 conducted illegal 
activities for it, was then arrested by the Gestapo in 1936 and imprisoned for two and a half 
years, then released but imprisoned again from 1944-45 in Ravensbrück until it was liberated.  
After getting her health back, Ida worked tirelessly to establish organizations in the young GDR. 
In 1975, Ida was still involved with the DSF and Soviet citizens in Werdau, despite her advanced 
age.278  In a similar story, a group from the People’s Solidarity (VS) organization nominated 
Josef, the chairperson of their Schönau chapter. Although Josef had been in a Soviet POW camp 
from 1945-49, he nevertheless was impressed with the Soviets, and he recalled that those running 
the camps did what they could to be kind to him, and even secretly gave part of their own meagre 
rations to the prisoners. After his release, he worked his way up in various state organizations, 
first working as a Russian translator and making Russian friends and then working in the 




“Troika der Freundschaft” was different than the anniversary competitions of other years: 
rather than focusing on results and creating a sense of competition amongst East Germans, this 
competition was much more about sharing individual stories and spreading the word to remind 
the populace of the past and present benefits of the GDR citizens’ connections to the Soviet 
people. By sharing recent travel stories and the testimonials of life-changing travel experiences, 
                                               
278 BArch DY 6/1028, Nomination of Ida Bueckler by the SED Kreisleitung Werdau's Veranenkommission A. 
Roessler, March 31, 1975. 
279 BArch DY 6/1028, Kreissekretariat Zwickau Land of National Front, Nomination of Josef Gralle, 1975. 
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from the National Front’s perspective, these stories had the potential to quell desires (to an 
extent, at least) for travelling to the West by “selling” the people on the East. By describing the 
Soviet Union in such glowing terms, these stories also emphasized the theses topics of the era 
that sought to underscore the superiority of socialism through the example of the extremely 
prosperous Soviet Union. They also reinforced the GDR leadership’s argument for a continued 
close connection with the Soviets.  
These testimonials also educated East Germans of the many ways in which the Soviets 
assisted in building up the GDR in those early years, by providing education and material 
assistance, and by giving the people hope for the future. Sharing these individual positive 
anecdotes was a way for the National Front to remind the old and instruct the young on how 
many Soviets had showed humanity towards their people, even though the Germans had been 
their enemies. What none of these personal anecdotes mention, however, is that these moments of 
kindness are simply evidence of general human decency in the midst of great suffering, rather 
than concrete proof of the innate kindness of one particular national group.  
Another glaring problem with the competition was that these stories of the early postwar 
years did not acknowledge the many people, especially women, who had suffered brutal 
treatment at the hands of the Soviets at the end of the war and during the occupation. These 
stories of the Soviets helping to rebuild completely sanitized the history of that era, conveniently 
reframing the dismantling of industry and harming of the region’s future potential as a time of 
“re-education” and training. Neither did these stories acknowledge the brutal rapes that many 
German women suffered at the hands of the Red Army, nor the general misery, economic 
hardship, and intensification of hunger that resulted from Soviet land reforms. The benefit of 
broadcasting these stories was instead aimed at making the Soviets more familiar to those East 
Germans who had not previously had contact with them: by hearing stories of their kindnesses 
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and friendliness, it would work to counteract any popular stories of brutality, lessen any lingering 
resentment, and encourage people (especially any youth) to join a Soviet organization like the 
DSF, or even apply for a trip to the Soviet Union and thus continue to facilitate the close ties 
between the GDR and the Soviet Union that the SED believed were essential to the GDR’s 
success.   
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Deepening the Soviet Connection: the 60th Anniversary of the October Revolution  
 
 
Figure 29: Advertisement template for an exhibition for the initiative “My best friend,” (BArch DY 6/1031) 
 
“Meinem besten Freund”/ “My best Friend” (1977) 
 
In 1977, five years after signing the Basic Treaty with West Germany and three years 
after having joined the UN, the GDR was still basking in the glow of the international recognition 
which its leadership had craved for so long. In honour of the 60th anniversary of the October 
Revolution, the National Front organized a cultural initiative for the population called “Meinem 
besten Freund” (“My best friend”). As was the case with 1975’s “Troika der Freundschaft,” due 
to the GDR’s recently acquired international recognition as a sovereign state, the National Front 
emphasizing the state’s legitimacy via their connection to the Soviet Union was not as vitally 
important as it had been, for example, during the 40th anniversary of the Revolution in 1957. 
Nevertheless, likely due to continued anti-Soviet feeling amongst the populace, the National 
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Front felt it was important for East Germans to continue participating in cultural competitions in 
honour of the Soviet Union, in the hopes that this general feeling would perhaps begin to abate 
and certainly not spread to the next generation.  
Although the Soviet regime had allowed some freedom during the Khrushchev thaw, by 
the Brezhnev years, the Soviet peoples’ initiative in cultural activities had changed a great deal, 
thereby making Soviet citizens “passive objects receiving and practicing whatever the cultural 
authorities offered.”280  While the people of the GDR were also participating in whatever 
commemorations the authorities prescribed, they were invigorated when they were able to 
participate on their terms, especially when not constricted by an overtly ideologically-focused 
anniversary competition. As we have seen, although in the late 1950s and early 1960s the 
National Front emphasized the importance of the lower levels’ total commitment to following the 
top’s instructions to the letter, by the end of the 1960s and even more so in the 1970s, Berlin 
became much more willing to allow the periphery room for maneuver when choosing and 
carrying out anniversary activities. Thus, as the following anniversary exhibition and competition 
will demonstrate, many Kreise, on their own initiative, simply told their residents they should 
start creating any items of their own choosing for the exhibition. This decision to be open to all 
manner of submissions, as opposed to only accepting items of a high artistic standard or ones that 
were visibly paying homage to the theses’ themes for that anniversary (as recommended by 
Berlin), resulted in a populace far more enthusiastic about the state-designed competition than 
usual, as well as an unusually high number of participants. 
 
                                               
280 Gleb Tsipursky, Socialist Fun:Youth, Consumption, and State-Sponsored Popular Culture in the Soviet Union, 




As shown in the above advertisement from the residential district of Wilhelmsruh (in the 
Berlin district of Pankow), in this competition, the National Front wanted East Germans to create 
a personal work of art for a Soviet “friend,” and then submit it to their local National Front 
committee to be put into an exhibition. The advertisement went on: 
We are calling on you to participate in the preparation of the ‘Exhibition of Friendship,’ 
which will demonstrate how strong the connection of the citizens of Wilhelmsruh to the 
Soviet Union is! This brotherly connection with the Land of Lenin is a crucial foundation 
for our past and future success.281 
 
                                               
281 BArch DY 6/ 1030, Advertisement “Bürger von Wilhelmsruh!” for “Meinem besten Freund,” by Ortsauschuß der 
Nationalen Front in Wilhelmsruh, Der Klubrat des Klubs der Nationalen Front, Die Wohnorganisation der 
Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft, Wilhelmsruh, 1977, p. 1-2. 
Figure 30: Advertisement from Wilhelmsruh for “Meinem besten Freund” (BArch DY 6/1031) 
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The National Front specifically targeted their advertisements to all residents and youth of the 
locality, asking all “who are active in folk art or who have chosen art as their profession” to make 
submissions to the contest.282 The objects could consist of handworks, photos, drawings, stories, 
poems, or even prose – all that mattered was that these objects above all demonstrate how the 
friendship between the German and Soviet peoples had grown over the years. The best self-made 
objects of each local exhibition (decided upon by juries made up of local National Front 
representatives), were to be forwarded to the regional, then district, and finally, the national 
exhibitions to held in Berlin for the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. There were prizes 
at every level: for example, the National Front in Wilhemsruh gave out five top prizes and twenty 
smaller ones.283  Following their display at the “Exhibition of Friendship” in Berlin, the objects 
were then to be presented as “gifts of friendship” to Soviet citizens. 
While this 1977 exhibition ultimately was a successful one with more objects created than 
the National Front could have imagined, organizing the exhibitions in the first place proved a 
struggle, especially for the top National Front organizers in Berlin. Unlike in the 1975 “Troika” 
competition, this was a much more complex competition that required considerable coordination 
among many levels of the National Front. As had been the case in the 1960s competitions, a 
major stumbling block to success was Berlin’s inability to exercise as much control and impose 
as much uniformity across the regions as it would have liked. Part of this was because Berlin did 
not immediately send out specific instructions to the regions on how to conduct their own local 
exhibitions, something which exacerbated the lack of uniformity. Coordination between 
organizations could also be poor, with organizations such as Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship (DSF) frequently writing Berlin asking for help in determining which other 
                                               
282 BArch DY 6/ 1030, Advertisement “Bürger von Wilhelmsruh!” p. 1-2.  
283 BArch DY 6/ 1030, Advertisement “Bürger von Wilhelmsruh!” p. 1-2. 
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organizations they could turn to for assistance with creating their own exhibitions.284 In other 
instances, some local National Front committees complained to Berlin of their difficulties in 
contacting workers’ enterprises (Betriebe), while other National Front committees protested that 
they lacked the money to put on the expected exhibitions, desperately requesting Berlin provide 
them with a source of funding.285 As a result of this multitude of concerning reports from the 
regions in the spring of 1977, the Berlin National Front decided to send out several 
representatives, including Inge Kießig and Kurt Pfister from the National Front’s Cultural 
Department, to personally visit different Kreise and Bezirke to investigate precisely how the 
lowest of levels were organizing their exhibitions.  
 
Figure 31: Example painting that was submitted for the exhibition (Neue Zeit, “Dem besten Freund: ein Zeichen der 
Verbundenheit,” May 7, 1977, p. 7). 
 
 In April, on a visit to the Bezirk of Karl-Marx-Stadt, Inge Kießig reported back to 
Berlin that while local officials thought the people in the Bezirk were excited about the initiative, 
the secretariat was nevertheless proceeding to create task forces to better manage their 
                                               
284 BArch DY 6/1030, author unknown, “Fragen, Probleme, Hinweise,” Report from Berlin, May 20, 1977, p. 1. 




exhibitions. In addition, Kießig noted that the Bezirk was still struggling to find the funds to rent 
the exhibit spaces they needed to put on the exhibition. Karl-Marx-Stadt officials also 
complained that they lacked a direct way to contact Berlin in order to clear up questions about 
which other mass organizations were involved in this initiative. On a positive note, Kießig saw 
that the Bezirk’s connection to their regional presses was very strong, which she thought boded 
well for their ability to spread the word about the initiative and the exhibitions. In May, in the 
locality of Schneeberg in Karl-Marx-Stadt, representatives had even invited the local editors of 
Aktuelle Camera (the GDR’s main television newscast) to report on the preparations of their 
residential exhibition.286  
 In July, Kießig visited the more successful Kreis Wernigerode in Bezirk Magdeburg. 
Overall, she thought the Wernigerode Kreis secretariat had made good efforts to reach a wide 
variety of people by popularizing the initiative through word of mouth, placards and posters, as 
well as at residential committee (Wohnbezirkausschuß) meetings. Wernigerode’s exhibition had 
taken place over ten days, between July 7 and 17, and showcased 230 objects (“gifts”): 180 of 
these were made by folk artists, and 50 by artists in collectives. While some residents designed 
their gifts with specific Soviet citizens in mind, others did not. Many artists were instead inspired 
by local Harz folklore to create stone figurines, bell-pulls, and cowbells. Kießig believed that 
these types of designs not only showed the great creativity of the locals, but also gave this 
exhibition a unique regional flavour. Kießig thought these items were so good they should be 
used as handmade souvenirs for the region in the future.287 Since Wernigerode’s large number of 
                                               
286 BArch DY 6/1030, Report from Inge Kießig to the Department of Culture in the National Front in Berlin, 
“Operativer Einsatz in Karl-Marx-Stadt /Stadt, Aue und Schneeberg für die Aktion Meinem Besten Freund,” April 7, 
1977, p. 1. 
287 BArch DY 6/1030, Report from Inge Kießig to the Department of Culture in the National Front in Berlin, 
“Bericht über die Kreisausstellung Meinem Besten Freund in Wernigerode,” July 15, 1977. 
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“gifts” outnumbered the number of Soviet citizens in the area, Wernigerode even offered to 
forward any extras to any neighbouring Kreise who may have not had enough for their own 
exhibitions. In the end, the National Front’s Wernigerode jury chose 30 gifts to be sent to the 
Bezirk exhibition in Magdeburg in September.288 
 Kießig also attended Magdeburg’s exhibition opening on September 9, 1977 at the 
Cultural Historical Association Museum of Magdeburg. On display here were the best gifts from 
the Kreis exhibitions, numbering 700 objects. Of these, the 30 “best” had already been chosen by 
the jury and were on display in their own room, ready to be sent on to Berlin’s national 
exhibition. While Kießig found the Bezirk exhibition to have been excellent overall, she thought 
the choice of the “30 best” to have been flawed: for her, these “gifts” neither represented much 
variety nor the breadth of cultural ability in the Bezirk. For example, the locally-inspired objects 
she had signalled out earlier –cowbells, figurines made of local spruce, stone men, and even a 
complicated model train made by a kindergarten in the region– were not among the chosen 
few.289  
 It is obvious that the objects the juries chose as the “best” in the Bezirk were the objects 
which were of a more overtly political nature. This becomes clear in Kurt Pfister’s reports, as he 
describes how many objects dutifully showcased the GDR-Soviet connection. For example, at the 
opening of Neubrandenburg’s Bezirk exhibition on September 15 at the House of the German-
Soviet Friendship Society (DSF), Pfister describes being particularly impressed at how certain 
objects deftly combined political content with aesthetic appeal. Even though the exhibition had 
265 diverse objects, displaying a wide breadth of talent, Pfister thought one of the best “objects” 
                                               
288 BArch DY 6/1030, Report from Inge Kießig to the Department of Culture in the National Front in Berlin, 
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was a large exhibit that took the form of a living room that contained a meter-high Russian 
nesting doll with 15 “sisters” (representing the 15 Union republics), a bust of Lenin, and portrait 
of Ernst Thälmann. Another object on display that impressed Pfister included a poster protesting 
American nuclear weapons.290 Meanwhile, in Potsdam’s Bezirk exhibition, out of the 110 objects 
on display, Pfister was likewise most fascinated with the Red Army Civil War Commander 
Vasily Chapayev-themed objects, mainly because he thought they represented the political 
meaning of this initiative so very well. 291   
 
The Perspective from the Regions: 
 
 As a result of the lack of initial coordination from Berlin, the individual Kreis and 
Bezirk exhibitions were quite varied. For example, Bezirk Leipzig decided to hold their exhibition 
during their sport festival (Turn-und-Sportfest) in order to encourage higher attendance numbers 
at their exhibitions since athletes and visitors were already visiting the city. Indeed, the only 
difficulty this presented was in finding an adequately-sized exhibition hall able to accommodate 
the extra attendees.292 Despite this creative way of increasing attendance numbers, however, 
Berlin still criticized Leipzig for failing to adequately promote the exhibition in the newspapers, 
as officials in the capital had only counted two advertisements in Leipzig as of May.293 
Meanwhile, in Bezirk Schwerin, most Kreis officials struggled a great deal with coordination and 
organization. Although Bezirk Secretary Smolni acknowledged that larger Kreise with larger 
populations did require greater preparation time for their exhibitions –especially if there were 
many different activities that needed to be organized– he was nonetheless very critical of the 
                                               
290 BArch DY 6/1030, report from Kurt Pfister to the Department of Culture in the National Front in Berlin, 
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management ability of the National Front Kreis officials on the whole. Smolni did at least 
acknowledge, however, that the Kreis secretariats themselves had had to deal with many 
incompetent smaller local committees that simply did not understand the task at hand and thus 
hampered the Kreis’s ability to achieve good results.294  
 In contrast, Kreis Rudolstadt (within Bezirk Gera) organized a massively popular 
exhibition, which included 16 local exhibitions that involved 39 different committees, 1050 
amateur artists, 120 folk artists, and 630 artists from societal organizations and institutes, with a 
grand total of 1800 people working on the exhibitions. In fact, the exhibitions were so popular in 
Rudolstadt that many people wanted to take part even though they had no particular artistic skill, 
resulting in many simply purchasing objects to be added to the exhibitions. In one instance, a 
Königsee resident even baked a huge cake to be put on display.295 Rudolstadt National Front 
Kreis secretariat Mühlmann found that the overall content of the objects on display at their local 
exhibitions not only featured the GDR-Soviet friendship quite prominently, but was also clearly 
connected to the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution.296 
 
Kreis Perleberg (Bezirk Schwerin) 
Despite the prevailing organizational struggles in Bezirk Schwerin, Kreis Perleberg was a 
good example of a Kreis that managed to overcome initial difficulties to succeed in putting on a 
great exhibition. As quality control checks297 undertaken by local officials indicated, the initiative 
was neither widely known nor popular at first. Part of the problem, the Schwerin Bezirk 
                                               
294 BArch DY 6/1031, Schwerin National Front Bezirksekretär Smolni to “Abteilung Information” at the Nationalrat 
der Nationalen Front der DDR, “Abschlussbericht zur Gemeinschaftsaktion ‘Meinem besten Freund,’” November 
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295 BArch DY 6/1030, report from Mühlmann, Kreissekretär Rudolstadt, July 1977, p. 1-2. 
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297 “Operativen Kontrollen.” It is unclear which organizing level undertook these quality control checks. They could 
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secretariat observed, was that even after receiving instructions from the Berlin National Front on 
how to begin organizing their exhibitions, many DSF, DFD, FDJ Kreis committees had wasted 
quite a bit of time waiting for further instructions from their own national DSF, DFD, and FDJ 
committees in Berlin.298  
Another difficulty was the grumbling the Perleberg Kreis secretariat heard from ordinary 
people. Although this was challenging for the organizers, from Kreis secretary Wedel’s 
perspective, he was consoled by the fact that these complaints at least did not constitute any 
completely “hostile” arguments about the exhibition.299 Residents had mainly complained that 
they lacked the raw materials required to make the objects and that it was also not clear what 
exactly they could submit to the exhibition. Some residential representatives even argued that 
their areas did not have any art collectives or people with the artistic talents necessary to put 
together an exhibition.300 Another common complaint was that the people did not have enough 
time to create quality work. One young professional artist couple commented that as artists they 
needed at least 18 months to merely conceptualize a good work of art, let alone plan and execute 
it. Thus, any exhibition that did not give them that kind of time “was not worth their 
contribution.”301 
The situation in Perleberg improved by June, especially after organizers changed tactics 
and decided to tell the public they would accept every gift presented to them, not just those of a 
certain artistic skill or made according to a specific theme. Secretary Wedel wrote that once this 
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had been made clear to the people, the Kreis received a flood of submissions.302 In addition, after 
a lot of effort, Wedel could also report that the secretariat had finally convinced the FDGB, DFD, 
DSF, and other mass organization committees to fall into line and assist with the exhibitions. The 
Kreis secretariat representatives had even convinced local mayors to help them spread the word 
about the initiative, which helped to further increase interest among residents.303 By August, the 
organizational difficulties had entirely disappeared, as the efforts of individuals and collectives 
together had resulted in a total of 1796 personal “gifts” being featured at Perleberg’s seven 
Wohnbezirk (residential) exhibitions. The most common types of gifts included textiles, wood 
and metalworks, paintings, as well as ceramics and leather items.304 The jury chose 146 of these 




In Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt, there was immense public interest in “Meinem besten Freund” 
in most Kreise, which was largely attributable to effective communication on the part of the 
Kreise. In April 1977, shortly after preparations began, the Bezirk secretariat of Karl-Marx-Stadt 
reported to Berlin that its Kreis secretariats had already commenced preparing the exhibitions, 
with 18 Kreise and their National Front mass organization counterparts (that is, members of the 
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DSF or DFD) even creating task forces to better coordinate the activities.306  Given that Kreis-
level directives would need to pass through many channels before the people at the residential or 
Hausgemeinschaft level would hear about the initiative, many of Karl-Marx-Stadt’s Kreise made 
the wise decision to use the regional press, Betrieb newspapers, and radio to inform ordinary 
citizens about plans for the initiative.307 For example, in Kreis Aue, 17 press articles about the 
initiative were published by April and the press in Freiberg obliged the Kreis’ orders and printed 
12 000 flyers.308 Many Kreis committees also informed the public of what was going on by 
holding advisory sessions with the Ort and Wohnbezirk (local and residential) committees, as 
well as with mayors of larger urban centres like Freiberg or Glauchau. In Kreis Werdau, the 
secretariat even made contact with the school council (Schulrat), while in Kreis Glauchau, the 
secretariat (with the help of the FDGB) connected with the directors of various Betriebe 
(enterprises). The Bezirk believed such methods constituted effective ways of informing the 
population about the exhibition and encouraging participation.  
The reason that Karl-Marx-Stadt’s Kreise needed to invest so much effort into 
communication was largely to make up for the Berlin National Front’s tardiness in 
communicating with them. Karl-Marx-Stadt pointed out that Berlin had sent out too few master 
versions of national advertisements too late to be useful. Even Berlin’s organizational 
suggestions arrived much too late. Without the relevant information from above, many local 
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organizations and institutes were thus hesitant to commence their preparations.309 While Berlin 
eventually did send out these advertisements, nowhere did it indicate which mass organizations 
were involved in this initiative, leaving local organizers unsure of which local-level organization 
committees they could reach out to for assistance. Local officials were also unsure of what types 
of objects they were to request the populace make for the exhibitions. In order to get around this 
and show the public what their options were, some Kreis members of the DFD (Democratic 
Women’s League) took it upon themselves to set up small demo exhibits on the main street in 
Karl-Marx-Stadt during the annual May Day festivities.310  
Once it finally became clear what was required, as in other areas of the country, people in 
Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt complained that they did not have enough time to create the kinds of 
“gifts” they wanted to submit to the exhibition. Some grumbled that it would have been far better 
to have run this competition during the winter months when there was less to do outside and 
more people could have taken part.311 Since professional artists also proved less interested in 
contributing because of the lack of time to produce high quality works, the Bezirk planned for the 
majority of objects to be created by semi-professional artists and folk artists already in art groups.   
Despite all of these organizational difficulties, after a concerted effort by the regional 
National Front committees with considerable organizational assistance from the regional 
committees of the Democratic Women’s League (DFD) and People’s Solidarity (VS), as well as 
the GDR Cultural Association (Kulturbund) and the Association of Gardeners, Settlers, and 
Animal Breeders (VKSK), by July 1977, Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt could report that the initiative 
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had finally found wide resonance with the population at large.312 The DFD and People’s 
Solidarity took on the task of helping the National Front with organizing most of the smaller 
exhibits and meetings, arranging 383 exhibits (185 urban, 200 in rural districts) with 400 urban 
and 337 rural committees involved in the planning (41.6% of all urban and 41.9% of all rural 
committees).313 In Kreis Aue, the trade union (FDGB) committees were the National Front 
committees’ best collaborators. Indeed, the trade union committees not only succeeded in 
winning over many workers’ collectives to participate, but their idea of linking the creation of 
objects for the exhibitions to already-occurring collective enterprise festivals (Betriebsfestspiele) 
proved very useful.314 
In the end, Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt could report that “Meinem besten Freund” had been a 
huge success overall, giving a large amount of credit to their regional press connections for 
having piqued the interest of a higher proportion of first-time participants. While 147 000 people 
attended Kreis exhibitions across the Bezirk, attendance varied widely by Kreis, with Karl-Marx-
Stadt/Land’s exhibition only receiving 650 visitors, while Zschopau’s exhibition had 6000 
attendees. Bezirk Secretary Oehme thought the best attendance could be found in areas where the 
exhibitions were put on as part of a Volksfest in the Wohngebieten. Indeed, when combined with 
Volksfest attendance figures, the Bezirk estimated that 450 000 people attended some variety of 
this initiative. Following the close of the exhibitions, the “gifts” not sent on to the Bezirk 
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exhibitions were given to Soviet people living in the region: some personally and some via 
“friendship delegations.”315 
The Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirk secretariat believed that this exhibition had allowed the talent 
of Bezirk residents to be put on full display and that it would be highly beneficial to repeat such 
an initiative for future anniversaries. After the initial organizational difficulties, the majority of 
the Kreis secretariats never expected such a positive response from the public and the great 
number of “gifts” presented to the exhibition.316 Oehme thought the exemplary Kreise in Karl-
Marx-Stadt included Aue, Plauen, Werdau, and Zschopau. The most successful Kreise in the 
Bezirk were Zschopau, which produced 2100 objects and Annaberg, which had 3000 objects for 
its exhibition. Kreis Zwickau-Stadt also produced 1000 objects, although two-thirds were 
produced by Betrieb (enterprise) collectives and DFD and People’s Solidarity residential 
organizations. 317 What made these Kreise so successful, Oehme speculated, was that they were 
areas in which people understood the “work” as a whole and where all mass organizations were 
working together.318 The Aue National Front Kreis secretariat, for example, was able to 
overcome the initial communication problems by utilizing their already-existent connections with 
their local Kreis committees and contacting them directly with their plans for organizing Kreis 
activities.319 With further help from the regional editors of the Freie Presse, the in-house 
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newspapers of certain collective enterprises (Betriebe), and airtime on a radio program, the Aue 
secretariat was able to effectively communicate their plans about the exhibitions for “Meinem 
besten Freund” to the public. In addition, many city and town mayors assisted with spreading the 
word about the initiative as well.320  
What the Bezirk learned overall from this initiative was that residents were generally very 
interested in these kinds of creative projects. Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt thought that by showcasing 
their best examples at the exhibitions, they could make initiatives of this type a permanent part of 
their day-to-day mass political work. In fact, in Aue, organizers had been taken aback at the 
“deep love” with which people of all ages crafted the objects they submitted, thereby displaying 
the great variety of talent in the Kreis. Organizers estimated some objects were even likely worth 
hundreds of Marks.321 The Aue organizers were extremely proud of their meaningful initiative, 
dutifully reporting to Berlin that behind every object submitted lay the requisite political support 
– even if they had no proof that this was actually the case.322 Oehme himself wrote that the huge 
interest in this project was due to the public’s backing of the underlying political message of 
showing the bond between Soviet and GDR citizens, and that designing more projects of this 
nature would bring this feeling of connectedness ever more to the surface going forward.323 
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Kreis Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land  
Despite the success of “Meinem besten Freund” in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt as a whole, 
not all Kreise were successful. For example, Kreis Auerbach only produced 600 “gifts” for its 
exhibition while Kreis Schwarzenberg only came up with 559, which from Bezirk Secretary 
Oehme’s perspective, was far fewer than they were capable of.324 However, it was the rural Kreis 
of Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land that represented one of the most difficult cases within the Bezirk. As 
was the case with other Kreise, this Kreis secretariat initially had difficulties communicating with 
other mass organizations. Unlike other Kreise however, Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land was not able to 
overcome this difficulty. As the Kreis secretariat lamented to Bezirk Secretary Oehme, the trade 
union (FDGB) and Cultural Association committees (Kulturbund) did not even bother appearing 
at any of the Kreis meetings despite repeated requests to do so, while the local FDBG committees 
treated the initiative as an exercise of simple gift-giving and nothing more.325 
However, Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land encountered further problems that contributed to its 
lacklustre results, resulting from its organizers’ entire approach to the exhibitions. Although the 
National Front in Berlin requested the objects submitted to be of high quality, Berlin wanted 
above all else to make the entire endeavour as pedagogically effective and inclusive as possible. 
As such, Berlin did not wish to deter anyone from submitting even the most homemade of kitsch 
to the local exhibitions. The Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land Kreis secretariat, though, did not feel the 
same way, and repeatedly complained about how unprofessional the submissions were: that these 
were more “hobby works” than representations of real artistry and not worthy of display. Upon 
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asking professional artists in the area to make submissions instead, they came up against real 
resistance and the professionals gave them a variety of excuses for their lack of participation. 
Some claimed their type of work was not well suited to an exhibition display (for example, the 
works of musicians and playwrights); another claimed illness; others protested that the time 
frame was too short; while still others argued that spring and summer was just too busy a time 
and that winter would better suited to an exhibition of this nature. One professional painter who 
did agree to make a submission would only offer print copies of previous works, citing time 
constraints on creating new original works.326 Thus, this insistence on “high-quality” submissions 
is likely one of the main reasons why submissions were so low in this Kreis. 
The Kreis secretariat of Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land ultimately advertised their exhibition as 
having been a “success,” though it did admit that its total of 609 visitors to the Kreis exhibition 
could have been higher.327 The secretariat also noted, however, that 15 local shop windows had 
featured partial exhibits – which the secretariat estimated could have been seen by up to 40% of 
the Kreis population (though these could hardly have compared to the full exhibitions the Kreis 
was supposed to organize).328 In the end, the Kreis jury chose 34 objects to be sent on to the 
Bezirk exhibition.329 A further complication was that once all the exhibitions were over, the Kreis 
secretariat found that instead of gifting their handmade objects to Soviet citizens (which was of 
course the entire purpose of the initiative), many participants requested the return of their “gifts”! 
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(perhaps because they were of such high quality?)330 Despite such issues, the Kreis secretariat 
stated that it had collaborated quite well with many collective enterprises by the end, including 
cultural houses, schools, as well as with the DSF.331 Nevertheless, the Bezirk was not fooled by 
the Kreis’s claims of success, for in the margins of the Kreis’s final report to the Bezirk, someone 
at the Bezirk secretariat placed a large question mark in the margin beside the word “success,” 
making clear how the Bezirk actually felt about this Kreis’s efforts.332  
 






Once the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution had passed, the Berlin National Front 
concluded that the “Meinem Besten Freund” initiative had been a resounding success, with 1.4 
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Figure 32: Photograph showing a selection of the gifts chosen for display in the Wohngebiet 
Weißensee, including wall hangings, knitted items and drawings. Contributed by local artists and 
members of enterprise collectives. (“Geschenke der Freundschaft aus Weißensee” Neues 




million people having attended 62 859 exhibits, which had approximately 300-450 presents per 
exhibit. In total, there were with 266 695 presents on offer from 23 138 people.333 Surprisingly, 
the visitor totals were not merely comprised of repeat visits from the people who made the 
objects, but rather, represented a large swathe of people from across the country. Berlin was 
entirely pleased with the results and thought these numbers demonstrated the achievement of the 
political-ideological aspect of this initiative and that the popularity of these exhibitions were a 
clear sign of the populace’s excitement and desire to show their dedication and connection to the 
Soviet Union. Whether this was truly the case or not cannot be determined. Certainly many of the 
objects did lack any overt political content. Nevertheless, the Berlin National Front chose to 
believe that creating gifts in this way provided East Germans with a new way of thinking about 
their relationship to the Soviet Union, thus allowing them to “reconstruct the ‘historic station’ of 
our brotherhood, display our political, economic, cultural and military connections, and portray 
political achievements of our countries and personal experiences.”334 After seeing these 
outstanding results, Berlin was satisfied that its ideological and pedagogical goals had been 
achieved. 
From a creative perspective, Berlin thought the artistic standard of many of these exhibits 
had been very high overall. The objects submitted encompassed all genres: from fine arts to 
applied arts, textiles and metalworks, carving and woodworks. 335 The only criticism Berlin 
ventured about the artistry was that in many different Kreise, ideology did not seem to feature as 
prominently as it could have in many of the works. Specifically, Berlin complained that “the 
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ideas of the October Revolution and our relations with the Soviet Union are often portrayed 
superficially and are not completely mastered artistically.”336 Nevertheless, the competition was 
an unparalleled success in that it had attracted people of all ages and of all social classes. The 
only real drawback in this regard from Berlin’s perspective was that professional artist groups 
had not been as interested in participating because of the lack of time that they would have had to 
prepare a good work of art. Many professionals ultimately felt their artistic abilities would have 
been wasted on this exhibition.337 Despite such concerns, the exhibition juries ensured that the 
kitsch was weeded out as the art and craftworks moved up through the levels of the competition. 
Those “gifts” that were judged as not adequate enough for the Bezirk and Kreis exhibitions were 
distributed directly to Soviet citizens on trips to the Soviet Union, sent to pen pals, given to 
members of the Soviet army stationed nearby, or even given out by delegations to partner cities 
like Pskow in the Soviet Union. 338  
The National Front was of the opinion that if the people had been given even more time to 
prepare for the exhibitions, they would have been able to create even better objects of even higher 
quality.339For National Front organizers learned that an artistic project like this had the potential 
to uncover the previously untapped potential of ordinary people. This discovery came as a 
surprise to many organizers, especially for Schwerin Bezirk Secretary Smolni, who commented 
that he was particularly surprised at the creativity in his area despite the absence of the traditional 
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hand-working traditions that were common in other regions.340 Smolni also felt that this 
competition had resonated so well amongst the people due to its accessible title of “Meinem 
besten Freund,” which had encouraged people to feel personally compelled to join in. 341 Indeed, 
many people actually crafted their “gifts” for specific Soviet people and requested that they 
personally participate in the objects’ distribution after the exhibition was over in order to 
maintain that level of personal contact. This does not mean that they were in any way convinced 
of the ideological underpinnings, however: these participants may have merely wanted to make a 
handcraft for friends who happened to be Soviets. Still, others claimed to have felt compelled to 
participate out of a sense of patriotism or loyalty to the Soviet Union (which was of course the 
real motivator the National Front hoped people would have in participating). As one woman from 
the town of Frohnau in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt told organizers: “although such a gift is by no 
means comparable to all that the Soviet Union has done for the liberation and rebuilding of our 
country, it is an expression of our most sincere thanks.”342 
One undeniable achievement of this initiative was that it helped further develop the 
connections between different mass organizations and committees. Many National Front 
committees, in particular, were excited about this initiative and held many talks discussing the 
underpinnings of this Aktion, which piqued the interest of many people, collectives, and clubs. 
Furthermore, by involving this large a number of people and committees, Berlin thought the end 
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341 BArch DY 6/ 1031, Schwerin National Front Bezirksekretär Smolni to Abteilung Information at the Nationalrat 
der Nationalen Front der DDR, “Abschlussbericht zur Gemeinschaftsaktion ‘Meinem besten Freund,’” November 
23, 1977, p. 2. 
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“Abschlußbericht zur Aktion ‘Meinem besten Freund’ im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt,” August 29, 1977, p. 1-2. 
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result could be seen as one of extending the reach and political effectiveness of the National 
Front committees in general.343 Thus, the conclusion to which the Berlin National Front came 
was that maintaining these connections would ensure a strong influence on the aesthetic training 
of the citizenry, especially if they organized similar initiatives in the future.344 Furthermore, the 
National Front saw a way capitalize on this huge public interest by creating more residential 
hobby groups to ensure ordinary people could contribute to larger creative projects in their spare 
time, without having to join one of the larger associations (which they had complained required 
great time commitments).345 It is likely that the benefit the National Front saw here was 
pedagogical: with even more people involved in producing cultural works, the National Front 
believed they stood a chance at maintaining their strong momentum in the lead up to the 30th 




 The high level of public interest and the high quality of the objects submitted for 
“Meinem besten Freund” in such a small space of time surprised everyone, organizers and the 
public alike.  As always, organizational skill varied by region and even within the Kreise 
themselves. Although Berlin was quick to blame the Kreise for any lackluster participation 
results, if certain organizations or individuals did not want to participate, the National Front in 
Berlin did not compel them to do so. As was the case in other competitions, the example of 
“Meinem besten Freund” in 1977 tells us that the National Front, while a great organizing force, 
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ultimately did not have as much control over its constituent mass organizations (such as the DSF, 
People’s Solidarity) as it desired. Indeed, communication between organizations was often spotty 
or even absent, and as a result, the lowest level organizing committees (often at the 
Hausgemeinschaft level), had no idea what they were supposed to be organizing or to which 
higher up committees they should be reporting. 
 Something that was within the Kreis secretariats’ purview to control, however, were 
their responses to difficult situations and many showed impressive initiative. For example, Kreis 
Aue in Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt began directly communicating with the local mass organization 
committees as soon as it became clear the national organizational committees had left them in the 
dark. In another stroke of ingenuity, Kreis Perleberg discovered that by lowering its expectations 
and telling the populace it would accept any objects, it effectively changed the perception of the 
exhibition from one meant for professional artists into an exhibition accessible to all and spurred 
an outpouring of submissions. This demonstrates the mistake that some Kreise like Karl-Marx-
Stadt/Land made in not recognizing the advantage in changing their frame of reference, as they 
continued to insist on receiving semi- or professionally-made works. However kitschy or poorly-
made some of the initial submissions might have been, Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land should have 
realized that the Kreis juries were in place for this very reason: to ensure the poorest quality were 
not chosen to be forwarded on to represent the Kreis at the regional, state or national exhibitions, 
but also to ensure that everyone felt welcome to participate. Ultimately, decisions such as these 
show how vital the Kreis organizational committees were to the overall success of these 
competitions: they were a powerful enough organizing body that they often had direct contact 
with the Berlin National Front and Department of Culture, yet a small enough body that they still 
had enough direct oversight of the organizational efforts in the residential areas in order to affect 
the outcome of a competition.  
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Celebrating GDR Socialism: the 30th Anniversary of the GDR  
 
 
Figure 33. Badge with the 30th Anniversary of the GDR Logo, “Du, unsere Republik,” “You, Our Republic” (BArch 
DY 6 /1039) 
 
“Du, Unsere Republik” “You, Our Republic (1979) 
 
In May 1978, a mere six months after the end of the celebrations in honour of the 60th 
anniversary of the October Revolution, National Front Vice-President Walter Kirchhoff began 
laying the groundwork for the next large anniversary in October 1979, the 30th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the GDR. Kirchhoff wrote to the representatives of various National Front 
organizations such as the FDGB (the trade union), the DFD (Democratic Women’s League), SED 
Central Committee (ZK)’s Culture Department, the Verband Bildender Künstler (Association of 
Visual Artists) as well as the secretary of the Free German Youth (FDJ)’s central committee, 
Egon Krenz, asking them to meet and help organize this new Gemeinschaftsaktion. In his letter, 
Kirchhoff referenced the role each mass organization had played in the ultimate success of 
“Meinem besten Freund,” and asked that they participate again with a new initiative in the same 
vein, called “Du, unsere Republik,” “You, Our Republic.” This would be considered part of the 
economic plan for the year, falling under the general initiative umbrella of the “Mach mit!” (Join 
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in!) initiatives that asked people to donate time to building and creating beautification projects in 
their residential areas.346  
The reason that the “Mach mit!” initiatives were necessary was due to the economic 
climate of the time: by now the GDR’s “golden years” were over and the state was massively in 
debt to the West. This became worse in the late 1970s, in part due to international events such as 
the world oil crises, but also because of the SED’s continued refusal to reform its ways and its 
strict adherence to its planned economy. Contributing to the growing crisis were Honecker’s 
generous social policies, through which the state subsidized everything from public transport, to 
housing, and even simple household items. Due to this focus on the present, there was little 
money left over to invest in infrastructure and the upkeep of cities and towns.347 As a result, the 
National Front, framing it as an exercise in showing one’s pride in their socialist state, designed 
“Du, unsere Republik” in a bid to ensure towns and cities kept up appearances and decorated over 
the more fundamental problems, despite crumbling infrastructure. 
The “Mach mit!” initiatives also served as evidence of identity creation. Having first been 
organized in 1968, at the same time as the new GDR constitution, Palmowski argues that the 
initiatives could be described as a training ground or “school” (as Ulbricht called it) that would 
demonstrate “socialist democracy in action” which would, in turn, help underscore the existence 
of the “new socialist citizens” in the new socialist nation. Palmowski writes that, “Join in! thus 
enabled a new quality of citizenship to emerge, which in turn led to a deeper love of Heimat and 
the socialist fatherland.”348 In this sense then, participating in “Mach mit!” also allowed GDR 
citizens to develop feelings of responsibility “for society as a whole,” which of course a direct 
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attack on the “unhealthy individualism” of the capitalist West.349 For, as Palmowski concludes, 
the SED wanted East Germans to “ensure that individual commitment to the socialist Heimat 
went beyond the public transcript and was appropriated in behaviour, thought, and attitude.”350   
The appeal for public participation in “Du, unsere Republik,” in July 1978 asked East 
Germans to come together to creatively decorate social institutions such as veterans’ clubs, youth 
rooms, health clinics, kindergartens, house clubs, restaurants and small galleries, as well as 
recreational areas such as green spaces in residential areas, parks, sport fields and playgrounds. 
The appeal also asked visual artists, landscape designers, architects, artisans, and designers to 
play a leading advisory role in bringing these projects together. The reward for East Germans 
who helped with this initiative, in addition to “brightening” up their socialist state as a whole, 
would be the receipt of honorary distinctions at the competition’s closing ceremonies in Berlin on 
October 6, 1979.351 
The reason the state highlighted the possibility of a reward for participating in the 
competition was due to the complicated issue of finding skilled volunteers for the projects. 
Although, as Molly Johnson points out, “the state appealed to its citizens to inspire their 
participation, often downplaying socialist ideology and relying instead on familiar appeals to 
civic and historical pride, material desire, and individual and group psychology. ”352 However, 
this did not always work out because it was difficult to find materials, tools, and volunteers. For 
example, collectives did not want to share their already overused equipment, while skilled 
                                               
349 Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation, 151. 
350 Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation, 152. 
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tradesmen did not want to volunteer their time because they were already overworked and 
underpaid, while those workers in cooperatives wanted to be paid for their time.353 Oftentimes, 
volunteers were expected to donate their own materials as well or try to raise money to buy the 
materials.354 For reasons such as these, Palmowski writes that in early years of the beautification 
campaigns in the late 1960s, there was more focus on cleaning projects because it was cheaper 
than finding construction materials and would cause less shortages elsewhere in the economic 
plan. By the 1970s, while the competitions did shift to more expensive construction projects, the 
state was not always pleased as many people wanted to create spaces like swimming pools, which 
were expensive to maintain.355  In the end, both Johnson and Palmowski conclude that 
volunteering for these building projects “reinforced pre-existing communal, local and regional 
ties” 356 which resulted in “heightened local pride … rather than the greater loyalty to socialism 
that the state desired.”357 
One reason Walter Kirchhoff began the planning for this Aktion so far ahead of time was 
in response to the common criticism that professional artists had had of the “Meinem besten 
Freund” initiative of 1977: that in order for them to produce high-quality objects that met their 
professional standards, they needed, in some cases, up to eighteen months to prepare. 
Accordingly, the 1977 Aktion’s one-month preparation timeline had proven itself better suited to 
amateur artists. The National Front repeatedly reminded their Bezirk and Kreis level committees 
this time around that, “Du, unsere Republik,” was to be about emphasizing quality over quantity. 
In order to create projects to this standard, the Kreise were thus to begin planning and organizing 
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throughout the summer and fall of 1977, a full year before the GDR’s 30th anniversary. Kirchhoff 
and others at the National Front had clearly read and absorbed the lower level committees’ 
critiques of the previous anniversary.  
Despite the long lead time, the National Front in Berlin was determined to keep up 
general interest throughout the entire year and a half of planning and eventual execution. As with 
the 1977 initiative, in order to ensure regional committees were preparing adequately, the Berlin 
National Front continuously sent out high-level representatives to observe their progress. After 
assessing the efforts in all of the Bezirke, Kurt Pfister of the Cultural Department concluded in 
September, 1979 that all of them had indeed forwarded the appeal from Kirchhoff to the relevant 
lower-level organizations. In addition, Pfister found that most Kreise had created task forces to 
help their secretariats with organizing the projects and sharing responsibilities. In the case of the 
Bezirke of Magdeburg, Halle and Rostock, they had organized this all at the Bezirk level.358 
As had been the case in previous initiatives, the responsibility for carrying out “Du, 
unsere Republik,” lay with the Kreis secretariats of the National Front and their associated 
Departments of Culture. Pfister found the working relationships between Kreis secretariats and 
their Cultural Departments to be varied, but overall good. He commented that these organizations 
had had years of experience working together in the past: for example, they collaborated at a 
knowledge and skills exchange in 1975 and had also worked together on “Meinem besten 
Freund” in 1977.359 Overall, Pfister was very impressed with the efforts made by all of the 
partners to reach out to artist collectives, individuals, professional artists, and architects, 
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believing this would mark the beginning of new working relationships that could be used to 
improve cultural life in their socialist home.360 
Pfister did observe some potential problems in the regions, however, such as in as the 
Stadtbezirk Berlin-Mitte and in the Kreis Madgeburg Süd/Ost, where the secretariats had 
attempted to shift all of their work onto the Departments of Culture (and were later ordered by 
their superiors in the National Front to end this).361 Pfister also noted that some Kreise (like 
Zerbst and Magdeburg-North) were trying to take shortcuts by simply repeating “Meinem besten 
Freund,” while other Kreise misunderstood the initiative and only sought the input of 
professional artists and not any other professionals. However, he pointed out that most Kreise 
understood that from the Berlin National Front’s perspective, their main role, in addition to 
formulating themes and acting in a leadership role, was to recruit people to produce highly 
creative and excellent quality work. As underscored before, Pfister told the Kreise that for the 
National Front, achieving quality was far more important than quantity.362 
While the types of projects that the National Front suggested varied, the themes on which 
many art installations were based were not. The themes were very patriotic, including titles such 
as “our socialist homeland,” the “anti-fascist resistance,” “German-Soviet Friendship,” 
“happiness and security of women and their families in socialism,” “youth and leisure,” “anti-
imperialist solidarity,” and “space flights of the GDR and the Soviet Union.”363 The National 
Front wrote that the final products were expected to prove “how our homeland is continually 
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becoming more beautiful through our ‘mass cultural work.’”364 Projects such as these, the 
National Front continued, demonstrated East Germans’ “optimistic outlook on life” and 
willingness to take part in social activities.  
While most of the projects amounted to smaller decorating projects, the Kreis of 
Waren/Müritz in the Bezirk of Neubrandenburg undertook a large expansion of an animal park 
belonging to the Müritz-Museum, including reorganizing its layout and adding more native 
animals. Given that the museum was an important one in the area, acting as a major source of 
knowledge about nature conservation and numbering 100 000 visitors a year, the project was a 
massive undertaking that required collaboration with Rostock’s animal park. Since the finished 
park was to be a peaceful relaxation spot for the residents of the city, the organizers discussed all 
aspects of the expansion beforehand with the locals, including the proposed creation of an 
exhibition hall and an aquarium for native fish species.365  
Smaller, more typical projects of “Du, unsere Republik” included the creation of a small 
gallery in Seelow (in Bezirk Frankfurt) with an accompanying exhibition that showcased the 
everyday life of the people in the Kreis. In the youth club house in Altenburg, club rooms, 
entrance ways, and halls were decorated with photos taken by the Kulturbund, as well as with 
ceramic works created for the occasion by a professional studio.366 In Friedrichshain in Berlin, 
groups of schoolchildren led by professional artists made paintings on the themes of plants and 
animals for the hallways and stairways of two secondary schools, while also creating glass 
drawings to decorate the windows of another school.  In Berlin-Treptow, workers from a 
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collective created metalworks with motifs from the life of communist hero Herta Geffke and 
presented it to a secondary school called “Herta Geffke” in Berlin-Treptow.367 In Schwerin, 
workers’ collectives of ceramic, enamel and textile workers decorated a pub for locals.368 At an 
Inn in Jessen in Bezirk Cottbus, a ceramics and engineering technical school, under the direction 
of a professional artist, decorated a wall space of 30m2 with motifs from the surrounding 
countryside. This last project was one an entire community participated in, with almost everyone 
in the area also helping to decorate the hall.369 
Although project lengths often varied, dependent upon the size of the undertaking and 
availability of materials and labour, a good example of an average timeline comes from Kreis 
Wolmirstedt in Bezirk Magdeburg. In this Kreis, two different projects involved creating a 
decorative wall installation for two different kindergarten and daycare centres, to be completed 
between the beginning of June and mid-September, with a budget of 3000 Marks for the first and 
1500 Marks for the second. In another example, a youth club received a decorative wall 
installation at a cost of 1000 Marks, displayed from mid-August to the end of October 1979.370 
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The National Front reported “Du, unsere Republik” as having been a resounding success. 
They believed that not only had this initiative deepened political convictions, but also made great 
strides towards the “beautifying of their socialist Heimat,” leaving people feeling more “at ease” 
in their residential areas.371 “In all Kreisen,” the National Front wrote in their final report, 
we observed a tendency to create complex projects. A project was considered completed 
only once its surroundings became a picture of beauty, order and cleanliness. Many 
citizens have now become involved. The pride in what they have achieved has grown and 
resulted in a desire to actively continue such work in their residential areas.372 
 
The National Front noted that 28 538 people took part in the initiative, of which 527 were 
professional artists, while 15 782 were amateurs. In total, people took part in 2245 projects at 493 
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Figure 34. Example from Neubrandenburg: showcasing a colourful street in Neubrandenburg that was 
now only for pedestrians. These houses from the 1950s were renovated, with the green space landscaped 
with flowers.  (BArch DY 6/1039. Lothar Gerecke, “Volkskunst macht die Heimat schöner,” Neues 




cultural institutions, 168 youth clubs, 395 kindergartens, 339 health sector buildings, 232 
educational buildings, 73 memorial sites, 128 leisure and sporting areas, 128 commercial 
enterprises such as 95 restaurants/pubs, and 261 places in the “Wohnumwelt” or home 
environment.373 People who donated their time were of different ages and working backgrounds 
and the National Front believed one of the major outcomes of this initiative was ordinary people 
developing new friendships – including contacts with artists – which they hoped would further 
encourage cultural life in residential areas.374 
Despite this overall success, experiences varied regionally. For example, Berlin received 
much assistance from collective clubhouses and culture houses, who, in many cases, were able to 
draw on their own organizations’ funds to help further the projects. They had even organized a 
knowledge/experience exchange between several groups in November 1978 so that they could 
trade skills and experiences to help better organize this particular initiative.375  Berlin was also 
able to maintain effective contact with the press, with all of the Berlin daily newspapers dutifully 
reporting on the projects to their readership.376 For its part, Bezirk Cottbus could also report good 
communication between the Bezirk and its Kreis secretariats at meetings, as well as good support 
from members of Cultural Departments of the Bezirk, the Society for German-Soviet Friendship 
(DSF), the Democratic Women’s League (DFD), and the Association of Visual Artists 
(Bildenden Künstler) even though other partner National Front organizations in Cottbus showed 
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little to no interest at all.377 Meanwhile, the Bezirk of Halle secretariat attributed the successes in 
their Kreise to the Kreis secretariat and Cultural Department’s strict control over their projects, 
especially in communications between different organizations. Uniquely, Halle organized task 
forces at both the Kreis and Bezirk levels, which included members of most National Front mass 
organizations.378  
In the case of Bezirk Neubrandenburg, the secretariat attributed their success to a large 
group of people having been focused on “achieving the political goals” of the initiative, given 
that many Neubrandenburg Kreise had arranged their projects as part of the larger “Mach mit!” 
(“Join In!”) initiative. 379 In the entire Bezirk, 2015 people had worked on 208 projects, which 
was 140 projects more than they had originally planned. Neubrandenburg reported its best results 
had been achieved in Kreise where the secretariat understood the need to address their appeals to 
a wide section of population, in particular, targeting those who were part of cultural groups such 
as the Democratic Women’s League (DFD) or educational groups. For example, the members of 
the Democratic Women’s League (DFD) consistently supported the secretariat’s activities and 
would often work on group projects in kindergartens.380 In direct contrast to Cottbus’s secretariat, 
which thought they would have been more successful if they had had more professional artist 
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groups involved, Neubrandenburg’s view was that they were ultimately more successful because 
they did not ask professional artists and groups to work on this initiative. 381   
While some of Neubrandenburg’s Kreise like Neustrelitz and Strasburg had difficulties 
getting started on their projects, shifting the majority of their planning and organizational work 
into 1979, a more serious problem occurred when other Kreise completely misunderstood their 
mandate. Some learned nothing from 1977’s initiative and decided the project was something in 
which only groups of very talented artists could participate. As a result, some areas did not even 
bother with the initiatives because they assumed that “we do not have those kinds of [artistic] 
people here.”382 These kinds of assumptions led to places like Kreis Ückermünde organizing only 
one project, or Kreis Templin organizing only three projects. The reason for such dismal results 
in these cases was because it was mostly the Kreis committees and their representatives who did 
the groundwork, so any misunderstanding at this crucial level would lead to complete failure, as 
local committees rarely took on these organizing responsibilities.383 
The Kreise had a better chance of success if all the societal organizations were working 
together right from the beginning and took on their own responsibilities.  Specifically, one area of 
Neubrandenburg that understood the importance of working together was Kreis Röbel, the 
smallest Kreis in the GDR. Not only did the Cultural Department of the Kreis and secretariat 
work well together, but they also created a task force that included the two professional artists of 
the Kreis, a painter named Schinko and a stonemason named Wagner. This small Kreis ended up 
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Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR, Sektor Information. September 17, 1979, p. 1-2. 
382 BArch DY 6/1039, Neubrandenburg National Front Bezirk Secretariat member Hoppenrath, report to Nationalrat 
der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, “Information zur Aktion ‘Du, unsere Republik,’” September 14, 
1979, p. 1-2. 
383 BArch DY 6/1039, Neubrandenburg National Front Bezirk Secretariat member Hoppenrath, report to Nationalrat 
der Nationalen Front der DDR, Abteilung Kultur, “Information zur Aktion ‘Du, unsere Republik,’” September 14, 
1979, p. 1-2. 
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creating four projects that included arranging a memorial area for the “victims of fascism,” 
putting up displays in the youth clubs, and refitting a promenade.384 
Meanwhile, the Bezirk of Karl-Marx-Stadt appeared to have absorbed many lessons from 
their experiences in “Meinem besten Freund,” including the importance of the Bezirke providing 
clear guidance to the Kreise. There was a difference in the quality of the work in the various 
Kreise, however, which was evident not only in the choice of projects and way they carried them 
out, but also in the variety of social forces that participated. Some were rather large projects: for 
example, in Tannenberg, (Kreis Annaberg) one project consisted of variety of groups helping to 
create free-standing plastic sculptures in a park.385 Other Kreise struggled with getting their 
projects started: for example, while Kreise like Aue, Flöha and Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land had been 
able to quickly decide on their project plans, including which artist groups would help, others like 
Marienberg delayed choosing their projects, and some others, like Oelsnitz, were slow to connect 
with collectives and artists.386 In other Kreise such as Werdau and Plauen, where the secretariats 
were very slow to make concrete partnerships and plans, Cultural Department member Inge 
Kießig, who was evaluating progress on the projects from Berlin, recommended that a 
representative be sent out from the Berlin National Front to personally visit the Kreis secretariats 
and help move plans forward.387   
                                               
384 BArch DY 6/1039, Inge Kießig, Abteilung Kultur, “Operativer Einsatz im Bezirk Neubrandenburg am 
21.09.1978” September 25, 1978, p. 3-4. 
385 BArch DY 6/1039, National Front Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirksekretär Georg Oehme, “Kurzinformation zur 
Entwicklung der ‘Volkskunstinitiative IX. Parteitag’ unter dem Motto ‘Du, unsere Republik’ zur künstlerischen 
Ausgestaltung von ‘Mach-mit!’ Objekten zu Ehren des 30. Jahrestages der Gründung unserer Republik,” November 
20, 1978, p. 4. 
386 BArch DY 6/1039, National Front Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirksekretär Georg Oehme, “Kurzinformation zur 
Entwicklung der ‘Volkskunstinitiative IX. Parteitag’ unter dem Motto ‘Du, unsere Republik’ zur künstlerischen 
Ausgestaltung von ‘Mach-mit!’ Objekten zu Ehren des 30. Jahrestages der Gründung unserer Republik,” November 
20, 1978, p. 2-3. 
387 BArch DY 6/1039, Inge Kießig, Abteilung Kultur, “Operativer Einsatz im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt am 
18./19.10.1978,” October 23, 1978, p. 8-9. 
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Kießig herself made visits to various Kreise in order to provide the National Front in 
Berlin with an insider’s view as to the reasons for successes and failures in the different regions. 
On a visit to Kreis Flöha, which, in her opinion had shown great initiative with their organizing 
and communication abilities, Kreis committee member Jankowski told Kießig that not only had 
they organized task forces on the Kreis secretariat level, but they had also created additional 
smaller task forces representing the heads of art collectives and the mayors of the towns, who 
then chose and organized the projects. Representatives of organizations like the Kreis trade union 
(FDGB) and cultural department, as well as the area newspaper, the Freie Presse, were also 
invited to the most important meetings of the task forces.388 In another Kreis, Marga Zais, Kreis 
secretary of Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land, reported that while her secretariat had created a task force to 
carry out the initiative and arranged many talks with artists and other organizational 
representatives to spread the word, this Kreis still faced many challenges. Firstly, she felt that the 
creative potential of the Kreis was largely located in the urban areas, and secondly, she found it 
difficult to find any money to fund these projects.  In the end, Karl-Marx-Stadt/Land’s task forces 
did finally settle on a variety of projects, including designing a fountain and wall decorations for 
a retirement home, designing a mosaic for an entrance to a school extension, creating another 
sculptured fountain, setting up a memorial, designing scarves for a youth festival, commissioning 
paintings of veterans for a clubhouse, and commissioning a playwright to write a play about the 
social initiatives undertaken in their Kreis over the past 30 years.389  
Out of all the Bezirke in the GDR, Gera appears to have struggled the most with “Du, 
unsere Republik,” likely because it failed to comprehend what Berlin’s goals for this initiative 
                                               
388 BArch DY 6/1039, Inge Kießig, Abteilung Kultur, “Operativer Einsatz im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt am 
18./19.10.1978,” October 23, 1978, p. 2-3. 
389 BArch DY 6/1039, Inge Kießig, Abteilung Kultur, “Operativer Einsatz im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt am 
18./19.10.1978,” October 23, 1978, p. 7-8. 
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were. Gera’s secretariat criticized Berlin for expecting the Bezirke to organize such a large 
initiative (especially in an ‘election year’), which simply overwhelmed the secretariat. While the 
Gera Bezirk secretariat had informed all of the social organizations’ representatives about the 
initiative, it does not appear to have resonated very well. Sharing responsibilities for organizing 
some of the projects just led to uneven results, especially in comparison to the way in which 
“Meinem besten Freund” had been organized previously.390 Several organizations in some of 
Gera’s Kreise did not carry out their responsibilities at all, while in other Kreise it was the 
Association of Gardeners, Settlers, and Animal Breeders (VKSK) and the Society for German-
Soviet Friendship (DSF) that did much of the organizing, while in still other Kreise, the work was 
carried by the Free German Youth (FDJ) or the FDGB (trade union).391 Success was largely 
dependent on how many professional and amateur artists were available in a Kreis, but many 
Kreise suffered from a lack of materials, such as, for example, coloured glass. Gera’s secretariat 
thought their best performing Kreis was Jena-Stadt, which completed a mere 14 projects.392 
Although Bezirk Gera had registered 154 projects, many were not finished in time for the 30th 
anniversary in October 1979.393 For its part, the Berlin secretariat attributed the lacklustre results 
to Gera “misunderstanding” the layout of the initiative and having unrealistic expectations of the 
projects (a fact which had caused other Kreise to fail in 1977 but which they had learned from by 
1979).394 
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The National Front concluded from the results of “Du, unsere Republik,” that East 
Germans desired more competitions to do with art and culture. That the originally planned 1400 
projects were exceeded by 800 to achieve a total of 2200 projects demonstrated for the National 
Front that not only was there was a need and desire for art and cultural projects, but that the 
regional National Front committees had succeeded in their political goal of keeping up interest in 
the projects over the course of the year. This also proved, the Berlin National Front was 
convinced, that its change in strategy from 1977, where they failed to provide adequate 
preparation time, had had real results. Despite this overall success, however, there were still 
differences in the quality, scope, and participation in the projects across the country. In some 
Kreise and Bezirke, the individuals and collectives working on the projects received very little 
help (and in some cases, none at all) from their sister regional National Front social organizations 
(like the DSF). In other Kreise, collaboration between the Kreis secretariats and the Kreis 
Cultural Departments could be strained at times. In many of these cases, Berlin had to get 
involved to mediate between the organizations.395 At the same time, the national press in Berlin 
did not always have the best communication strategy with the Kreise, for secretariats often did 
not provide Berlin with sufficient information to publish stories in the national papers. The result 
was that Berlin often had to write back many times asking for more details.396  
Other struggles facing the majority of Kreis secretariats included shortages in building 
and decorating materials like brushes, textiles, or colours which could result in delays to the 
                                               
395 BArch DY 6/1039, Abteilung Kultur, “Abschlußeinschätzung der Aktion ‘Du, unsere Republik’ zur 
künstlerischen Gestaltung gesellschaftlicher Einrichtungen,” October 26, 1979, p. 7-8.  
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projects. As in other initiatives, another major challenge for organizers was encouraging public 
participation. The Bezirk secretariat of Neubrandenburg cynically suspected, for example, that in 
the case of various park projects run by the VKSK, people were less motivated by the political 
meaning underpinning the projects (as the National Front hoped) than they were by the 
possibility of their park being awarded the title “state recognized leisure area.”397 This self-
interest was also evident in Bezirk Leipzig, which reported that the residents of the Kreise were 
most willing to participate in the competitions if the chosen projects led to better living and 
working conditions, especially the improvement and beautification of their immediate 
surroundings.398   
Despite these challenges, however, the National Front remained convinced that 
collaborative work was an important factor in the overall success of the initiative. Going forward, 
the National Front hoped to continue with these kinds of beautification projects, especially for the 
35th anniversary of the Liberation from Fascism in 1980. Indeed, Berlin wanted these and related 
projects such as “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden -- mach mit!” to continue as ongoing 
activities. Berlin thought that, by doing this, the regional National Front committees could 
encourage even more people to participate, especially if they began regularly organizing skills 
and knowledge exchanges. In order to keep up interest in volunteering, Berlin concluded, all 
organizations would need to maintain their close contacts with each other, especially those 
associated with amateur and professional artists’ organizations.399 Most important of all, 
however, the heavily-indebted state desperately needed these kind of initiatives to continue in 
                                               
397 BArch DY 6/1039, Neubrandenburg National Front Bezirk Secretariat member Hoppenrath, report to Nationalrat 
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order to keep up appearances domestically and internationally, for the state simply could not 











In 1979, in the aftermath of the successful 30th Anniversary of the GDR initiative “Du, 
unsere Republik,” the National Front decided that the “Join in!” (“Mach mit!”) initiatives, first 
begun in 1969, would continue indefinitely. The reason for this was due to a housing shortage 
that had become “a most pressing social problem.”400 Given the increasingly bad economic 
situation, it was helpful to the state both economically and pedagogically if East Germans 
donated their own time to fixing up their residential areas. It was economically beneficial because 
the state would not have to raise funds it did not have for these improvement projects. It was also 
pedagogically relevant, the state believed, for people to donate time to a project from which they, 
their families, and neighbours could benefit, and in which they could feel pride and ownership. 
The popularity of local activities over more high-culture ones (dedicated to showing the Soviet-
                                               
400 Sigtraut Finzelberg, “Ein Wohnungsbauprogramm von historischer Dimension wird in der DDR erfüllt,” Berliner 
Zeitung, September 9, 1989, p. 11. 
Figure 35. Caption: “Our cleared-up garden: previously this was just a backyard, but now it is a nice shadowy place to 





East German bond, for example) was something which the National Front had come to expect. In 
addition, local activities had particular advantages over larger ones, for as Eli Rubin points out, 
Hausgemeinschaft-level activities, especially the “Mach mit!” competitions, helped “create a 
very real sense of community and esprit d’corps in most of the [apartment] buildings.”401 In his 
study of one housing development on the outskirts of Berlin, Rubin found that many residents of 
the Hausgemeinschaft had been very interested in their building’s communal activities, though a 
greater number of people were interested in helping prepare for celebrations than were in helping 
with activities that involved manual labour.402 Rubin notes that while one reason for this interest 
was fear of the Stasi, which was well-connected to many local National Front organizations, 
another major reason residents participated was due to “a certain amount of social pressure” from 
their neighbours.403  
This social pressure amongst neighbours could also be found in larger residential districts. 
During one beautification campaign in Magdeburg in 1964, a group of residents from Wohnbezirk 
138 angrily complained to their local National Front representative that while “almost every day, 
particularly on Saturday evenings and Sundays, one can observe hardworking people trying to 
realize these beautification projects,” their group did not see many leading local functionaries 
doing their part in the projects. This group of locals protested that even though the officials often 
possessed the nicest homes, they often left their yards in a complete state of disrepair, which in 
turn affected the aesthetic appeal of the whole neighbourhood:  
If you look at the surroundings of these houses, you might get the impression that these 
people have been struck with blindness. They see – or they do not want to see – how hard 
                                               
401 Rubin, Amnesiopolis, 111-12. Rubin goes so far as to describe the buildings as representing “a kind of 
Foucauldian microphysics of power or ‘governmentality,’ in which the National Front (or SED or Stasi, for that 
matter) needed not be visible or even consciously respected—the whole machinery of the buildings and the social 
structures bound up with them set in motion a group dynamic that naturally replicated the collectivist enforcement of 
the communist regime.”  
402 Rubin, Amnesiopolis, 111-12. 
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people are working in our residential district. [Their] front gardens look like a nature 
reserve and the clothes line bars are nearly falling over because they can no longer carry 
the weight of the rust. [...] There are still comrades who refuse to help all because they are 
“overloaded with work.” […] [So] they leave the dirty work to everyone else. 404 
 
Meanwhile, people such as retirees as well as skilled tradespeople who were carrying out the 
majority of the work, the group pointed out, were struggling to complete their beautification work 
as they often lacked the materials necessary to complete the job. Although clearly unhappy with 
the level of involvement by the local functionaries, residents still felt it was necessary to band 
together and carry out the work regardless. While this group from Wohnbezirk 138 did vent its 
frustrations to the National Front directly, it is unclear what, if any, satisfactory result was 
reached. 
Nevertheless, even though at times leading to discord among neighbours, these 
beautification projects still had many positive benefits. Jan Palmowski argues that from the 
state’s perspective, these projects functioned as a form of identity creation, effectively showing 
that East Germans were “socialist citizens [who] were clean, orderly, respectful of property and 
mindful of each other’s safety.”405 Thus, repeated active commitment to these public activities – 
like those of Wohnbezirk 138 – Palmowski maintains effectively “reinforced their ‘state 
consciousness (Staatsbewußtsein) and distinguished GDR citizens from West Germans.”406  
In February 1980, National Front President Erich Correns and Vice-President Walter 
Kirchhoff framed the goal of residents using their own time to repair housing and local 
infrastructure as maintaining the momentum of the restoration and beautification initiatives that 
had been going on (in this form) for about a decade. While state-led building initiatives had 
existed from the founding of the country, the large community-led beautification projects had 
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begun in earnest in 1968 under the slogan of “Join in! Make our Cities and Communities more 
Beautiful!” “Schöner unsere Gemeinde und Städte – mach mit!” At that time, the National Front 
had wanted to remind the populace of what their communities had achieved 20 years after the 
war, but had also wanted to ensure continuous maintenance to smaller community-based 
buildings and residential projects, as well. Over a decade later, with the state deeply in debt, the 
National Front attempted to keep up these kinds of very necessary volunteer-driven projects. 
Thus, Correns pointed how beneficial it would be if everyone just kept working in the spirit of 
these past successful anniversary competitions: 
We, too, as fellow campaigners of our great socialist people’s movement, see our future 
task as making a greater contribution to the realization of the conclusions of the Ninth 
Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany through participating in the 
context of our now traditional competition “Join in! Make our Cities and Communities 
more Beautiful!” (“Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden – Mach mit!”). That is why it 
is right and necessary for Hausgemeinschaften and families to hold personal 
conversations about continuing the great initiative and activities that the National Front’s 
committees and the many members have developed over the past year about taking part in 
the new tasks at a higher level. 407 
As in the past, the National Front proposed participating in these initiatives as a way of 
strengthening the republic, which in turn, was a central aspect of securing peace in the world. 
“Therefore,” Correns went on, “the National Front must act more strongly than before through 
their persuasive efforts (Überzeugungsarbeit), to ensure that all social organizations feel 
responsible for the realization of the economic plan.”408 Of course, given the other dubious ways 
in which the state was desperately trying to find funds to service its debt, convincing 
communities to donate their time to helping each other and their community at large, was not 
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necessarily a terrible idea in principle.409 The problem was that the longer these initiatives went 
on, the less they seemed like one-off anniversary celebrations, and more like state-mandated 
volunteer work. Although socialist competitions had always been economically-based in reality, 
as time went on, these cultural competitions became more clearly about serving their economic 
purpose. 
 
Figure 36. People participating in “Schöner unsere Gemeinde und Städte – mach mit!” in 1969. Caption reads “the 
people from the 48 families of Wohnbezirk 20 in Glauchau, creating a nice street that meets all requirements from a 
dirt road” (BArch DY 6/ vorl. 6974, Scrapbook “Wettbewerbsergebnisse der Gemeinde Blumenholz” [Kreis 
Neustrelitz]) 
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Figure 37. This photo of a Hausgemeinschaft in Karl-Marx Stadt working on beautifying the grounds of their 
building captures the importance of landscaping to GDR officials during the final decade of the GDR. In this 
advertisement for “Schöner unsere Städte und Gemeinden - Mach mit!” in 1980, the caption states that in Karl-
Marx- Stadt alone, 191 hectares of hedges and flower boxes have been taken care of in residential areas and parks. 
However, the people were reminded that there were over 100 000 hectares of “green spaces” in the GDR, with a 
tenth of those existing within residential areas in their courtyards and backyards. Thus, people across the country 
were reminded that they should, in tandem with collectives like FDJ groups and others, should ensure their “green 
spaces” were taken care of (Neues Deutschland, “Blumenrabatten vor der Haustür: ‘Mach mit!’ - Initiative zur 
Gestaltung von Grünflächen,” 7. August 1980, p. 2). 
 
 
“Schöner unsere Gemeinde und Städte – mach mit!” View from a Hausgemeinschaft in 
1979 
 
The inside view from the Hausgemeinschaft of Halbarstädter Straße 2 in the city of Halle 
tells us a great deal about what the socialist competitions looked like at the lowest level of 
organizing during the final decade of the GDR. Firstly, the clear divisions between the Aktion as 
they appeared from above did not exist on the bottom level: communities took on many different 
national, regional, and local socialist competitions during their whole year of carrying out “good 
deeds” in honour of their socialist state.  As a result, the work of the people at the 
Hausgemeinschaft level was very practical. Based on an overall goal set by their local National 
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Front Kreis committee, individual families would carry out tasks such as making small repairs in 
order to preserve the value of their buildings, to add “comfort” to their living spaces; and to 
ensure that their living spaces maintained a high level of order, cleanliness and security, all so 
that their living spaces contributed to the maintenance of their “socialist environment.”410  
During 1979, in honour of “Schöner unsere Gemeinde und Städte – mach mit!” the 
members of the Hausgemeinschaft on Halbarstädter Straße refurbished 10 living rooms, painted 
and varnished several dozen window frames and doors, fixed 35 locks and lights, completely 
renovated the building garage, and fixed their clothes lines with help from their neighbours in 
another building. The residents also put much time and effort into fixing up their large building 
courtyard: they painted benches, tables, play structures, fences and put new sand in the sandbox 
for the children.411  
These small specific tasks were carried out by families as part of their contribution to 
making their socialist home a better place. A broad range of activities were considered part of the 
initiative: for example, the Eckert family donated 400 ml of blood, volunteered for the local 
elections, purchased four posters for the 30th anniversary of the GDR, spent 10 hours renovating 
their living room and two hours painting their bathroom and basement windows, donated three 
hours of time to a community initiative in Leninpark and participated in a further eight hours of 
scrap collection for their residential district. For their fellow residents, the Eckert family changed 
light switches in the corridors and cleaned the courtyard.412 Other work volunteered by other 
families included the Wald family donating 10 Marks to the people of Vietnam, designing flower 
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Hausversammlung zu Ehren des 30. Jahrestages der DDR.” Approx. end of September, 1979, p. 5-6. 
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boxes for the building courtyard, and refurbishing a room for their 80-year-old parents.413 The 
Knobloch family of the Hausgemeinschaft donated a lot of time to helping residents of 
neighbouring Hausgemeinschaften with odd jobs like painting, helping with moving and fixing 
locks. The Knobloch family also helped their neighbour Frau Kothe, carrying coal and wood 
upstairs for her in the winter, washing her curtains, fixing her stove, and helping her with small 
repairs such as for her radio.414 
Beyond the work in their own and neighbouring buildings, the residents of Halbarstädter 
Straße 2 also contributed to work for their region, participating in their residential district 
(Wohnbezirksausschuß) meetings and taking part in friendly competitions within their district. 
For example, it was their Hausgemeinschaft’s idea for families to make contracts with a VEB to 
ensure the upkeep of the 1300m2  area of their neighbourhood park on Leninallee. They also 
donated time helping neighbouring Hausgemeinschaften, such as by assisting two families with 
moving and renovating two apartments.415 By the end of 1979, the residents planned to create a 
lane for their garbage containers and a paved path in the courtyard, as well as to prepare to 
support the initiatives of the residential district in achieving its own economic initiatives for the 
following year.416 Additional regional activities the group anticipated participating in included 
cultural events of the region, such as every event of the “Wir und unser Wohngebiet – wir bitten 
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zum Tanz” local initiative including the next two dances in October and December 1979, as well 




What began in the 1960s as simple beautification campaigns, during the 1970s and into 
the 1980s grew into ongoing large-scale “Mach mit!” initiatives. In contrast to some of the earlier 
cultural campaigns, these economic initiatives were entirely practical in nature: people would 
donate labour, skills, and time to upkeep their homes, apartments, residential areas, parks, streets, 
clubs, and local restaurants/inns/pubs – thus saving the already financially struggling state money 
while at the same time keeping up the appearance that the GDR actually had the money to spend 
on such projects.  
By April 1989, the state claimed that this focus on housing had resulted in a total of more 
than 3.2 million homes being rebuilt or reconstructed, amounting to nearly 350,000 in Berlin 
alone.418 The Central Committee of the SED was proud of this achievement, given that in 
October 1973, its stated goal had been to build or modernize a total of 2.8 to 3 million dwellings 
in the GDR between 1976 and 1990, something which the SED claimed had already been 
surpassed by 1989. Of course, the constant labour ordinary people donated to remodeling the 
houses certainly helped the state in achieving such results.419 
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Conclusion to Socialist Competitions  
 
In the GDR, socialist competitions were a part of daily life for everyone from factory 
workers to agricultural workers, from artists, to children. During major anniversary years, the 
National Front organized special competitions in the months leading up to the anniversary itself. 
These competitions consisted of economic competitions in which all industries participated in 
order to increase production and get ahead of their yearly economic plan, as well as cultural 
competitions, in which participation was more voluntary and usually required some creative 
desire and skill.   
From the state’s perspective, these campaigns were necessary and vital to not only its 
economic success, but to the state’s success as a whole: for it was through the cultural campaigns 
that the state could drive home its ideological message: not only was the state seeking to 
convince people of the existence of a new East German identity, distinct from the capitalist West 
and opposed to the threat the “imperialists” posed for the safety of Europe and the world, it was 
also seeking to make the close connection between the GDR and Soviet people seem both natural 
and necessary. Then there was the economic aspect of the competitions, which not only sought to  
improve on the inherent disadvantages in the centrally planned economy, but also to reinforce the 
idea that East Germany could be every bit as successful as West Germany in providing its people 
with both consumer goods and a social safety net, thereby “catching up to and overtaking the 
West.” Over time, however, the GDR did not only not overtake nor catch up to the West, but fell 
further and further behind, at which point the socialist competitions devolved into desperate face-
saving measures, particularly in the case of the beautification projects: for with the people 
working to save the crumbling cities, the GDR’s financial straits did not appear to be dire from 
either outside or within.   
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Although their purpose and design remained much the same over the years, by the late 
1960s, a subtle shift in Berlin’s perspective on its role in tightly controlling its ideological 
messaging had begun to emerge. In 1957, Berlin was particularly insistent on the uniformity of 
its national competitions and paid close attention to how the competitions were unfolding 
themselves in the regions. Indeed, Berlin representatives pored over regional newspaper 
advertisements in exhaustive detail in 1964 – reading every last word and sentence of 70 different 
daily newspapers for months – in order to assess the efforts these localities were making in 
engaging the population in their socialist competitions. In these years, if the Berlin National Front 
sensed a region was diverging from their instructions, it would intervene by directly contacting 
the wayward locality in order to guide it to a “successful outcome,” i.e. widespread popular 
participation in the initiatives.  However, by 1969, a subtle tolerance began to emerge in Berlin’s 
views of its own role and power. Not only did the centre feel confident enough in the periphery 
by 1969 to entrust it with an extremely complex competition that would require great 
organizational skill, it did not largely interfere with regional divergences from the central 
message when they emerged. This did not mean that Berlin held any less tightly to the reins of 
power, but rather, that Berlin had determined over time that a lighter touch would be more 
effective. As a result, direct interventions became less frequent than previously. However, the 
Berlin National Front nevertheless remained obsessed with knowing every last detail about the 
popular participation in all events, and so turned to sending out its own representatives to 
individual localities to get opinions of officials on the ground, as well as attend the grand 
openings of events such as exhibitions, for example, to assess the organization of the events for 
itself (thereby bypassing the filter of the local committees).   
Although local groups did not have complete autonomy in their competitions since they 
had to report back to their superiors, the truth was that Berlin was remote enough that these 
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ground-level day-to-day actions were often designed and decided on by those at the lowest levels 
by the 1970s. As long as the local competitions contained some reference to the anniversary 
theses themes (even if they only paid lip-service to it) and contained some major elements of 
Berlin’s own suggestions, as long as these localities succeeded in getting widespread 
participation (or even better, excitement) from the public, Berlin in these later years was satisfied 




GDR Anniversary Commemorations: A Conclusion 
Siegfried Wittenburg, reflecting on his factory brigade’s involvement in anniversary 
events at the time of the 25th anniversary of the GDR in 1974, recalled the changes that came 
with the state’s introduction of competitions for the title of “Socialist Labour Collective.” 
Although his brigade had previously held festivals in any form they wanted, their superiors 
informed them that they needed to earn this title so that their brigade could receive a medal and a 
bonus. All the workers needed to do, their boss told them, was create a “brigade journal” 
describing their celebrations and including photos, and then submit it to their enterprise’s 
“Competition Commission.” Importantly, however, the workers did not seem to have much of a 
choice as to whether they even wanted to participate. Upon informing them about this new 
competition, their boss asked whether anyone was opposed to it, to which, Siegfried commented, 
“No one dared to raise his hand.” To the boss’s question, “Who is in favor?” Siegfried explained,  
“All hands stretched more or less in the air.” Their boss then replied, “Okay, so I will report to 
management that the proposal was unanimously approved.” Siegfried described the rest of the 
process as an ever more tedious one:1 
In the years that followed, it became [increasingly] difficult to describe these yearly 
collective pleasures… in the reports of the Brigade journal so that we could secure the 
next collective premium. The competition tightened. Colleagues developed poetic and 
drawing talents to visually overwhelm the Competition Commission. There was a sense 
that nobody read these repetitive reports anyway. For the basic principle nevertheless 
always remained: ‘wine, woman and song’ in socialism instead of ‘sex, drugs and rock 'n' 
roll’ in capitalism. Anyone who ‘shook things up’ abused the principles of Erich 
Honecker and ran the risk of being targeted as a critic of the regime by the grey men.2 
 
                                               
1 Siegfried Wittenburg, “DDR Wettbewerb: Erst das Kollektiv der sozialistischen Arbeit, dann da Vergnügen” 
Spiegel Online, October 12, 2015. https://www.spiegel.de/einestages/ddr-auszeichnung-zum-kollektiv-der-
sozialistischen-arbeit-a-1034415.html. 
2 Wittenburg, “DDR Wettbewerb.” 
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Despite this dull exercise, Siegfried pointed out that “the brigade festivals nevertheless 
remained unforgettable.”3 Written 40 years after the fact, it is very likely that Siegfried’s 
recollection of events was negatively affected by events after the ones he describes, such as by 
the fact that by the 1980s, these competitions had become rote and repetitive, while at the same 
time the reach of the Stasi into peoples’ everyday lives had expanded markedly. What is 
nevertheless significant is the fact that Siegfried remembered the competitions as being complete 
drudgery, in comparison to the fun of the festivities – both of which were equally designed and 
formed by the state with the goal of educating the populace on their ideological anniversary 
theses. The fact that these brigade workers felt compelled to participate – even if they were not 
particularly enthusiastic about it – shows that the SED did succeed in in this respect: while the 
National Front may not necessarily have wholly convinced the populace of the narrative as told 
by their anniversary theses, by successfully encouraging people to work together to compete 
against other groups and win funds for their next “unforgettable” brigade party, they succeeded in 
getting the populace to collectively gather to celebrate the state and still form positive memories 
associated with the anniversaries. Of course, there is still the fact that they were following top-
down orders by having “fun” on the state’s terms and in a way that contributed to the state’s 
pedagogical goals. In this respect, then, such an example serves to further underscore the 
dominant role the SED played in ordinary peoples’ lives and the overbearing way in which it 
sought to control even the most local of commemorations.  
As this dissertation has sought to demonstrate, GDR anniversary commemorations were 
about much more than just anniversary festivals. For the SED and the National Front, the 
anniversaries were a chance to show the populace (and indeed the outside world as well) how 
                                               
3 Wittenburg, “DDR Wettbewerb.” 
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successful the GDR was, and to reinforce its values. In doing so, the state sought to define “being 
East German” – that is, that they were a peaceful and anti-fascist society, distinct from the West 
German capitalists, friendly with the Soviets, but still possessing their own new “socialist 
identity.” The theses characterized this identity as one upholding gender and class equality, as 
well as a focus on youth, the arts and culture, and one that promoted education and scientific 
research. A further advantage, the theses argued, were the vast social benefits Honecker provided 
in the 1970s through his “unity of social and economic policy,” such as the five-day work week, 
subsidized consumer goods, childcare and transport, great pensions, and an ever-increasing 
minimum wage. Then, of course, there was the fact that they were the only Germany that was 
“ruled by the working class,” i.e. the SED. While we cannot say for certain what parts of this new 
identity (if any) were actually internalized by the populace, we can say that this is what the state 
desperately wanted the National Front to convey in the anniversary commemorations.  
The National Front, in creating the types of competitions and festivities it did, attempted 
to communicate all of the SED’s lofty and albeit impossibly theoretical perspectives to the East 
German populace at large in order to create a new East German identity. Though it did not create 
the anniversary theses themselves, the national and regional National Front committees proved 
obedient intermediaries, always ready to find new ways to help East Germans absorb the SED’s 
ideological messages. In this respect, this study also sheds light on the inner workings of the 
National Front: an oft intangible and ill-understood web of state organizations. It was not just a 
body that only came into force for “elections;” rather, this study has demonstrated that it played a 
very real and very important part of the governing state apparatus. Indeed, the SED entrusted the 
National Front and its constituent committees with one of the state’s most important tasks: that of 
disseminating the Party’s ideology and rallying popular support for it. This is significant because 
there is no evidence that the Berlin National Front was operating under any oversight from the 
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SED’s Central Committee. Instead, they received their directives directly from the propaganda 
wing of the SED Central Committee. 
By looking at the way in which the Berlin National Front planned these festivities – 
which became ever less detailed as time went on, increasingly relying on the ingenuity of the 
regional National Front committees – we can get a fascinating insight into the way in which the 
centre viewed the periphery: mainly as ever-resourceful and ultimately, very capable of figuring 
out the practicalities of arranging very complex competitions, cultural events, and festivities. 
Despite the commemorations’ overall “success,” there were often large differences in the quality, 
scope, and participation in the projects across the country. However, as this work shows, a major 
barrier to successfully carrying out a competition or festival was that the communication between 
different National Front organizations could often be poor or non-existent both laterally and 
vertically. While Berlin could certainly reprimand the lower levels for their inefficiencies, they 
could not actually control them. In fact, even when the Berlin committees provided clear and 
detailed instructions, the organizers on the ground often did not strictly adhere to them, and 
proceeded to carry out the initiatives in a way that they felt made sense to their local situation and 
audience. This appears to be the case because many organizers genuinely did want to celebrate 
the GDR and brighten up their communities and there is no evidence of subterfuge. These lower 
level (often volunteer) organizers were not necessarily the most committed ideologues, but rather, 
pragmatic ordinary people who simply did what they thought was necessary to organize events 
on the ground level as best they could, given the time and financial constraints they had to work 
with. There is certainly no evidence of committees suffering harsh consequences for not carrying 
out a competition very well. When Berlin disapproved of a local committee’s anniversary 
preparations, they would either sternly explain to the local committee what they were doing 
wrong and unfavourably compare them to other regions that had done well, or as in the case of 
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the socialist competitions of 1977 and 1979, send out representatives to attempt to salvage the 
competition. Berlin seems to have taken the view that these instances were a chance for 
improvement and evidence of areas in which further “ideological work” (i.e. convincing the 
populace of the state’s narrative) needed to be carried out.   
Also vital were the midlevel functionaries who enabled this communication between the 
top and bottom levels of the state apparatus. While the National Front itself existed amongst a 
web of organizational structures in the GDR, the National Front’s smooth functioning was also 
dependent on further webs of committees from the national level all the way to the 
Hausgemeinschaft level. In the case of anniversary commemorations, while Berlin translated the 
goals of the SED Central Committee from its theoretical levels into more manageable anniversary 
plans, Berlin itself neither implemented, nor directly oversaw the anniversary celebrations. 
Although there were Berlin National Front functionaries who would often keep an obsessively 
close eye on the proceedings in many of the regions, it was the responsibility of varying levels of 
mid-tier officials to translate these goals and indeed make sure that the lower levels were not only 
provided with anniversary plans, but that they also would make decisions to further intercede 
with the local organization if need be. Although Berlin could also become involved, it was not a 
norm, and indeed Berlin only seemed to do so as a last-ditch effort to salvage the 
commemoration in a particular region/locality.  
Most of the time, those who interceded were mid-tier officials at the Bezirk or Kreis level, 
with varying degrees of responsibility. These people were the vital “cogs” in the SED machine, 
for it was they who kept it running. Neither the SED nor the National Front in Berlin designed 
the majority of commemorations in any detail and the anniversary celebrations and competitions 
were certainly not spontaneously designed from below. Indeed, in some ways, mid-tier officials 
possessed less power than those at the very top of the state apparatus who designed the 
 
 318 
anniversary commemorations, as well as less than those at the bottom who actually implemented 
the anniversary plans. However, this middling-role also made these officials more powerful 
because while they could neither make decisions down to the last detail in preparing the 
festivities or competitions, nor dictate the content of theses, their roles as intermediaries 
reinforced GDR power structures by keeping the state’s propaganda flowing from the top, while 
at the same time ensuring the peoples’ acquiescence to the regime kept up by reporting local 
successes back up the chain. In this sense then, the SED in Berlin was totally reliant on these 
officials, for its anniversary commemorations certainly could not have existed in same way 
without them. Without these intermediaries, the top level could not have maintained its very 
hands off approach, rather, a far closer involvement with the organizers at the lowest of levels 
would have been required, taking up much valuable time.  
By looking at these lines of communication between the multi-layered committee 
structure, we can get a sense of how the careful design of the anniversary commemorations 
transformed along its journey from its beginnings as themes of the SED Central Committee, to its 
manifestation on the lowest of ground levels, down to the nature of the decorations at a local 
kindergarten, or of a Hausgemeinschaft volunteer replacing the lightbulbs in a stairwell. In 
exploring these banalities, we can come to appreciate how incredibly important the socialist 
competitions were to the state. Although people only remembered the parades, the extremely 
varied socialist competitions were one of the major ways in which the state sought to bring 
people onside their ideological messages, such as the necessity of close Soviet-GDR relations.  
Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to underscore just how important the anniversary 
commemorations were for the GDR, for they were a key element of the SED’s efforts to educate 
the population about their new socialist state. Like the new France after the Revolution and the 
Soviets after the Russian Revolution, the GDR needed to break with the horrors of recent German 
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history and distinguish itself from the new West German state. In the beginning, the SED’s 
solution was to tie itself to the Soviet past instead (which had had to go through the same process 
itself in 1917, breaking with symbols of imperial Russia) and create a reason for its citizens to 
form bonds with Soviet ones. At the same time, the anniversary theses criticize the ways in which 
the new West German state did not constitute such a break with the Nazi past. By the 1960s, the 
anniversary theses reflected this pride in the GDR’s accomplishments as an independence state 
and sought to convince the populace of their new-found success and growing sense of identity. 
As was made clear in the theses, the GDR was striving to create both internal and external 
legitimacy. Particularly before the Wall was built, it was important for the SED to create internal 
legitimacy, so as to attempt to convince the people of the GDR to stay and thus stem the flow of 
people across the border into the West. However, since people stopped fleeing after the Wall was 
put up, the SED’s creation of internal legitimacy became much more about convincing the people 
of the GDR that they were part of a greater ideal, in order to assuage their feelings of being 
trapped. For, in the early 1960s, far more important to the SED was attaining external legitimacy 
in the world at large. This was something that was in evidence at the 1964 celebrations in honour 
of the 15th anniversary, where one goal was attracting western visitors to come see what the GDR 
had achieved. Although this external legitimacy did not develop immediately, the opening up of 
relations between East and West through the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972 and the GDR’s 
joining of the UN in 1974 underscored that the international community was prepared to accept 
the state’s permanency. Indeed, as time went on, although internally the GDR was struggling 
economically, this was never obvious to the outside world.  Internally, in later years, the GDR 
anniversary theses even became even more confident and emphasized the clear superiority of 
socialism – proven by not only their economic successes,  but also by the very generous social 
policies that benefitted the entire population during this time. Despite imminent economic 
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collapse by the 1980s, the SED began to diverge even more from reality and doubled down on 
their previous themes in their anniversary theses about their international acclaim and economic 
prowess, asserting the stability and prosperity of their state. 
It is difficult to say whether these socialist competitions actually achieved their dual 
purposes of further convincing people of the state ideology as well as helping to get the economic 
plans further ahead. On the one hand, while people certainly did participate in these competitions, 
it is not clear whether they did so as a result of any real ideological convictions, out of a desire to 
help the community, whether the rote nature of the commemorations eventually set in, if there 
was a fear of reprisal from the Stasi, or whether their reasons changed depending on the initiative. 
Much of it could also have been a result of the social pressures to conform. For example, during 
the 1960s, the populace seemed very interested in the local beautification campaigns, if only to 
finally clean up the still existent rubble of the war – though, after 20 years of continuous 
campaigns, it is not difficult to imagine that enthusiasm could have worn thin. The fact that 
people participated nevertheless tells us that they accepted the way things were, even if they did 
not agree with them. 
Given the high number of celebrations that took place, it is very likely that most East 
Germans participated in the commemorative anniversary events over time, even if it was merely 
in the form of attending a sporting event or helping to decorate a street. Although too many 
events existed for the state to possibly insist on East Germans attending every one, it ultimately 
does not matter, since the uniformity with which all events were designed meant that it is highly 
likely every individual East German was exposed to the state’s ideological anniversary message 
at some point. While individuals attending one commemorative event over another meant that 
they might not have attended the ones mostly closely curated to their interests, choosing one 
event over another in no way meant being exposed to a diluted or different message and as such, 
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posed no threat to the state’s stability. Thus, having “fun” at a GDR anniversary commemoration 
invariably meant engaging with the anniversary theses, whether they were overtly present or not. 
An interesting case that demonstrates the effectiveness of a less overt theses presence in 
anniversary activities is that of the “Meinem besten Freund” Aktion held in honour of the 60th 
Anniversary of the October Revolution. Internal reports show 1.4 million people attending 62 
859 exhibits, and a total of 23 138 people producing 266 695 objects4 – a surge of popular 
interest that genuinely surprised organizers in the regions as well as in Berlin. No other national 
Aktion seemed to attract this kind of interest, likely because others were not as accessible as 
“Meinem Besten Freund.” While ostensibly as ideologically pedagogical as the rest of the 
socialist competitions, “Meinem besten Freund” differed in that many regional organizers 
decided to also accept non-ideological, non-political submissions. That this decision resulted in 
higher participation numbers is clear: those regions which accepted any submissions at all – even 
poorly crafted ones –  reported higher participation numbers and thus better “results” than the 
regions that refused to do the same.  
When looking at anniversaries from the angle of the development of a collective identity 
(that of the “new East German”), the current study helps us understand the ways in which 
collective identities and “consciousnesses” are formed and how they can be used as an instrument 
of social control. Nowhere is this clearer than in the examples of festivities held in 1964 in 
Sonneberg and Langewiesen in Bezirk Suhl, which, while providing us with a glimpse into what 
these festivals looked like at the lowest levels, also shows us that intricately involved state 
ideology was central to even the most simple of community-inspired festivities. The fact is that 
the National Front attempted to carefully manipulate people into participating, not only through 
                                               
4 BArch, DY 6/ 1031, “Information über die Kreisaustellungen ‘Meinem besten Freund’ anläßlich des 60. 
Jahrestages der Großen Sozialistischen Oktoberrevolution,” undated (likely Nov 1977), p. 2-4. 
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the ideological propaganda in the form of flyers, newspaper articles and discussions, but also in 
the way in which it conceived of and organized these festivities and competitions. Delegating the 
organizing to the local committees who would be sure to create events relevant to the community 
was certainly a calculating way of inserting a political meaning into everyday collective 
activities.  
In addition, crafting many of the anniversary appeals to participate as not only of benefit 
to the state at large, but also as a way of donating time to improve one’s community, was a very 
powerful motivator. For it is much easier to set aside any abstract opposition to the state 
leadership and volunteer to decorate and clean up one’s neighbourhood, than to refuse on 
principle and possibly become a social pariah. For example, even though the 1975 radio show 
competition “Troika der Freundschaft,” was ostensibly asking for individual submissions, by 
broadcasting them far and wide, the National Front made it a communal event with the goal of 
creating bonds by sharing personal experiences, even if they were at odds with the listeners’ own 
experiences. The fact was that the state continuously sought to create community spirit by 
pushing many people to work across organizations and communities and forge bonds they might 
not otherwise have had the opportunity to form. In this way then, community competitions could 
be said to have acted as a kind of substitute for voting, as people could contribute in a very real 
way to the upkeep of their state, including by helping to achieve the economic plans.  
On the other hand, however, there was a darker side to these commemorations that went 
beyond creating community spirit, and that was how far the state went to promote its vision of 
East Germany to the population. As demonstrated in the introductory chapter, advancing a 
particular agenda and seeking to create a distinct identity is something common to all states, 
which the country’s leadership reinforces and communicates to their population in various ways. 
However, in the case of the GDR, the leadership clearly sought to strictly control its message 
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down to the individual East German. Although local National Front committees did have some 
power to determine how best to organize anniversary events at the ground level, they did not have 
the same power with respect to the theses themselves. The SED Politburo’s propaganda wing 
created them and there was no room for an alternative narrative. For example, although many 
East Germans had negative views of the Soviets given all they endured while under Soviet 
occupation, there was no space in which this negative narrative could be expressed. Given that 
one of the main pillars of the state’s legitimacy was its firm “friendship” with the Soviet Union, 
the state would not allow any kind of discourse to creep into the anniversary commemorations 
that depicted negative experiences of the Soviet Union, nor did it even try to provide a rationale 
for the brutality of the Soviet occupation – such as the even more brutal Nazi invasion of the 
Soviet Union – instead preferring to rewrite history and pretend it had not happened at all. 
Although less-than-positive opinions often came up in theses discussion forums, rather than 
acknowledge or incorporate these opinions, it was the duty of the local National Front 
committees to counteract them in an effort to convince East Germans of the state’s point of view. 
The same can be said for the increasingly difficult housing situation in the GDR: rather than 
acknowledge the problem and admit that the state’s financial difficulties were resulting in a lack 
of good housing options, the state, through the anniversary competitions, sought to deny that the 
supposedly thriving GDR was struggling economically, and instead attempted to save face by 
convincing residents that it was their duty as East Germans to repair their own neighbourhoods. 
In effect, the state was in a decades-long battle of legitimizing itself by convincing people at 
home and abroad through their anniversaries commemorations that the GDR had much to offer 
its citizens in the past, present and future – certainly much more to offer than the alternative, the 





Select mass organizations of the GDR: 
Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands (DFD): Democratic Women’s League of Germany 
Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund der DDR (DTSB): German Gymnastics and Sports Federation 
Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ): Free German Youth 
Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB): Free German Trade Union Federation 
Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft (DSF): Society for German–Soviet  
Friendship 
Kulturbund (KB): Cultural Association of the DDR 
Pionierorganisation Ernst Thälmann: Ernst Thälmann Pioneer Organization 
Verband der Kleingärtner, Siedler und Kleintierzüchter (VKSK): Association of Gardeners,  
Settlers, and Small Animal Breeders 
Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe (VdgB): Farmers’ Mutual Aid Association 
Volkssolidarität (VS): People’s Solidarity 
 
Terms: 
Bezirk: state/province  
Kreis: county 
Gemeinde: region (smaller than a county) 
Wohnbezirk: residential area  
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Figure 38: Source: Deutschen Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Verbindung mit dem Staatsverlag der Deutschen Republik, eds., 
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Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde  
Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO)  
DY 6    Nationalrat der Nationalen Front der DDR 
  Politische Massenarbeit 
  Bedeutende Jubiläen und Gedenktage 
DY 30   Zentralkomitee der SED  
  Büro Egon Krenz 
  Büro Kurt Hager 
  Protokolle des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei  
Deutschlands 
DR 1    Ministerium für Kultur 
   Büros der Minister Abusch, Bentzien und Gysi 
DR 105 Büro für nationale Jubiläen und kulturelle Gedenktage beim Ministerium für Kultur 
 
Landesarchiv, Berlin  
C Rep. 902 Bezirksleitung Berlin der SED 
C Rep. 149 Rat des Stadtbezirks Berlin-Pankow 
C Rep. 147 Rat des Stadtbezirks Berlin-Lichtenberg  
C Rep. 146 Rat des Stadtbezirks Berlin-Köpenick 
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